political system of kazakhstan essay

The Political System of Kazakhstan

• First Online: 21 September 2024

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• Hélène Thibault 3 &
• Sabina Insebayeva 3  

Part of the book series: Contributions to Political Science ((CPS))

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This chapter outlines the evolution of the Kazakh political system since independence in 1991. We review its early constitutional arrangements and the creation of its representative institutions in light of the power struggles that resulted in the consolidation of power around the figure of the first Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991–2019). We also discuss the protests that occurred in January 2022 and the violent repression that left more than 200 people dead, which have together shown the extent of popular discontent and the willingness of the authorities to use force to quell it. How did these protests impact the reconfiguration of power under the presidency of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev? Finally, we also elaborate on Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the delicate balance of power in the region. The chapter also accounts for the most recent shifts in regional politics due to the war’s impact.

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This particular date was chosen to commemorate the 1986 Zheltoksan (“December” in Kazakh) events during which Almaty residents protested against the nomination of a new secretary general of the Communist Party of the Kazakhstani Soviet Socialist Republic (KazSSR), who was a Russian.

According to the Law “On the State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan” dated December 16, 1991a , b ), as well as the Law “On the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan” dated June 5, 1992, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan was the supreme judicial body that ensured the supremacy of the Constitution.

The first chairman of the first constitutional court was Murat Baimakhanov.

Following Nursultan Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019, interim president Tokayev unilaterally decided to rename Astana Nur-Sultan to honor the first president, a move that infuriated the majority of citizens. Following Nazarbayev’s sidelining after January 2022, the capital regained its original name in the spring of 2022.

The permanent members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Türkiye, while Hungary and Turkmenistan have observer status. Ukraine, citing the presence of the Crimean Tatars on its territory, expressed the wish to join the organization as an observer country.

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Thibault, H., Insebayeva, S. (2024). The Political System of Kazakhstan. In: Lempp, J., Mayer, S. (eds) Central Asia in a Multipolar World. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-63727-8_3

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• Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook - Kazakhstan
• Kazakhstan - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
• Kazakhstan - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)
• Table Of Contents

Kazakhstan’s first postindependence constitution was adopted in 1993, replacing the Soviet-era constitution that had been in force since 1978; a new constitution was approved in 1995. The 1995 constitution provided for legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government dominated by a strong executive. Amendments to this constitution in 2017 reduced executive authority and granted the legislature additional checks on executive power. Additional amendments in 2022 further reduced presidential power, including the reestablishment of a constitutional court and the guarantee of greater independence for local leaders.

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Kazakhstan is a unitary republic with a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate and an Assembly (Mazhilis). Working jointly, the two chambers have the authority to amend the constitution, approve the budget, ratify treaties, and declare war; each chamber also has exclusive powers. Legislators serve four-year terms. Two members of the Senate are elected from each oblast and major city by all legislative members of that administrative unit, with the exception of several appointed by the president. Ninety-eight members of the Assembly are elected from population-based constituencies by universal adult suffrage.

The president is the head of state and is directly elected for a maximum of one seven-year term. The president appoints the prime minister and other ministers of the cabinet, as well as the chairperson of the National Security Committee, most of whom are then confirmed by the legislature; the foreign minister, minister of defense, and minister of internal affairs are appointed without requiring legislative consent. The president serves as commander in chief of the armed forces and is responsible for the country’s foreign relations .

The highest judicial body is the Supreme Judicial Council, and there also are a number of lower courts; a Constitutional Court, the members of which are appointed by the president and legislature, reviews constitutional questions. Judges serve life terms and are appointed by the president, with those of the Supreme Court also subject to confirmation by the legislature.

The constitution specifies a number of rights of the citizens of Kazakhstan, including freedom of speech , religion , and movement. Citizens have the right to work, to own property, and to form trade unions. Despite the democratic language in the constitutions of 1993 and 1995, in the early years of independence Kazakhstan became increasingly authoritarian . The country’s first parliamentary elections (1994) were declared illegal by what was then the Constitutional Court. This precipitated the drafting of the 1995 constitution, which expanded the already substantial powers granted to the president by the 1993 constitution. In 2017 a set of amendments reduced the role of the presidency and granted greater authority to the parliament. Amendments enacted in 2022 also advanced the independence of the parliament and the judiciary from the presidency.

Kazakhstan possesses a small army, air force , and navy. During the Soviet period a vast nuclear arsenal was stationed in Kazakh territory. Kazakhstan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993, however, and by 1995 it had dismantled or returned to Russia all of its inherited warheads. Since 1994 the country has been a full member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance closely associated with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Kazakhstan moved to profoundly influence the future course of education in 1989 when it declared Kazakh the official language of the republic, though in the 1995 constitution Russian was also officially acknowledged. Prior to independence, Russian generally served as the language of government and of education in the Kazakh S.S.R. Many younger Kazakhs, educated entirely in Russian, scarcely knew the traditional language of their people. The shift to the Kazakh language affected classroom instruction, textbooks, newspapers, and such media as television and cinema, all of which contribute to public education. The process of conversion to Kazakh-oriented communication began immediately and greatly affected the educational system. Few Russians speak and write Kazakh well. Implicit in the change has been the necessity for teachers to have a fluent knowledge of Kazakh, a requirement that tends to remove Slavic personnel from the elementary and secondary classrooms for Kazakh children. In addition, the number of schools dedicated to education in Kazakh has increased, while the number of Russian-language schools has declined. Nevertheless, Russian remains widely in use.

A major reorganization of the curricula and redesign of textbooks began in the years after 1989. The study of Kazakh history, literature, and culture , long slighted in general education, now receives appropriate attention in school curricula. The institutes in the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences (founded 1946) focus their research on subjects important to Kazakhstan, in science as well as in the humanities. The renunciation of Marxist-Leninist ideology in Kazakhstan has freed scholars from the restrictions that hampered their research and interpretation of findings. Many serious works long proscribed by communist censors have appeared in print for the first time or after many years of being out of print.

In addition to the Academy of Sciences, higher educational institutions include the Kazakh al-Farabi State National University, Qaraghandy State University, and a number of polytechnical, agricultural, veterinary, and other facilities in Almaty . Medical and teachers’ institutes function in Qaraghandy, and different institutions can be found at other regional centres. A network of vocational schools offers specialized secondary and technical training.

Housing, medical care, and other services are inadequate, despite large outlays by municipalities and the republic to keep up with the expanding population. Housing and other shortages exacerbate ethnic tension between Kazakhs, Russians, Uighurs, and other city dwellers, tensions that equitable distribution can partly alleviate .

Rates of infant and maternal morbidity and mortality, though lower than in other Central Asian republics, are far higher in Kazakhstan than in Western countries because of an unbalanced diet, environmental pollution , and inadequate prenatal care. Life expectancy is low compared with the West. Although sanatoriums and hospitals exist in many locations, they dispense a level of medical care far below that considered standard in the West.

Public health suffers greatly in heavily industrialized areas, such as Qaraghandy province, because Soviet authorities never seriously made environmental protection a high priority. In the vicinity of the Aral Sea , and especially in Qyzylorda (Kzyl-Orda) and Aqtöbe provinces, Kazakhs suffer from the pollution and salinization of the sea. Its waters are contaminated with pesticides, especially DDT, and with chemical fertilizer fed into it by various rivers. The contraction of the Aral Sea has left a toxic dust in the newly formed salt flats, leading to respiratory disorders and other health problems. In Qyzylorda province the toxic emissions from rocket launches and related activities in the Baikonur Cosmodrome near Tyuratam introduced additional industrial pollution into the area. But the most serious general health problems in Kazakhstan arise from the widespread radiation poisoning of the soil, food products, and water sources of eastern Kazakhstan, especially Semey province, where the Soviet military command for decades exposed almost one million people to nuclear weapons testing . Birth defects, cancer, and other illnesses related to radiation poisoning occur with unusual frequency among people in the region. These severe health hazards led the cultural and medical intelligentsia of Kazakhstan to organize mass demonstrations to protest the continued poisoning of Kazakhstan by nuclear testing and development in adjacent sites in Lop Nor in northwestern China after Soviet nuclear tests in eastern Kazakhstan had ceased.

Official website of the

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

• State of the nation address

Republic of Kazakhstan

The republic of kazakhstan.

The Republic of Kazakhstan is a unitary state with the presidential system of government. Under the Constitution, Kazakhstan is a democratic, secular, legal and social state which recognizes the man, his life, rights and freedoms as the supreme values of the country.

Kazakhstan gained independence on December 16, 1991. Astana is the capital city of the country. Kazakh language is the official language of Kazakhstan. The Russian language has the status of the language of interethnic communication. The unit of currency used in Kazakhstan is tenge.

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the head of state, the highest political official, who determines the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the country and represents Kazakhstan on the international arena. The President is a symbol and guarantor of the national unity and the state power, inviolability of the Constitution, as well as the rights and freedoms of an individual and citizen.

The Government implements executive powers, heads the system of executive bodies and exercises supervision of their activity.

The Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan performs legislative functions and consists of two Chambers acting on a permanent basis: the Senate and the Majilis.

The Senate is composed of deputies, two of whom represent each region of the country, as well as the cities of the national significance and the capital of Kazakhstan. Ten deputies of the Senate are appointed by the President, five of them by the proposal of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan.

The Majilis consists of 98 deputies. The term of the powers of Senate deputies is six years; term of the powers of the Majilis deputies is five years.

The country is divided into 17 administrative zones and has 3 cities of national significance.

The population of Kazakhstan exceeds 20 million people. The ethnic composition of the population according to the results of the National Population Census of 2021 is as follows: Kazakhs – 70.4%, Russians – 15.5%, Uzbeks – 3.2%, Ukrainians – 2%, Uyghurs – 1.5%, Germans – 1.2%, Tatars – 1.1%, Azerbaijanis – 0.8%, Koreans – 0.6%, Turks – 0.5%, Dungans – 0.4%, Belarusians – 0.4%, Tajiks – 0.3%, Kurds – 0.3%, Poles – 0.2%, Kyrgyz – 0.2%, Chechens – 0.2%, other nationalities –1.4%.

Covering an area of 2.724 million square kilometers, the country has the ninth largest territory in the world. In the north and the west, the country shares border with Russia (7,591 km), with China in the east (1,783 km), with Kyrgyzstan (1,242 km), with Uzbekistan (2,351 km) and Turkmenistan (426 km) in the south. The total length of land border of Kazakhstan with other states amounts to 13,200 km.

Kazakhstan is the largest land locked country in the world. Most part of the country accounts for the desert - 44% and semi-deserts - 14%. Steppes occupy 26% of Kazakhstan’s territory, while forests - only 5.5%. There are 8,500 rivers in the country. The Northeastern part of the Caspian Sea is a part of the country. The Aral Sea is divided between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, there are 48,000 large and small lakes, among which are Balkhash, Zaisan and Alakol. The remoteness of the country from the oceans determine the continental climate of the country.

There are more than 5,000 deposits of mineral resources in the country, the estimated cost of which is said to be tens of trillions of dollars. The country is ranked first in the world on explored reserves of zinc, tungsten and barite, second – on silver, lead and chromites, third – on copper and fluorite, fourth - on molybdenum, and sixth - on gold.

Kazakhstan also has significant oil and gas resources and holds the 9th place in the world in proven oil reserves, most of which are located in the western regions. In addition, the country’s uranium and coal deposits are the 2nd and the 8th largest in the world respectively.

Kazakhstan is among the world’s top ten exporters of grain and is one of the leaders in flour export. Nearly 70% of arable land in the north of the country is occupied by grain and industrial crops - wheat, barley, millet. Rice, cotton, and tobacco are cultivated in the south of the country. Kazakhstan is also famous for its gardens, vineyards and melons. Livestock farming is another leading area of agriculture in the country.

Since independence in 1991, per capita GDP has increased 20-fold – from US $700 to US $14,000. According to the British experts, out of 25 of the most dynamic economies of the first decade of the 21st century Kazakhstan is ranked third, leaving behind China and Qatar. According to the World Bank, the country has joined the group of countries with above-average income.

Over the years of independence, Kazakhstan attracted US$ 200 billion of foreign investment, accounting for nearly 70% of the total volume of foreign investments in Central Asia. Foreign exchange reserves of the country at the beginning of June 2015 amounted to about US$98 billion, of which more than US$ 69 billion are a part of the National Fund.

In the World Bank and IFC’s Doing Business 2014 survey, Kazakhstan was ranked the 50th. In the ranking of global competitiveness of the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in 2015 the country took the 34th place, ahead of Spain, Turkey, Italy and many other countries.

Kazakhstan exports mining products, fuel, energy, the products of metallurgical and chemical industries, along with grain. The main trade partners of the country are Russia, China, Europe and the CIS states.

To diversify its economy, the country has successfully implemented a Programme of Accelerated Industrial and Innovative development, stipulating the modernization of the old enterprises and opening of the new ones.

At the moment, Kazakhstan is implementing a large-scale project titled “New Silk Road” that envisions the revival of the country’s historical role as the major bridge between the two continents. It is also planned to transform the country into the largest business and transit hub of the region.

At the same time, a large-scale social modernization programme is being carried out in the country implying the construction of new schools, vocational colleges and universities, opening of modern medical clinics and hospitals, improvement of the system of social support.

Currently, the country is home to 130 ethnic groups, and has a successfully functioning advisory body on harmonization of interethnic relations - the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. In Astana, the Congresses of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions are held regularly.

As a leader in Central Asia, the country is making a significant contribution to stability in the region. The country has made great strides on the global stage, which is proved by the presidency of Kazakhstan in the OSCE Summit held in Astana in December 2010. Another significant initiative was the launch of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Asian analogue of the OSCE. Kazakhstan’s activities as the chairman of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the leading organization of the Islamic world got positive feedback from the international community. The country is a well-established leader in the global anti-nuclear movement.

Kazakhstan is a member state of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The basis of Kazakhstan’s prosperity is the stable growth in all sectors of its economy, international recognition and political stability. Kazakhstan is a country looking into the future, which retains its culture, traditions and successfully realizes its huge creative potential in the nowadays dynamic world.

February 9, 2015

President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On introducing amendments and additions to the Labour Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan” aimed at providing employment guarantees and social support of youth.

Joint Declaration by the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Federal Chancellor of Germany

September 17, 2024

June 9, 2021

On further measures of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of human rights

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Understanding Kazakhstan’s Politics, Again

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The people of Kazakhstan have made their preferences clear.

Following the re-election of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in April 2015, I wrote an article “ Understanding Kazakhstan’s Politics ” to offer insights into the domestic factors shaping Kazakhstan’s political trajectory. Almost a year later, following the recent elections for the Mazhilis , the lower house of parliament, it is appropriate to once again examine Kazakhstan’s internal political development.

I recently travelled to Astana for the elections, where I was able to interview a former Mazhilis deputy, two Mazhilis candidates, and political operatives, among others.

The results of the elections were largely as expected. The ruling Nur Otan party won 82.20 percent of the vote and 84 seats, while the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CNPK) and the Ak Zhol Democratic Party secured 7.14 percent and 7.18  percent of the vote, respectively, endowing each of those two parties with seven seats in the Mazhilis. None of the three smaller parties, Birlik, the Social Democratic Party (OSDP), and Ayul, reached the 7 percent necessary threshold to gain representation in parliament. This election effectively preserves the status quo , as in the recently dismissed session of the Mazhilis , Nur Otan held 83 seats, Ak Zhol 8, and the CNPK 7.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which observed the elections, concluded that they were “efficiently organized, with some progress,” but still failed to uphold Kazakhstan’s stated OSCE commitments. The elections did not present voters with “genuine political choice” and there was a “lack of pluralism of opinion in the media.” The OSCE added that Nur Otan’s dominant position in national politics has effectively obscured the distinction between the state and political party.

Realizing the Kazakhstan’s stated OSCE commitments requires the people of Kazakhstan to accept “the importance of pluralism with regard to political organizations ” and other norms endemic in other OSCE liberal democracies. While the government of Kazakhstan has pledged its commitment to democratic development, do the people of Kazakhstan really want a Western-style liberal democracy? Is the Kazakhstani electorate ready for this form of government?

Surely, the people of Kazakhstan are eager to be a member of the developed nations club, and they desire the prosperity of a liberal democracy, but there is little evidence to suggest that they are ready to embrace the norms, behaviors, and traditions characteristic of societies with a high degree of political pluralism, such as those found in other OSCE liberal democracies. Kazakhstan’s conservative culture does not lend itself to lively, and often confrontational, political life.

This is not to suggest that the people of Kazakhstani are anti-freedom or pro-authoritarianism; rather, to most Kazakhstanis, at this point in the country’s historical development, realizing a liberal democratic political culture that would satisfy the country’s OSCE commitment is of secondary importance to the values of national unity, security, sovereignty and stability.

Unity, Security and Stability

Security is a central tenant of Kazakh culture. As a historically nomadic people reared on the Eurasian steppe, devoid of the defensive benefits of a sedentary lifestyle and vulnerable to invasions from rival nomadic tribes, Kazakhs consider the preservation of unity among friends, family and co-nationals to be invaluable to the existence of the Kazakhstani state. Kazakhs’ sensitivity to border threats manifests today in the country’s multi-vector foreign policy, which emphasizes friendship with all peace-loving peoples. Within Kazakhstan, security, unity and solidarity are predominant tropes in national politics, as the pre-election platforms of all six parties highlighted the importance of a unified Kazakhstani nation in the face of an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world. After all, Kazakhstan is a land-locked state neighboring Russia and China, and not too far from the conflict-ridden regions of Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.

The results of the 2014 World Values Survey confirm Kazakhstan’s preoccupation with security. More than half of Kazakhstanis polled feel “quite secure,” and yet 72 percent of Kazakhstanis are either “very much” worried or are “a great deal” worried about losing their existing job or not finding a new one. The collapse in global oil prices since late 2014 caused the government in October 2015 to readjust the 2016 national budget based on an average oil price of $40/barrel, down from an original assumption of $80/barrel in the 2015 budget. With oil revenues generating in excess of 50 percent of the government’s budget, Kazakhstan’s economy is sensitive to fluctuations in global oil prices. Under pressure from global markets and internal financial distress, in August 2015 the Central Bank of Kazakhstan made the prudent decision to float the Kazakhstani tenge (KZT). This move, while necessary for the country’s long-term financial development, caused short-term economic hardship as the KZT depreciated 44 percent – from 185 KZT/USD to 330 KZT/USD – between August and December 2015, slashing the population’s real income.

Beyond economic volatility, some 71 percent of those polled in the World Values Survey indicated they were “very much” or “a great deal” worried about a war involving their country, another 80 percent were worried about a terrorist attack, and 65 percent were concerned about a civil war. Generally, the results suggest that people of Kazakhstan are worried about the future – as the country ranked above Ukraine, and below Pakistan in this category. Yet, Kazakhstan ranked as one of the top 13 nations in the survey for countries that perceived the least threat to their physical security.

The Kazakh preoccupation with security informs how the country’s electorate perceives governance, with a preference for hierarchy. Like their nomadic ancestors, the people of Kazakhstan admire a strongman. In an interview, one Ak Zhol Mazhilis candidate shared, “we are Asiatic in that way. In Kazakhstan, you give up some rights in exchange for security. You give up pluralism and the right to say what you want, but that’s how it is, and we are doing ok.”

To that end, Nazarbayev is regarded the guardian of Kazakhstan’s national unity, even by members of the opposition. An Ak Zhol official noted, the president “is the only leader capable of uniting all of Kazakhstan’s over 120 nationalities, because his first act as president was to secure border agreements with China and Russia.” Another Ak Zhol candidate observed, “whether we like it or not, Nazarbayev is our future,” and “we live in a dangerous world, and Kazakhstan has not experienced any terrorism or civil war, thanks to Nazarbayev.” Meanwhile, some former Nur-Otan officials shared that despite their departure from the party, they continued to vote for Nazarbayev, as he is the only one capable of ensuring national unity.

Kazakhstan’s legislative culture reinforces the super-presidential system. While the legislature influences politics through the appropriation process, senators and deputies are not nearly as active in the legislative process as they are in the U.S. Congress or in Western European parliaments. Deputies themselves do not draft legislation, but fulfill the legislative mandate presented by the executive branch at the beginning of the term. One former Mazhilis member recalled how deputies worked around the clock, including weekends, in the fall of 2008, just as the real estate bubble hit Kazakhstan, to ratify a series of anti-crisis measures presented by the president. While legislation is amended during the review process, generally, deputies try not to change more than 50 percent of the original text, as doing so would alter the bill’s original intent, and require resubmission to the executive. Deputies therefore restrain themselves from making significant modifications in order to ensure the bills are passed. Moreover, similar to the party discipline that dominated Soviet-era politics, deputies in the Mazhilis vote as a unified bloc, in accordance with the policies set by their respective the party leadership. Any diversion from the party line could be perceived as an abandonment of party ideology. Insofar as Kazakhstan lacks a vivacious legislative culture, it is natural that the political pluralism observed in long-established OSCE liberal democracies lags.

The preoccupation with security also influences how the people of Kazakhstan perceive elections. In an interview, one political operative claimed that while it may be a good idea to reinstate the system self-nominations for the Mazhilis that existed prior to 2007, when a party-list system was implemented, so as to allow for greater political pluralism, the current system of presidentially-appointed Akims (regional governors) should continue. Allowing the direct of elections of Akims could be dangerous, as citizens in the border regions of Northern and Western Kazakhstan would likely elect a pro-Russian leader who would ally with Russia in the event of a crisis, and stimulate the disintegration of Kazakhstani unity. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, an elected pro-Russian official would provide a prerequisite for future potential Russian aggression. This is why the super-presidential system works – it preserves Kazakhstan’s status as a united, unified, and secured state.

Looking Ahead

Kazakhstan, a new state with a government that has been in existence for just 25 years, is not yet a liberal democracy. The country lacks the true political pluralism found in other OSCE liberal democracies that have evolved over hundreds of years. But this is the stage Kazakhstan is at in its historical development, and the people of Kazakhstan have made it clear that in a dynamic global economic and security environment, they favor security, unity and predictability. To them, this is Nazarbayev and the Nur Otan party.

Dena Sholk , author of The Sholk Road Adventures , is an independent Eurasian analyst and a former Fulbright scholar in Kazakhstan. 

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Kazakhstan in Crisis: Politics and Geopolitics 

Three questions to nargis kassenova.

On January 5, protests in Kazakhstan’s largest city Almaty brought the country under new scrutiny. After the dust settled, the public was left to wonder how the protests will influence the world and whether they disturbed the regional equilibrium. Nargis Kassenova, a central Asian specialist and Senior Fellow at Harvard University offers her insight on what is at stake for Kazakhstan’s future and for its place within Central Asia.

Are we facing spontaneous social unrest, a " coup attempt " organized by a " single center " as mentioned by president Tokayev in his Monday, January 10, 2022 speech ? What is your understanding of Kazakhstan's internal political situation? 

The protests themselves were not surprising, since the socio-economic grievances had been accumulating over time. The situation worsened as a result of the economic recession caused by the pandemic (inflation rates were above 8% for all the end of 2021). What was surprising was the speed with which they spread across the country. The protests started in Zhanaozen, a little town in western Kazakhstan in the oil rich Mangistau region, and were triggered by the spike in the prices on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) (a term most Kazakhstan people didn’t even know before the protests). Due to reforms in the fuel market, the prices of LPG doubled from 50 tenge per liter ($0.11) in 2021 to 120 tenge per liter ($0.28) on January 1. It was not the first protest in Zhanaozen, the tensions were rising, and as it turned out the rest of the country was also on the edge.

Kazakhstan was in a duumvirate situation where two presidents co-ruled for some time: Tokayev, the President of the country, but also Nazarbayev, with his title of the First President-Leader of the Nation. Nazarbayev did not relinquish power, and retained his position as head of the ruling Nur-Otan party until the end of 2021 and as head of the Security Council until last Wednesday.

Ever since 2010, with the amendments to the Constitutional Law, there has been a preparation of legislation for a political transition. 

Ever since 2010, with the amendments to the Constitutional Law, there has been a preparation of legislation for a political transition. Nazarbayev received the title of Leader of the Nation and a set of life-long rights and immunity from prosecution. His family members were also granted immunity. Despite his resignation, Nazarbayev kept representing Kazakhstan at different international forums. The latest took place at the end of December, when he attended, together with President Tokayev, an informal summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Saint Petersburg.

So, the transition had been prepared for a long time, and the 2019 transition did not seem complete. Before last week, President Tokayev did not have the full power he was entitled to have as a country’s Head of State. It remains to be seen whether additional constitutional changes will be needed to complete and stabilize the transition. 

I am skeptical about the government’s claim that there was one " single center " organizing the protests and believe that they were spontaneous. Very quickly political demands like the removal of Nazarbayev, and the organization of free and fair elections arose. I take President Tokayev’s claim that this was an attempted coup more seriously, because we do see a very serious shake-up at the top of the political system. Importantly, Tokayev’s speech had direct references to Nazarbayev and his family business.

At present it is not clear what the future will be, it is not even clear where Nazarbayev is. According to the press secretary, he is in Nur-Sultan, and he is in consultation with president Tokayev. The health condition of the 81 years old "former" President is also unknown, as the events were probably quite a shock for him. We also still don't know if charges will be pressed against him or not. I would suspect his family members may be affected. He may be left in peace, so as not to upset an already difficult situation.

What are the possible consequences of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) intervention on Kazakhstan’s political trajectory and its relationship with Russia?

The CSTO support came as a big surprise and the full picture of how it happened is still relatively unclear. The intervention put Kazakhstan in the uncomfortable position of Russia’s protectorate. It does not look good being an independent stable mid-level power for thirty years, but still having to ask Russia for help. I think, though, that the situation with Kazakhstan's weakened position is not irreparable.

The discussion is now rather: how necessary was it? The situation did start to improve prior to the arrival of the Russian troops. On January 6, 2500 Russian peacekeepers were sent to help. I would think that it was largely symbolic, as Kazakhstan has enough forces by itself and 2500 is a rather small contingent. Kazakhstan has been investing in the security apparatus for years, and local forces were certainly enough to deal with the militants. Now there are armed vehicles in the streets of Almaty and things have really calmed down in the last few days and this was largely done thanks to Kazakh own military forces. 

We can assume a political struggle at the top of the political system, and clearly Putin gave support to President Tokayev during the crisis. CSTO didn’t grant this kind of assistance to Kyrgyzstan when the Kyrghyz interim government asked in 2010. Armenia recently also asked for Russian help to no avail. The sending of CSTO troops to a member state to deal with a political crisis is something new. Officially, it’s to help with the conduct of a counter-terrorist operation, but it makes little sense to be sending "peacekeepers" to deal with a terrorist attack.

We can assume a political struggle at the top of the political system, and clearly Putin gave support to President Tokayev during the crisis. 

The officials are already reframing the narrative and talking about internal actors who with the support of external forces destabilized Kazakhstan. It seems to me the claim that it was an external terrorist attack was a way to to justify a quick CSTO intervention.

For what we know, the CSTO troops are not participating in military operations. They are just guarding key infrastructure. It seems the goal was mostly symbolic, to provide support to President Tokayev and to signal to the political elites in Kazakhstan that he has Putin’s endorsement. What happened in Kazakhstan is not a color revolution though. President Putin does not like Kaddafi-type scenarios, he does not like the tragic end of dictators. It scares him and we see what has been happening to removed authoritarian leaders in the post-Soviet space. Russia invited and accepted Askar Akayev: the first President of Kyrgyzstan. The second President of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has been in exile in Minsk since the Kyrghyz revolution of 2010. Viktor Yanukovych (President of Ukraine until 2014) had also fled to Russia after the Euromaidan civil unrest. Russia accepts a downfall, but Putin does not want popular vengeance to unravel. Russia thus needs to manage the transition in Kazakhstan. They have accepted the fact that there is a transition in Kazakhstan and that the Nazarbayev family needs to be pushed aside if necessary. 

What does the crisis tell us about the dynamic of Russia-China relations in Central Asia? 

What we know is quite scarce. We know that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also offered help, but I think it was more of a symbolic gesture as a regional security organization.

I do not think that the situation will really affect China-Russia relations, but Kazakhstan will lean more towards Russia now, because the government owes Russia for its help. Kazakhstan has always been in Russia’s sphere of influence, and the two countries have a lot of interdependencies. They have strong links and common business and security, and social interests, and deep people-to-people connections. 

At the same time, Kazakhstan is also striving to build up its sovereignty, while avoiding antagonizing Russia. Kazakhstan maintains friendly relationships with the rest of the world and develops its relations with China, the West, Turkey (Kazakhstan is a member of the Organization of Turkic States), and Muslim countries. I would expect Kazakhstan to continue its multi-vectoral foreign policy balancing relations with great powers. Some do say that this crisis will put an end to this policy, but I think Kazakhstan will maintain its balancing act.

Geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the West are making things more difficult for countries in between, like Kazakhstan, which tries not to be too overwhelmed by Russia. For example, Kazakhstan did not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, and did not support Russia on the Crimea annexation issue. It abstained in a number of United Nations votes. The intensification of these rivalries is shrinking the space for maneuver.

Copyright: Abduaziz MADYAROV / AFP

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Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: A Role Model, from Past to Present

Dr. Mehmood Ul Hassan Khan has specialties in management, marketing, economics and governance. He has also master degree in Development with specialization in Diplomacy and Public Relations. He has also a rich experience in research, peace and conflict resolution and defence issues. His research and comprehensive articles have already been published in China, Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, USA, South Korea, UAE and Kuwait too.

He has great experience in the socio-economic, geo-politics and geo-strategic issues of Central Asia, Caucasus and Middle East. He is a famous expert on CIS and Caucasus in Pakistan. Member Board of Experts: CGSS, Islamabad. Ambassador at large at IHRFW.

The “Geneva of Asia”, Republic of Kazakhstan has a pragmatic, forward looking and progressive foreign policy which emphasizes to foster strong, sustainable alliances, meaningful partnerships, and trustworthy friendships based on mutual respect. Due to its visionary leadership it has many foreign policies and diplomatic accomplishments during the last thirty years.

Kazakhstan seems a kind of positive/soft state having rich natural resources, the world’s ninth largest country by area, and located in the very geographical center of Eurasia.

It does not have favourable geopolitical conditions and moreover its own position at the junction of the interests of global players, yet it confidently maintains domestic political stability, sustainable economic growth and constructive relations with all the main actors of the global power politics.

Kazakhstan, shares one of the longest land borders with two world powers, Russia and China, manages to successfully maneuver in the dark waters of world politics.

According to Kazakhstan’s official statistics (2019-2020) China second-largest trading partner of it. In this connection, bilateral trade reached $11 billion in 2018. China is also a major investor in Kazakhstan through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Kazakhstan’s Khorgos Gateway, the biggest dry port in the world, was constructed by Chinese companies.

Kazakhstan has also maintained cordial bilateral relations with Russia since its inception. According to Kazakhstan’s official statistics (2019-2020) Russia is its largest trading partner, with an estimated $18 billion in 2018. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has very trustworthy relations with President Vladimir Putin.

In this context, security agreements provide a stable base for the Russian-Kazakh relationship as well as Kazakhstan’s membership to the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. In January 2019, the two governments ratified a deal under which Kazakhstan will assemble Russian military helicopters. That same year, Kazakh troops participated in the Russian-led multinational exercise center 2019. But it has rejected Moscow’s offer to build a nuclear power plant in its territory which showed its independent foreign policy.

Since its independence, Kazakhstan has been a successful model of political stability, consistence democratization, social cohesion, and people’s friendly legislation and structural reforms which is based on the foreign policy strategy of H.E. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the First President of the country.

Nazarbayev, like Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, is the real de facto architect of modern Kazakhstan. H.E. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Nazarbayev’s successor and the former Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, succeeded in the presidential elections of 2019, and continued and consolidated uniqueness of its foreign policy and followed the line of his predecessor.

Kazakhstan’s foreign policy does not envision itself as a pawn on some Eurasian chessboard, but rather as an independent power with its own objectives and ambitions. Moreover, Kazakhstan is looking to increase its image and influence, in Central Asia and beyond.

The Republic of Kazakhstan managed risks of foreign policy through the balanced development orientations of external relations in all strategic areas. It followed a “multi-vector” principle, which remained doctrinal significance for Kazakhstani diplomacy.

It distinguishes Kazakhstan from other Central Asian Countries which has an ideal combination of consistency and flexibility in the implementation of this principle and it remained strong, stable and sustainable in all its important parameters of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, politicization and democratization, socio-economic prosperity, effective good governance and last but not least, human survival and productive channels.   

It has been a reasonable pragmatism and the rational decision making “not to put all eggs in one basket” which created strategic cushion to move forward in a peaceful manners. In this context, Kazakhstan has been applying the “multi-vector” model to almost all spheres of its international cooperation, engagements and dialogues since its inception. 

Kazakhstan protected all its vested interest of security through innovative diplomatic maneuvering and economic manipulation since 1991 and successfully surpassed all regional as well as international crises. Formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was a deliberate strategic move to achieve element of diplomatic diversity and further sustainability among the regional main stakeholders. It has actually enhanced its regional connectivity and Out-Reach Policy (ORP) of South Asian Region.

Kazakhstan also followed Balancing Act Doctrine and has been an active participant in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, and maintains close cooperation with the United States, which, despite some kind of displeasure and discomfort in Moscow and Beijing, plays an important stabilizing role in the region from the point of view of Kazakhstan’s vested interests.

Kazakhstan has also friendly ties with USA. The U.S. former President Donald Trump and former Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev met in January 2018, a high-level meeting which was followed by another in September 2019 in New York between Presidents Trump and Tokayev. Regular official contacts with senior U.S. officials also occur through the C5+1 group comprised of the five Central Asian states and the U.S.

According to Kazakhstan’s official statistics (2019-2020) bilateral trade between Washington and Nur-Sultan reached $2.1 billion in 2018. This marked a new milestone in bilateral trade, which has generally increased in recent years; traffic of goods and services reached $1.3 billion in 2017.

Right from the beginning, Kazakhstan sought to expand the orbit of its interests, intentionally associating itself with a broader international agenda. In this connection, Kazakhstan initiated the idea of Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building measures in Asia (CICA) the only international platform providing a stable dialogue on security issues in Asia as a whole. It enabled to identify its presence in European Union (EU) through the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010 which further enhanced its pivotal role in the European security architecture especially energy security.

Kazakhstan and the European Union (EU) have signed a new trade agreement, the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which entered into force on March 1, 2020. According to the European Commission (2020) the EU is Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner as a bloc, with almost 40 percent share in its total external trade. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has invested in Kazakhstan’s energy industry by building solar power facilities.

Kazakhstan consistently adopted and implemented the principle of economic pragmatism, which remained the main criteria for all strategic decisions for the last thirty years. Economy first, then politics”, remained dominating factor during former president Nazarbayev and is still the role model of incumbent government. This approach was development oriented which promoted economic stability and ultimately achieved its sustainability.

It blocked political radicalism within the country, but also in the external arena, in relations with strategic partners. Nevertheless gradual political reforms have been initiated which also created befitting business equity and political tranquility in the country. 

Kazakhstan’s engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), invariably emphasizes the purely economic nature of this organization. Thus Nazarbayev’s principled position in favor of economic pragmatism blocked all attempts to politicize the union.

Kazakhstan’s inclusion in the Turkic Council is another prime example of its economic and commercial diplomacy which has actually further diversified its regional as well as international relations.

Kazakhstan has been performing status of facilitator and mediator for the last thirty years. It hosted a round of the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program back in 2013, and has hosted over a dozen rounds of talks intended to find a solution for the conflict in Syria under the flagship of the “Astana Peace Process (APP)”.

Moreover, its successful diplomatic efforts to reconcile Putin with Erdogan in 2016 became possible in particular because of special relations with Turkey which successfully averted an imminent diplomatic tussle and maintained peace in the region and beyond.  Nazarbayev’s personal trusting relationship with both leaders played a special role which defused widening political and diplomatic rift between two countries. In this regard, Kazakhstan’s spirit of classical old diplomacy played a decisive role.

Interestingly, Kazakhstan followed anti-crisis diplomacy due to which Kazakhstan was able to avoid the risk of being drawn into contradictions between world powers.

In this connection, the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 somehow created a difficult situation for the multi-vector policy of the country. Refusing to openly accuse the Kremlin at the start of the conflict, Nazarbayev, at the same time, was able to withstand the pressure from Moscow to recognize South Ossetia’s independence was a “master stroke” of its foreign policy. Afterward, Kazakhstan actively supported the resolution calling “for preserving the territorial integrity of states.” at the SCO summit.

Kazakhstan’s peaceful persuasion of diversification energy policy in terms of supplies and production should be treated as a significant “balancing” step to begin exporting oil to the West through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline which was aimed at partially reducing the dependence on the transport and communication systems of Russia.

Right from the beginning, Kazakhstani has been staunch supporter of conflict resolution and always seeks to independently create favorable external conditions.

Kazakhstan striving hard spirits developed spirits of rational decision making which secured its strategic interest and developed economic self-reliance and financial stability during the intensification in relations between the West and Russia, as well as deepening contradictions between the US and China, and resultantly it has created the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC). The establishment of AIFC has actually further enhanced inflows of FDIs, FPIs and joint ventures in the country and moreover, enabled it to enter in the Russian and Chinese financial markets.

Formation of the AIFC vividly reflects Kazakhstan’s ability to skillfully integrate itself into the dynamics of relations between different poles of power, effectively capitalizing its competitive advantages as a transit zone.

Kazakhstan has been following systematic efforts to integrate its foreign policy initiatives into the very center of international politics. Furthermore, this policy pursues a number of specific tasks, such as preventing a marginalization of Kazakhstan, as well as the inclusion of Central Asian region in the international arena.

Since its inception, Kazakhstan unilaterally rejected nuclear weapons arsenal. It is pertinent to mention that Kazakhstan possessed the 4th largest nuclear capability in the world, which was more than what China, the UK, and France had combined.

In this connection, its zero nuclear arsenal policy won the hearts and souls of all the regional as well as international power brokers. Voluntary rejection of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) was the innovative move which has certain socio-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic dividends. It fostered its credibility in the West and among the international community in general.

Its rational thinking to abandon of nuclear potential has also secured numerous tangible dividends. Since 1991, Kazakhstan has attracted more than $300 billion of foreign direct investment, accounting for 75 percent of all investments in Central Asia as a whole.

Its visionary leadership created “Greater Eurasia” which was based on the unification of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the European Union into a single mega-project. It was announced at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in 2015.

The idea of Greater Eurasia (GE) triggered its regional connectivity and further consolidated its economic potential.  It opened a new window of opportunity for all the regional players to form befitting propositions in terms of economy, trade and commerce, investments, and commercial diplomacy. Finally it promoted the principle of “inseparable of security”.

Kazakhstan has been following proactive politics is now the best way to stay afloat, which makes it possible not to become a passive hostage of a steadily escalating rivalry between major powers. It tried to promote spirits of harmony, peace and stability.

Its Astana club created a new format for meetings of political and business elites. It is a unique forum where the most influential representatives of the USA, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and 30 other, mainly Eurasian, countries gather at the same table to resolve issues.

According to its Foreign Ministry (2019) Kazakhstan has established relations with Barbados and with all Latin American and Caribbean nations which vividly reflected its diversified, dynamic and constructive foreign policy.

It hopes that in the near future, the “Asian Vienna (Kazakhstan) might be of considerable interest, because of its ability to resolve contradictions along the USA-Russia, USA-China, USA-Iran lines. The visionary leadership of Kazakhstan and its rich and diversified diplomatic and mediating experience may turn out to be very valuable assets.

Kazakhstan is a member of many influential international organizations. It is active member of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and last but not least, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Since 2003, it has been arranging the Congresses of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in its country, aiming to unit at one table the leaders of all leading world religious confessions.

Kazakhstan also chaired the Group of Landlocked Developing Countries, a 32 member state initiative under the umbrella of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Furthermore, Kazakhstan remains the only Central Asian nation to have held a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for 2017-2018.

Kazakhstan took its participation in the UN to a new level when it deployed for the first time a company of 120 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in October 2018 and a new contingent was sent in November 2019. No other Central Asian country has sent this amount of military personnel to UN peace missions.

Now President Tokayev has carried on the multi-vectored doctrine that First President Nursultan Nazarbayev implemented during his presidency. Both leaders believe that by enacting strong political and economic reforms, the country will be in a better position to build its relationships with other nations.

Kazakhstan is a neutral nation, which has worked hard to reform its military, political and economic policies as it advances toward a full democracy. The new concept of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy openly declares its intentions to secure the status of a “leading state” in the region.

On March 6, 2020, a presidential decree has approved the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Concept for 2020-2030.

It highlights salient features of its system of fundamental views, i.e. the principles, goals, objectives, priorities, and mechanisms of the country’s foreign policy during the reference period.

In this context, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev from the very beginning clearly emphasized the need to continue exercising the country’s endorsed political course, the foundations of which were laid by country’s first president Nursultan Nazarbayev.

It seems that the adoption of a new Foreign Policy Concept aimed at pursuing a multi-vector and well-balanced foreign policy . It is blue print for the new era. It is road map of further strengthening of bilateral relations and achieving of objectives of commercial diplomacy. It facilitates the associated main stakeholders to jointly work for the further development of the positive developments of Kazakhstan.

The new concept of foreign policy has some certain additions, variations and supplements which jointly shape its future recourse, formation of national narrative, development plans and above all specific priorities in diverse filed of economy, trade & commerce, investments, structural reforms, politicization and democratization, new social norms and devising of new comprehensive grand strategy to combat with all emerging state and non-state threats and crises.

It pinpoint strategic therapy to merging threats like climate change,     conflict between various international actors, including sanctions, erosion of the international law principles, increased extremism, terrorism, and the arms race, the intensification of hybrid, cyber, trade and currency wars, among others.

It affirms Kazakhstan imperative and advantageous position of an active and responsible international community participant and contributor to ensuring international and regional stability and security. It emphasizes to maintain friendly, predictable and mutually beneficial relations with foreign partners.

It seems that Kazakhstan is interested to remain distant and neutral in contradictions and conflicts of world power brokers. Therefore, a multi-vector and pragmatic foreign policy permits Kazakhstan to build relations with other countries and international organizations as per its vested interests and on an equal and constructive basis.

It chalks out new principles including helping build stable, fair and democratic world order, promoting the state’s external openness and the inextricable link between security and development in international relations. It urges an equitable integrative world to take care of global political, economic and humanitarian issues.

The new concept highlights the strategic importance of multiculturalism and aiming at establishing a collective vision and effective approaches for the international community to address a wide range of global and regional issues based on multilateral advisory and agreements.

It further consolidates the concept of the “Listening State” proposed by President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev in his first Message to the people of Kazakhstan. It refers to creating a qualitatively new mechanism for ensuring a continuous dialogue between state and society, whereas the former gives a prompt and effective response to the needs of citizens.

It has certain economic dimensions which are development oriented and dynamic in its composition. It has further increase its constituent priorities, compared to the previous concept, from 9 to 14.

Previously Kazakhstan extended its investment cooperation with foreign partners through listing the economy sectors requiring foreign investment. These are mechanical engineering, appliance industry, agriculture, light manufacturing, healthcare, education, transport, tourism, etc. Thus, the activities of Kazakhstani diplomats are focused on promoting the non-raw-materials sectors of the country’s economy.

Figure-VIII

It is designed to promote the development of Kazakhstan’s transit and logistics potential, including the introduction of an “open skies” regime, the expansion of the range, volume and geographical destinations of national exports, dismantling various export barriers in foreign markets, as well as the promotion of institutions like the Astana International Financial Center, The Khorgos International Center for Cross-Border Cooperation and created jointly with Uzbekistan the “Central Asia” Center for Trade and Economic Cooperation.

It indicates a major change in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy priorities. Its perspective applies particularly to the country’s positioning in a regional context. In the previous concept, Kazakhstan presented itself as a country that recognizes its role and responsibility and strives for the development of intra-regional integration in Central Asia, now it openly declares its intentions to consolidate its status as a “leading state in the region which is indeed a paradigm shift in its outlook.  

According to new concept relations with other countries in the region have a strategic nature and relations with China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It supports the expansion of multilateral dialogue and cooperation in Central Asia. Now it appears that Kazakhstan stands ready to help strengthen the existing interaction formats between the Central Asian countries and foreign partners.

Interestingly, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy priorities are now shifted from individual countries to regional and multilateral cooperation. In Asia, for instance, the emphasis is placed both on active participation in the work of the SCO, the Council of Interior Ministers, the OIC, the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states, and on expanding ties with ASEAN, the League of the Arab States and other international organizations, where Kazakhstan is involved.

It fosters enhanced cooperation in the Caspian region in the field of energy, transport, environmental protection and security following adopted in the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. It also expresses an intention to continue close cooperation with the EAEU member state and to optimize negotiation approaches within the framework of the Union. It supports further strengthening of bilateral relations with Great Britain, which completed its exit from the European Union (Brexit) last year.

Being prominent regional expert of Kazakhstan & CIS I support salient features of new concept of foreign policy. It combines policy formulation with actuality of its implementation thus jump from cosmetic orientations to systematic approach to achieve the goals of further socio-economic prosperity, economic sustainability, continuation of structural reforms, further initiation of political, democratic, social, civil, administrative and judicial reforms under the gambit of pragmatic and progressive foreign policy.

Over the past 30 years Kazakhstan has established diplomatic relations with 186 countries and transformed into one of the dynamically economies of the region and world alike. It successfully nurtured its macro-economy with immaculate vision, policies, programs and integrative mechanism of balanced foreign policy since its inception.

Successive leadership of Kazakhstan followed a holistic foreign policy to make bridges of political consultation, social concession, geopolitical and geostrategic alignment which enabled it to sail through the regional triangle of China, Russia and Turkey to global super orbits of the USA and the EU to protect its vested interest.

Its inbuilt quality of crisis management under the umbrella of foreign policy has averted numerous crises of basic identity, sovereignty, territorial disintegration, economic meltdown, financial crunch, political instability and above all crises of alliance and conveniences. Its participation in the SCO, OIC, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Turkic Council has further diversified its foreign policy.

Its superior, supportive and stimulating skills of “Conflict Resolution” have been role model for all the regional as well as international power brokers due to which it lessened escalations and promoted normalizations between the conflicting parties, prime examples may be nuclear negotiations about Iran, Syrian crisis and many others important political and diplomatic rifts in the near past between Turkey and Russia, Iran and the West and last but not least, disorder between Central Asian Countries.

Interestingly its multi-vector foreign policy stimulates people’s friendly policies. Its listening state policy is the outcome of its historic civilization, traditions and norms further enhances and institutionalizes spirits of e-government, accountability, good governance, social responsibility and last but not least political activation in the country.

Its new concept of foreign policy for 2020-2030 has now introduced new ways and means to foster socio-economic prosperity, political stability, democratic norms and social cohesion in the country. It has outlined new codes of glory and gratification. It has new priorities of economic growth, regional connectivity, global engagement and of course persuasion of leading role of Kazakhstan.    

Its new concept of foreign policy for 2020-2030 showcases its investment potential and prospects of joint ventures through befitting regional as well as international partnerships.        

To conclude the Republic of Kazakhstan has been pursuing its foreign policy on the basis, continuity of the former president policies, striving for building a stable, fair and democratic world order; equal integration into the global political, economic and humanitarian space; effective protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Kazakh citizens and compatriots living abroad.

Moreover, Kazakhstan has been trying to promote the external openness of the state, the creation of favourable external conditions for increasing the welfare of Kazakh citizens, the development of the political, economic and spiritual potential of the country.

Kazakhstan’s multi-vector, pragmatic, progressive and proactive foreign policy stands for the development of friendly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with all countries, interstate associations and international organisations of practical interest to Kazakhstan.

Its foreign policy sustains multilateralism to create a collective vision and effective approaches of the international community to solving a wide range of global and regional problems on the basis of multilateral consultations and agreements.

Its foreign policy is the ideal combination of development and security which cares both at the national, regional and global levels. It involves the development of integrated approaches of the international community to respond to cross-border security challenges and threats, conflict resolution, peace building in post-conflict countries. 

Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy has strategic goals which include strengthening the independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, maintaining the independence of its foreign policy. It cultivates consolidation of leading positions and promotion of long-term interests of Kazakhstan in the Central Asian region. It asserts its active and responsible role in the international community, making a significant contribution to ensuring international and regional stability and security.

It secures its friendly, predictable and mutually beneficial relations with foreign states in both bilateral and multilateral formats, the development of integrated cooperation with interstate associations and international organisations.

It supports its foreign policy potential in order to increase the competitiveness of the national economy, the level and quality of life of Kazakh citizens.

It assists in preserving and strengthening the unity of the multiethnic people of Kazakhstan through foreign policy methods and raising the practical interests of citizens of Kazakhstan and national business to the forefront of the state’s foreign policy.

Its new concept of foreign policy 2020-2030 guides the parameters to achieve its strategic goals through increasing efforts to form a politically stable, economically sustainable and secure space around Kazakhstan, continuation of the course on strengthening international peace and cooperation, increasing the effectiveness of global and regional security and interaction systems; the development and implementation of new approaches to key foreign policy issues at the bilateral and multilateral levels, taking into account the promotion and protection of the long-term strategic interests of the state; ensuring a new level of “economisation” of the foreign policy, further strengthening the position of Kazakhstan in the system of the global economic relations; realisation of “humanitarian diplomacy”, popularisation of a positive image of the country in the world community; establishing an effective system of communication with the public of Kazakhstan on foreign policy issues; improvement of work to ensure the protection of personal and family rights of citizens, the legitimate interests of individuals and legal entities of the Republic of Kazakhstan abroad.

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Party System Formation in Kazakhstan

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asian states have developed liberal-constitutional formal institutions. However, at the same time, political phenomena in Central Asia are shaped by informal political behaviour and relations. This relationship is now a critical issue affecting democratization and regime consolidation processes in former Soviet Central Asia, and this book provides an account of the interactive and dynamic relationship between informal and formal politics through the case of party-system formation in Kazakhstan.

Based on extensive interviews with political actors and a wide range of historical and contemporary documentary sources, the book utilises and develops neopatrimonialism as an analytical concept for studying post-Soviet authoritarian consolidation and failed democratisation. It illustrates how personalism of political office, patronage and patron-client networks and factional elite conflict have influenced and shaped the institutional constraints affecting party development, the type of emerging parties and parties’ relationship with society. The case of Kazakhstan, however, also demonstrates how in the former Soviet space political parties emerge as central to the legitimization of informal political behavior, the structuring of factional competition and the consolidation of authoritarianism. The book represents an important contribution to the study of Central Asian Politics.

Kazakhstan government, political system (Politics)

Kazakhstan government overview.

Kazakhstan has a hybrid system of government that combines aspects of both parliamentary and presidential systems.

The principle of independence and the political system were formulated in the first Constitution of Kazakhstan of January 1993, which was approved by referendum on 30 August 1995.

Kazakhstan government features

Kazakhstan has a parliamentary system with a president as head of the State. Kazakhstan last presidential election was in January 2006 for a seven-year term. Kazakhstan president serves as commander-in-chief, sets foreign policy, can initiate legislation, and appoints Kazakhstan prime minister, subject to Parliamentary approval.

Kazakhstan parliament is the supreme legislative body and consists of two chambers, the Senate (Upper House) and the Mazhilis (Lower House). The 47 members of Kazakhstan Senate are indirectly elected representatives of regional assemblies and appointees of Kazakhstan president. The Mazhilis is composed of 67 elected deputies. Kazakhstan parliament is elected for a four-year term.

Kazakhstan prime minister is the head of the executive branch of government and is appointed by Kazakhstan president, with the approval of Kazakhstan parliament. He chairs the Cabinet, which, as of January 2006, consists of three Deputy Prime Ministers, the Ministers of the 14 State Ministries and the 5 Chairmen of the State Agencies.

The heads of the local administrations (Akims of 14 oblasts and 2 cities) are appointed by Kazakhstan president. Since December 1997, the capital of Kazakhstan has been Astana. From 1929 to 1997 the capital of Kazakhstan was the city of Almaty, founded in 1854.

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Kazakhstan government views.

Kazakhstan President and ministries buildings

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Kazakhstan Government buildings

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Kazakhstan Parliament building

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• Political System

Political System of Kazakhstan

The Government of Kazakhstan exercises executive power, heads the system of executive bodies and provides guidance of their activities. The Head of the government is appointed by the President when the candidature of the premier has been approved by the majority of Parliament. Personal composition of the government is appointed by the President by the presentation of candidatures by premier.

Structure and composition of the government of Kazakhstan.

Prime-minister submits for a consideration to the President the structure of the government. The structure of the government is - the Prime-Minister, Vice Prime-Minister, 3 Prime-Minister deputies and 16 ministers.

Principal powers of the Government of Kazakhstan: elaboration and realization of principal tendencies of social economic state policy, defense potential of the country, security and guarantee of public order. Submission for the Parliament's (Majilis) consideration the republican budget and its execution report, ensuring the execution of the republican budget.

Bring in a bill into Parliament, execution ensuring.

Guidance ministries, state committees, other central and local executive bodies activities.

Appointing to a post and dismissal the heads of central executive bodies that are out of government.

Termination of the powers of the Government of Kazakhstan. The government resigns its powers before a new elected Head of state. The government declares its go out to the President when Parliament (Majilis) passes the vote of no confidence. Also tenders the resignation on the initiative of the President and when Prime-Minister resigned.

Political system of Kazakhstan

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