research paper topics nihilism

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When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

Philipp klar.

a Medical Faculty, C. & O. Vogt-Institute for Brain Research, Heinrich Heine University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

Georg Northoff

b Mental Health Center, Zhejiang University School of Medicine, Hangzhou, China

c Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics, Institute of Mental Health Research, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective's (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual's existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

Introduction

Like death and ecstasy […], schizophrenia has often seemed a limit-case of human existence, something suggesting an almost unimaginable aberration: the annihilation of consciousness itself. ([ 1 ], p. 3)

Nihilism is one of the most extreme existential experiences in schizophrenia as it goes far beyond the notion of a meaningless life as one source of suicide. Instead, it consists of the experience that ultimately the individual's self and the world do no longer exist , which renders meaningless the existence itself, and in some individuals, even the option of suicide. In her first-person account, Kean [ 2 ] offers a narrative description of this very experience: “When I believed I did not exist, nothing else mattered to me. Even suicide meant nothing to me − I am not real, I do not exist, so it does not matter if this nonexistent self dies.”

The subjective severance of both the self's and the world's unification in schizophrenia has been addressed since the beginning of the twentieth century. Such existential experiences were already captured by German psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969): he investigated this topic mainly on psychological and philosophical grounds within his book Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Psychology of Worldviews) [ 3 ]. Existential nihilism in neuropsychiatric disorders of the schizophrenia spectrum was subsumed by Jaspers as der absolute Nihilismus in Psychosen (absolute nihilism in psychoses): within this existential state, nothing truly exists anymore: all human beings are dead; the world does not exist anymore; the individual itself is a mere quasi-existence; and nothing contains true values anymore [ 3 ]. In his earlier book General Psychopathology , Jaspers likewise stated that “[…] nihilism and skepticism can only be experienced in absolute perfection in psychoses. The nihilistic delusion of the melancholic is an ideal type: the world is no longer, the sick person is no longer.” ([ 4 ], p. 247).

Thereafter, precisely in the middle of the twentieth century, Scottish psychiatrist Ronald D. Laing (1927–1989) famously emphasized a most profound disturbance of schizophrenia that he labeled “ontological insecurity” as part of his existential-phenomenological theory [ 5 , 6 ]. In Laing's view [ 5 ], the schizophrenic individual is principally affected by the loss of Heidegger's [ 7 ] notion of “In-der-Welt-sein” (being-in-the-world). The latter is the natural and most basal feeling of belonging to one's own body and of being rooted in the world, which is usually taken for granted in healthy subjects, hence providing them with “ontological security.” On the contrary, schizophrenic individuals lose ontological security as they eventually face a split between their individual's self-consciousness on the one hand and their body and the world on the other hand. Consequently, an existential disruption between the individual's self-consciousness and the natural world along with other living beings emerges [ 5 , 6 , 8 , 9 ]. The schizophrenic individual experiences his self as detached and isolated from both body and world; in most extreme instances, this accounts for the experience of death of the self and, even more extreme, annihilation of the existence of the world as such [ 5 , 8 , 9 ].

Present-day phenomenological psychopathology [ 10 ] focuses on the experience of both self and world in schizophrenia [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 ]. Especially, Danish psychiatrist Josef Parnas (1950-) approaches these extreme experiences of schizophrenic individuals [ 14 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 ]. For instance, Parnas presents the following quotations of solipsistic experiences in schizophrenic individuals: “The patient does not feel fully awake or conscious : ‘I have no consciousness'; ‘My consciousness is not as whole as it should be'; ‘I am simply unconscious'; ‘I am half-awake'; ‘I have no self-consciousness'; ‘My I-feeling is diminished'; ‘My I is disappearing for me'; ‘My feeling of consciousness is fragmented'; ‘It is a continuous universal blocking’” ([ 22 ], p. 225). Analogously, Sass [ 20 ] consistently describes schizophrenia including its heavily altered self-consciousness as an existential disorder affecting the individual's “ontological existence/dimension,” which converges with Parnas and Henriksen who present the disrupted self in schizophrenia congruently as “a basic sense of being ontologically different (different in kind) or of living in another ontological dimension.” ([ 14 ], p. 253).

Synthesizing and extending the current literature, we aim to provide a truly existential account of nihilism in specifically schizophrenia (whereas we do not consider other forms of nihilism as in depression). Without reasoning in detail, we determine the notion of existential by distinct stages: (1) the phenomenological stage that concerns the experience or consciousness of self and world, (2) the epistemological stage as featured by knowledge about self and world, and (3) an ontological stage about one's existence and reality in the world. Based on this notion of existential as including experience, knowledge, and existence, our aim to develop a 3-stage model of existential nihilism in schizophrenia that reaches beyond the so often reported solipsistic experience [ 12 , 22 , 26 , 27 , 28 ]. The phenomenological descriptions introduced above hereby acquire a supporting role in establishing our existential framework. Concerning this matter, a fundamental aspect is to emphasize that our model of nihilism in schizophrenia principally focuses on the subjectivity of the individual's annihilation. Nihilism, therefore, is neither understood as an objective nor quasi-objective feature, and its existential dimension is principally unexplainable from a scientific-empirical third-person perspective (TPP). Conversely, the experience of nihilism is intrinsically bound and interwoven into subjectivity, especially into immediate, pre-reflective experiences and feelings, in such a way that an existential framework is consequently required.

We specifically propose 3 conceptual stages regarding the pathological development to the final occurrence of comprehensive nihilism. To achieve this aim, the already well-established phenomenological concept of the “self-world structure” [ 12 , 21 , 24 , 25 , 27 , 29 ] serves as starting point for our model. Our article contains a slightly distinct interpretation of the self-world structure in the section Self-Consciousness as Constituted by the Ecological Self-World Structure, followed by an overview of the 3-fold existential model of nihilism in the section Existence and Being-In-The-World − Phenomenological, Epistemological, and Ontological Stages. Finally, the sections Initial Phenomenological Solipsism toward the Self and the Environment; Phenomenological Solipsism: What Is Disrupted; Phenomenological Solipsism: Experience of Self; Phenomenological Solipsism: Experience of World; Phenomenological Solipsism: What Is Preserved; Expanding from Experience to Knowledge: Epistemological Solipsism toward the Self and the World; Epistemological Solipsism: What Is Disrupted; Epistemological Solipsism: Experience of Self; Epistemological Solipsism: Experience of World; Epistemological Solipsism: Fragmentation of Temporality; Epistemological Solipsism: What Is Preserved; and Existential-Ontological Nihilism: Annihilation of Self-Consciousness individually present the 3 distinct stages of nihilism.

Overview − Self-World Structure and a 3-Stage Existential Model of Schizophrenia Nihilism

Self-consciousness as constituted by the ecological self-world structure.

Phenomenological psychopathology offers the concept of the “self-world structure/relationship/polarity” [ 12 , 21 , 24 , 25 , 27 , 29 ]. The self-world structure is the necessary predisposition of healthy self-consciousness toward the individual's experience of its self, that is, any form of the sense of self as well as toward the environment: objects, living beings, and general phenomena of the surrounding natural life-world. The self-world structure consequently reveals that the healthy self is intrinsically linked and depended not just on the person and body, accounting for embodiment [ 5 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 ], but equally on the environment or world by default within subjectivity [ 21 , 29 , 37 ]. Accordingly, neither the healthy self can exist without the perceptual presence of environmental phenomena as part of the natural world, nor healthy environmental perception can exist without a sufficient level of self-consciousness. Self and world are intrinsically merged in the co-constitution of both ourselves and the world within our experience.

This notion of an intrinsically unified self-world structure as ecological co-constitution of self-consciousness is widely shared by phenomenology in general [ 36 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 ] and phenomenological psychopathology in particular [ 16 , 24 , 37 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 ]. Even when we experience our self, that is, self-consciousness, the world is always already there in the background of our experience, in essentially a pre-reflective form. Moran accordingly elucidates that “Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty all characterize human intentional existence as transcendence towards the world , presenting subjectivity as essentially running beyond itself, world-disclosing, and sense-giving.” ([ 48 ], p. 597). In the same respect, Merleau-Ponty ([ 36 ], p. 430) states that “subject and object are two abstract moments of a unique structure which is presence ” and that “[…] there is no ‘inner man,’ man is in and toward the world, and it is in the world that he knows himself.” ([ 49 ], p. xii). Contemporary philosopher Dan Zahavi correspondingly declares that “when looking at a concrete life experience we will consequently come across a co-givenness of self and world” ([ 47 ], p. 300) and that “it is this intentional life that is at one and the same time self-involving and world-disclosing. This involvement already occurs pre-reflectively and must be considered as essential and constitutive feature of experience.” ([ 47 ], p. 300). Zahavi presents a passage where Heidegger elucidates the phenomenological intrinsic unification of the self and world: “Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein, Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world.” ([ 42 ], p. 29–30). Concluding the above, intentionality can be considered in the light that consciousness is a structural-relational phenomenon between conscious acts and their respective intentional objects [ 42 , 50 ]. This is supplementary mirrored in a broader framework of relational conjunction between the self and the world.

It shall be recognized that the hereby considered phenomenological notion of the self refers to the “experiential, core, basic, or minimal self” [ 21 , 29 , 40 , 41 , 47 , 51 , 52 ] that is not a higher reflected and declarative-narrative level or even specific substance of the self, for example, the self as an ontological entity or distinct “object” within phenomenal experience, but instead a most fundamental aspect of conscious experience, which is always pre-reflectively present in healthy subjects, termed as “mineness or ipseity” [ 14 , 21 , 40 , 53 , 54 ] or as “what-it-is-like-for-me-ness” [ 55 ] within the first-person perspective's (FPP) “stream of consciousness” as James [ 56 ] labeled it. 1 Such experiential, core, or minimal self with the self as fundamental aspect of conscious experience on the existential-phenomenological level is well compatible with the “basis model of self-specificity (BMSS)” [ 57 ] that conceives the self as a basic biological and ultimately ontological feature of the brain's relationship to the world, namely world-brain relation [ 57 , 58 ]. This further underlines the intrinsically ecological nature of both the existence of self and our experience of that very same existence of self.

Existence and Being-in-the-World − Phenomenological, Epistemological, and Ontological Stages

The possible variation of the self-world structure to unilateral extremes, namely toward either the self or the world, becomes remarkably obvious within the experience of schizophrenic individuals. In this regard, 3 very insightful first-person accounts about the nihilistic crisis in schizophrenia are provided by Kean [ 2 , 59 ] (now Humpston [ 60 ]). Since we understand nihilism as the intrinsically existential experience of “nothingness” rather than an objective feature, its investigation necessarily requires the inclusion of and reliance on FPP accounts. This is in conformance with Laing, who stated that “[…] schizophrenics have more to teach psychiatrists about the inner world than psychiatrists their patients.” ([ 6 ], p. 91). Given our primarily existential framework, we deem it necessary to flesh the existential experiences of the person themselves, and this is paradigmatically reflected in our case report. That is even more so given the lack of phenomenological accounts of specifically nihilism in the current literature.

In combination with the corresponding phenomenological concept of self-world structure, we now elaborate that first-person accounts allow the deduction of a 3-stage existential model containing a quantitative transition from the phenomenological over the epistemological to the ontological stages of our existential framework. Initiating phenomenological solipsism toward the self and further expanding toward the environment are not all-or-nothing phenomena. Instead, we conceive nihilism in schizophrenia to be located on a continuum with smooth transitions between the 3 stages of our model of existence, that is, phenomenological, epistemological, and ontological. This 3-stage model (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.1) 1 ) contains the subsequent stages that follow the trajectory from experience over knowledge to Being : (1) phenomenological solipsism toward the self and the environment; (2) epistemological solipsism toward the self and the environment; and (3) finally, existential-ontological nihilism regarding Being. The intrinsically subjective nature of existential nihilism reaches beyond traditional frameworks and phenomenological concepts in general and phenomenological psychopathology in particular. Consequently, it is indispensable to nest yet differentiate the first phenomenological and second epistemological stages from the final existential-ontological stage. While the first 2 stages already anticipate the third stage, it is the latter that will ultimately represent the attempt to indicate a fully developed existential nihilism.

a A quantitative transition is suggested to apply for the pathological development of self-consciousness toward the final occurrence of nihilism in schizophrenic individuals. This transition initiates with phenomenological gaps toward the self and the environment. Later, phenomenological solipsism expands toward the self and the environment including all its objects and living beings into the deeper epistemological stage. This transition ultimately reaches the more extreme characteristic of ontological nihilism concerning the annihilation of the self and the world, that is, Being, and hence the most fundamental stage of existence. b Subjective time and space: the temporo-spatial frame or extension of consciousness increasingly shrinks from stage 1, over stage 2, to stage 3 as the pathological development proceeds. On a most fundamental level of Being, conscious experience consists of TPCs between the self and the world. While healthy TPCs exist aside critical and fragmented ones in stage 1, the balance continuously shifts to abnormal TPCs as in stage 3. In stage 3, nihilism is associated with the severance of the self-world structure, since the intentional arc, reflected by the white TPCs including their interconnected lines, no longer properly spans across both the self and the world. TPCs, temporo-spatial connections.

It requires specification that a schizophrenic individual does not simply jump from one stage to the next, which would reflect a categorical-qualitative transition; instead, a fluid, continuous, and graded pathological development exists, which only on the conceptual-descriptive and interpretative level of our existential framework is definable by these 3 stages. Such a conceptual model necessarily comes with certain simplifications of the affected individuals' phenomenological and existential reality. Bridging the gap between phenomenological concepts and first-person accounts of existential nihilism, this attempt tentatively advances the self-world structure by suggesting 3 nested stages: each previous stage is contained within the underlying next stage. The top surface is reflected by the phenomenological stage that is nested within the underlying epistemological and ontological stages. The phenomenological and the epistemological stages are both nested within the most fundamental existential-ontological stage. Such nestedness allows deepening the 3 stages of nihilistic development in schizophrenia by additionally incorporating their dynamic pathological development.

Disruptions of the Self-World Structure in Schizophrenia: From Phenomenological Solipsism of Self and World to Existential-Ontological Nihilism of Being

First and foremost, it is important to note that the pathogenesis in schizophrenia negatively affects both sides of the self-world structure: this is reflected by the phenomenal experience of the self (the mineness, ipseity, or for-me-ness of experience) and of the world (object-directed intentionality) on all its distinct 3 stages and respective stages (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.2). 2 ). In consideration of the self's and world's sides of disruption, it has to be noted that since self and worldly experiences are intrinsically united, they are 2 sides of the same underlying disruption.

a The self-world structure is tentatively advanced by suggesting 3 distinct stages that elucidate and deepen the dynamic pathological development to the final occurrence of nihilism in schizophrenia. The upper part displays an overview of the general nestedness of the 3 distinct stages. Within the pathogenesis of nihilism in schizophrenia, initially, experience is negatively affected. Second, in addition to experience, the more far-reaching epistemological layer of principal knowledge is likewise negatively affected, and finally, self-consciousness faces its approximate annihilation, as reflected by the most fundamental existential-ontological stage. b Although both self and world are tightly interwoven within phenomenology, that is, they cannot be dissociated in healthy subjects, a conceptual-explanatory separation displays their individual disruptions in all 3 stages.

Generally, the first stage exhibits a disruption of the FPP, which is pre-reflective self-consciousness, while the second-person-perspective (SPP) and TPP of intersubjectivity and reflection are yet preserved. Within the second epistemological stage, the SPP and TPP are additionally impaired to the FPP. The impairment of the SPP and TPP concerns reflective self-consciousness, that is, the level of what can be experienced and known in principle about both the self and world. Reflective or non-immediate perspectives of experience are then relatively, that is, up to a certain degree, epistemologically excluded. Paradigmatically, the affected individual cannot consistently and outright contemplate upon her/his state of mind anymore but is exclusively bound to immediate pre-reflective experience. Holistic reflection about either the self or the world, therefore, is no longer possible. All 3 possible perspectives are intrinsically interwoven in subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Finally, the intentional structure of self-consciousness is fundamentally impaired within what we conceive as the annihilation of self-consciousness in the third existential-ontological stage. Within this final stage, the individual experiences and especially feels annihilation of existence and reality concerning both the self and the world. Doubting existence and reality in this final stage is not mediated within a TPP's reflection; instead, such annihilation sets the existential background in an immediate, pre-reflective, and pre-intentional fashion. In other words, the individual feels comprehensive annihilation of both the self and its relation to the world that is prelinguistic and therefore existential.

Beyond Experience and the Phenomenological Method − Need for an Existential Approach

Impairments of self-consciousness that lead to nihilism, including the reduction of the intentional arc and its associated minimization of the temporo-spatial expansion of consciousness (see section Ontological Nihilism: Temporo-Spatial Reduction of the Intentional Arc), require a framework that includes phenomenology, yet goes beyond ideal-typical phenomenological concepts and limitations. This is due to the fact that phenomenology conceives the intentional structure of consciousness as always and principally given for one's experience [ 1 , 21 , 29 , 40 , 41 , 47 , 51 , 52 ]. Accordingly, within the boundaries of the phenomenological framework, one cannot go beyond the notion of the “minimal self” for healthy subjects to provide a more comprehensive understanding of our proposal that the schizophrenic individual loses his self . This understanding stands in opposition to simplified characterizations of such experiences as mere psychotic delusions by objectified classificatory systems in modern psychiatry.

It was Laing, already in the year 1967, who criticized this viewpoint, which still represents present-day daily routine in psychiatry, where simplified diagnoses are conceived to be literally true entities. The schizophrenic individual faces a situation where the therapist may lack genuine interest in his subjective life-world. Criteria and labels are then applied that further inhibit deepening access into the patient's inner world to provide an interpersonal understanding of his existential dimension and experience of life. Such constellations between the therapist and the patient were described and criticized by Laing: “A feature of the interplay between psychiatrist and patient is that the patient's part is taken out of context, as is done in the clinical description, it might seem very odd. The psychiatrist's part, however, is taken as the very touchstone for our common-sense view of normality. The psychiatrist, as ipso facto sane, shows that the patient is out of contact with him. The fact that he is out of contact with the patient shows that there is something wrong with the patient, but not with the psychiatrist. But if one ceases to identity with the clinical posture, and looks at the psychiatrist-patient couple without such presuppositions, then it is difficult to sustain this naive view of the situation.” ([ 6 ], p. 89–90).

We argue that precisely this step, partially going beyond conceptual limitations to take the schizophrenic individual's experience seriously, is required to better account for the extreme experiences and feelings that converge into existential nihilism. The aforementioned clarifies why eminently the third and ultimate stage is fundamental in the sense that it tries to capture the existential dimension of nihilism, that is, the severance of the self-world structure, for example, by highlighting the role of pre-intentional “existential feelings” [ 16 , 17 , 18 ] (Fig. ​ (Fig.3). 3 ). Table ​ Table1 1 provides further understanding of our main concepts and terms that we use throughout the article.

The relationship between established phenomenological concepts, for example, by phenomenological psychopathology, and their applicability to the annihilation of self-consciousness in the final existential-ontological stage is roughly inverse. Phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology especially offer descriptive and interpretative power regarding stages 1 and 2. The final third stage, however, requires both to include yet to go beyond the contemporary conceptual horizon of phenomenology to account for existential nihilism.

Overview of main concepts

Existential framework: experience, knowledge, and existence. FPP, first-person-perspective; SPP, second-person-perspective; TPP, third-person-perspective.

Three-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism

Initial phenomenological solipsism toward the self and the environment, phenomenological solipsism: what is disrupted.

The first and uppermost phenomenological stage initiates with the disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience. Impaired is consequently the FPP concerning both the self and the world. As introduced in the sections Overview − Self-World Structure and a 3-Stage Existential Model of Schizophrenia Nihilism and Self-Consciousness as Constituted by the Ecological Self-World Structure, self-consciousness is ecologically co-constituted by the intrinsically unified self-world structure. Any disruption of the self's side also entails a disturbance of the world's side and vice versa, that is, the subjective experience and general perception of the natural environment and one's position within. The disruption of the FPP entails corrosive effects on specific phenomenological features. In that matter, we suggest that precisely the “mineness” or “ipseity” of experience suffers.

Phenomenological psychopathology traditionally subsumes such disruptions under the core disturbance of the self-disorder in schizophrenia [ 37 , 61 , 62 , 63 ]. Self-disorders already evolve in childhood or early adolescence [ 64 ] and within the general prodromal phase of schizophrenia [ 65 , 66 ]. The high temporal stability of anomalous experience in schizophrenia is reported by both first-person accounts and phenomenological psychopathology [ 2 , 59 , 67 , 68 ]. In her narratives, Kean [ 59 ] offers insight into altered self and world-related experiences:

Despite the “usual” voices, alien thoughts and paranoia, what scared me the most was a sense that I had lost myself, a constant feeling that my self no longer belonged to me. ([ 59 ], p. 1034).

The clinical symptoms come and go, but this nothingness of the self is permanently there. Not a single drug or therapy has ever helped with such nothingness. By nothingness, I mean a sense of emptiness, a painful void of existence that only I can feel. My thoughts, my emotions, and my actions, none of them belong to me anymore. This omnipotent and omnipresent emptiness has taken control of everything. I am an automaton, but nothing is working inside me. Schizophrenia has silenced my real self, and even the observing self is biased by the process of subjective observation. ([ 59 ], p. 1034)

Emphasis is on the circumstance that self-consciousness, conceived as the relation between the self and the world, is not immediately lost. While self-consciousness preserves, it nonetheless faces initial and multiple manifestations of disintegration plus fragmentation that are captured by analyses of phenomenological psychopathology [ 14 , 22 , 23 , 29 ] as well as by reports of first-person accounts [ 2 , 59 , 60 ]. Based on the previous findings above and in the Introduction, we infer that the disruption of self-consciousness seems to initially correspond to a comparatively higher top surface of the self-world structure. We define this top surface as the phenomenological stage of experience (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.2). 2 ). It is remarkably the final stage that provides the self's existence and reality as such , forasmuch as self-consciousness is not annihilated but “solely” disturbed on this first stage (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.1) 1 ) of pathogenesis.

Phenomenological Solipsism: Experience of Self

On the self's side of the self-world structure, the formerly named disruptions of the “mineness, for-me-ness, or ipseity” of pre-reflective self-consciousness occur. There is alterity of the “experiential” or “minimal” self as reflected by a “diminished self-affection” [ 14 , 20 , 21 , 40 , 53 , 54 , 69 ]. The individual's healthy ipseity deviates to alterity, manifested in the phenomenon that the FPP's immediate conscious experience is no longer intrinsically blended with the experiential self. The mineness of one's experience is consequently disrupted. It is precisely this mineness of experience that is taken for granted in healthy subjects [ 14 , 21 , 40 , 53 , 54 ].

The result is that a cardinal gap between the individual's experience and the latter's intrinsically melting connection to any sense-of-self opens up [ 28 ]. Sass [ 1 , 69 , 70 , 71 ] additionally describes this arising phenomenological gap via the concept of “diminished self-affection”: the experiential self and its relation to its normally own mental states are no longer experienced “on-line” from a centralized and immediate point of view. Instead, one's mental states now appear to be more distant; they emerge as significantly reflected rather than immediately experienced. Hence, mental states appear somewhat dissociated within a mediated TPP's contemplation or reflection instead of being directly inherent within the FPP's pre-reflective experience. Sass compresses diminished self-affection as follows: “[…] a profound weakening of the sense of existing as a subject of awareness, as a presence for oneself and before the world” ([ 69 ], p. 244).

Phenomenological Solipsism: Experience of World

On the world's side regarding the experience of environmental phenomena including their connection to the self, that is, objects, other living beings, and social interactions within the life-world, phenomenological solipsism entails a hyper-reflective stance toward the natural world and the relation of one's self with the former, often termed as “hyperreflexivity” [ 1 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 ]. In a most general explanation, hyperreflexivity refers to heightened forms of self-consciousness, so that the self abnormally relates itself to external environmental phenomena. Hyperreflexivity is often linked with the reduction of self-evidence concerning ordinary, implicit, and daily-life phenomena that are normally taken for granted in healthy subjects. Conversely, ordinary phenomena now seem increasingly suspicious to the schizophrenic individual, resulting in a hyper-reflective stance. This hyper-reflective attitude can paradigmatically be observed in the tendency to overanalyze everyday social interactions and behaviors of others because people cannot be understood reasonably anymore [ 73 ]. Such alterity of and alienation from worldly experiences was famously labeled as the crisis or collapse of common sense by German psychiatrist Blankenburg [ 74 ], further described in his book Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit (The loss of natural self-understandability) [ 75 ]. Overgaard and Henriksen [ 76 ], as well as Stanghellini [ 77 ], interpret the collapse of common sense as a disturbance of pre-reflective or intuitive attunement with others and the world. Besides, considerable reflection and suspiciousness about natural and ordinary environmental phenomena do not resolve this experiential gap toward the world. It is rather the case that alienation from the world negatively increases [ 78 ]. Sass [ 69 , 71 , 72 ] and Sass et al. [ 79 ] frequently term the experiential gap toward and alienation from the world as decreased “grip” or “hold” on the world. In this respect, Sass [ 71 , 72 ] assumes that hyperreflexivity and the associated crisis of the common sense are an inherent factor of altered self-consciousness, the “[…] vital, experiencing self, which normally serves as a constituting and orienting background for experience of the world” ([ 71 ], p. 599), is no more existent.

Phenomenological Solipsism: What Is Preserved

Abnormally altered experiences of both the self and the world conform to an initial disruption of the self-world structure. We subsume this commencing pathology under the umbrella concept of “phenomenological solipsism,” affecting the immediate and pre-reflective FPP's phenomenal experience. In contrast, the level of principal knowledge concerning the self and the world, represented by the underlying epistemological stage, is yet preserved. The prime feature of intentionality is still directed toward both the self and the world, which makes knowledge acquisition regarding both sides of the self-world structure possible. This initiating low to low-medium disruption of the FPP and of the self-world structure then converges into what is conceptualized as phenomenological solipsism toward one's self and the world (1) shown in Figures ​ Figures1 1 and ​ and2 2 .

Expanding from Experience to Knowledge: Epistemological Solipsism toward the Self and the World

Epistemological solipsism: what is disrupted.

In the second stage of pathogenesis, the epistemological layer of principal knowledge undergoes impairments. In addition to the FPP of immediate and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the SPP and TPP of reflective self-consciousness are now affected. Choosing a rather reflective or mediated TPP necessarily requires to go beyond the temporo-spatial frame of the immediate and pre-reflective FPP. Paradigmatically, one can think of the example of time whereby an axis connects the past over the present to the future. To reflect about either the past or the future, it is required to “stretch” one's mind beyond the present moment. In other words, remembering the past and anticipating the future rely on the ability to go beyond the immediate and pre-reflective experience of the present moment − the “now.” Going beyond pre-reflective experience of the present moment (the FPP) equals to a transition from the FPP over the SPP and finally to the TPP. In the TPP, one reflects upon his self and the relation of one's self to the world; consequently, there is a certain detachment from immediate and pre-reflective experience (FPP) to reflection that is situated in the TPP. The TPP is, therefore, not understood in the sense of an “objective” perspective, for example, one that empirical sciences claim to take, but a TPP inside the borders of one's experience that is nested within subjectivity. Such possible epistemological constraints of knowledge about oneself and one's relation to the world are likewise linkable to Zahavi's (2005) notion that self-knowledge is a natural aspect of human beings in addition to the FPP of the minimal self: “What contributions do such narratives make to the constitution of the self? It has been suggested that they make up the essential form and central constitutive of self-understanding and self-knowledge. In order to know who you are, in order to gain a robust self-understanding, it is not enough to simply be aware of oneself from the FPP. It is not sufficient to think of oneself as an I; a narrative is required” ([ 40 ], p. 118). A disruption of one's ability for reflection about both the self and the world is consequently equal to abnormal epistemological limitations: in this second stage, the schizophrenic individual is primarily bound to immediate experience that does not allow for comprehensive reflections upon her or his state of mind anymore. Similarly, a deeply depressed individual can be unable to properly reflect about her/his dysfunctional beliefs. Real possibilities the individual may still encounters are no longer perceived as such; for example, the individual underestimates her or his possibilities due to the depressive state of the mind, for example, reflection upon her/his dysfunctional attributional style is no longer possible.

While the experience of ipseity was replaced by alterity within the first stage, the schizophrenic individual now faces 2 possible unilateral disruptions regarding the intentional structure of consciousness. The unilateral directionality of intentionality spans either (1) too heavily toward the extreme end of the self at the expense of object-directed intentionality toward the world (reflecting isolation of the self from the world), or vice versa, that is, (2) too heavily to the extreme end of the world at the expense of the self (reflecting a massive immersion by the world and a significant reduction of the experiential self). This variation of the self-world structure and its unilateral imbalances in schizophrenia are mirrored in what Kean [ 59 ] terms “existential permeability” in her narrative first-person accounts:

My view is that the key to understanding such self-disturbances lies within how one relates to the external world and how one attributes this relationship to interpreting oneself. For example, if a person relates too much to the outside world, to such an extent that he ignores his own internal self, this may result in him feeling being engulfed by others. On the other hand, if one finds little or no connection to the world, he may think that his self is going to implode and destroy him from the inside. Basically, I call this relationship existential permeability. ([ 59 ], p. 1034–1035)

In his famous book Madness and Modernism , Sass [ 1 ] describes how self-consciousness requires a balanced relation within (or distance to) the world that comparatively reflects what Kean [ 2 , 59 ] labeled existential permeability. Sass states that “One must, among other things, maintain a certain optimal distance in one's experiential stance − neither coming so close to sensory or material particulars as to lose oneself in their sheer actuality, infinite minutiae, or endless mutability, nor moving so far away from particular objects or sensations as to lose touch with their conventional or practical significance.” ([ 1 ], p. 118). In schizophrenia, however, individuals deviate from a centered or balanced position within this continuum [ 1 ].

Consequently, the initial disturbance concerning the experiential self within the FPP now expands to abnormal constraints of principal knowledge (epistemology) of either the self or environmental phenomena regarding reflective consciousness of the SPP and TPP. Once intentionality approximately shifts to one of the extreme ends of the self-world structure's mutual continuum, the opposite side naturally becomes almost inaccessible. As already introduced in the sections Overview − Self-World Structure and a 3-Stage Existential Model of Schizophrenia Nihilism and Self-Consciousness as Constituted by the Ecological Self-World Structure, healthy self-consciousness, defined as a relational phenomenon, requires an ecologically constituted balance of the self-world structure, so that intentionality spans across self and world. Consequently, in the possible 2 extreme unidirectional variations of intentionality, either self or world is virtually and temporarily excluded from the individual's experience. In the account of the above and numerous phenomenological analyses, presented subsequently, it is possible to deduce the following self-world structure's quantitative continuum regarding the intentional structure of self-consciousness and its epistemological limitations in the advanced pathogenesis of schizophrenia (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.4 4 ).

The self-world structure consists of a reciprocal balance between both ends of its mutual continuum (as reflected by self and world). Alternating unilateral imbalances of the self-world structure either excessively toward the self or the world can manifest in schizophrenia. Either the world, that is, natural environmental phenomena, or the self, that is, any sense of self, consequently becomes epistemologically excluded within phenomenal experience. Under these circumstances, both the self and the world partially cannot be experienced anymore at the same time and consequently lack their respective intentional focus. The intrinsic union of self-consciousness and the self-world structure is then bygone.

Epistemological Solipsism: Experience of Self

On the self's side of the self-world structure, intentionality unilaterally shifts to the other 1-sided extreme of approximately only reflective self-consciousness. This shift leaves almost no room for healthy environmental phenomena and a corresponding sufficient amount of object-directed intentionality. Epistemological limitations of self-consciousness are potentially exemplified in the differentiation of the immediate subjective “I” as noetic and the “me” as objective noematic self by Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura (1931-): while the subjective “I” (noetic self) refers to the prelinguistic immediate experience of life and the world (FPP), the noematic self appears within mediated reflection (SPP and TPP). Once the ongoing immediate experience of the “I” is taken into explicit awareness, it already becomes the objective noematic self − the “me” [ 45 ]. Healthy subjects always exhibit a balanced structure between the “I” as noetic self and the “me” as noematic self, which, on the contrary, is imbalanced in schizophrenic individuals [ 37 , 45 , 80 ]. If the subjective pre-reflective I of one's self and worldly experiences is disordered, the reflectional objective me concerning one's phenomenology likewise gets affected on the grounds of the intrinsically structural relationship between noetic I and noematic self. Ultimately, the union of self-consciousness, which is always about the self and the world, is separated [ 44 ]. Self and world consequently cannot be perceived simultaneously any longer. This separation reflects altered epistemological limitations: the exclusion of either the self or the world and the impairment of healthy unified self-consciousness.

Epistemological Solipsism: Experience of World

In the perspective of the world's side of the self-world structure, the self is conversely “drown” in the environment since intentionality unilaterally directs toward the world. Any significant sense of self can no longer be perceived as such “on-line.” The experiential self and the mineness or for-me-ness of experience not only becomes temporarily inaccessible within the pre-reflective FPP, but likewise in the SPP of intersubjectivity and TPP concerning reflection. Two further quotations by Humpston [ 60 ] harmonize with our suggested unilateral shift of intentionality toward the world:

I thought I was dissolving into the world; my core self was perforated and unstable, accepting all the information permeating from the external world without filtering anything out. Where did my self end and where did the external world start? ([ 60 ], p. 241)

[…] when there was heightened salience from my surroundings, I would be absorbed by the external world, but my self tended to dissociate simultaneously. ([ 60 ], p. 241)

It is inferred that with a further intensification of the schizophrenic crisis, the environment temporarily and drastically vanishes. Meaningful and vivid recognition of real environmental phenomena fades. Sophisticated behavioral interactions with environmental phenomena can no longer be consciously related neither to the individual in general nor to any sense of self [ 54 , 62 ] including sense of agency [ 81 ] in particular. In this respect, Henriksen et al. delineate experiences “[…] of not being fully present in the world (e.g., manifested in feelings of being ephemeral, not fully existing, lacking a core,” decreased emotional resonance and responsivity, and in a pervasively felt distance to the world) or quasi-solipsistic experiences.” ([ 28 ], p. 6). The reciprocal influence between both sides of the self-world structure crystalizes: imbalances of intentionality occur as a result of the fact that the disruption of self-consciousness entails following impairments of environmental perception since self-presence and presence in the world are 2 interwoven sides of the same underlying fundament, as reflected by the unified self-world structure [ 12 , 21 , 29 ]. This self-alienation from the world is also referred to as disruption of the self's merging “presence” within common human life along with the experience of distancing environmental phenomena in the world [ 62 , 82 ]. In short, a phenomenological fluid attunement to the world is bygone [ 70 ]. Accordingly, the following excerpt of such experience by Kean [ 2 ] validates the formerly indicated:

My self − or someone else's self − was already out there, controlling my every move without my conscious awareness. I was trapped in the nothingness between the internal and the external, hiding behind the veil of my own perceptions, which I didn't perceive to be my own. ([ 2 ], p. 5)

As Parnas and Sass [ 27 ] declare, the self-world structure or subject-object articulation becomes blurred. Unilateral imbalances are additionally and often portrayed by phenomenological psychopathology [ 12 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 83 ], for example, as unstable or permeable boundaries between the self and others/world, so that “the patient may feel somehow transparent, without any barriers, ‘radically exposed’ or ‘as if’ fusing with others or the surroundings.” [ 84 , 85 ]. Parnas et al. [ 54 ] label this the permeability of the self-world boundary, which comes very close to Kean's [ 2 , 59 ] notion of existential permeability and the former quotation above:

The patient experiences himself and his interlocutor as if being mixed up or interpenetrated, in the sense that he loses his sense of whose thoughts, feelings, or expressions originate in whom. He may describe it as a feeling of being invaded, intruded upon in a nonspecific but unpleasant or anxiety-provoking way. ([ 54 ], p. 254)

Epistemological Solipsism: Fragmentation of Temporality

Additionally, affecting both self and world experiences simultaneously, altered epistemological limitations can be intrinsically linked and traceable to the often reported impairments of subjective time within the phenomenal experience of schizophrenic individuals [ 82 , 86 ]. Frozen phenomenal time within schizophrenia was firstly rigorously described by French psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972) [ 87 ], where self-consciousness lacks its alignment to the presence in general as well as to environmental situations and phenomena in particular [ 86 ]. Up to present-day research, both phenomenological psychopathology and philosophy extensively report abnormal time experiences in schizophrenia [ 6 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 ]. A loss of fluid temporal continuity within self-consciousness, the “inner time-consciousness” [ 8 ], is frequently reported [ 1 , 98 , 99 ]. “Temporal continuity” is replaced by “temporal fragmentation” of conscious time perception [ 88 , 89 ], which means that a flowing and smooth transition from one perception to the other is bygone. The temporal background where all phenomenal experiences are virtually linked is impaired. Therefore, self-consciousness and connections to the environment, allowing for real interactions, that is, intentional behaviors and receptive feedback as primary dimensions of consciousness [ 32 , 33 ], commence vanishing. Stanghellini et al. [ 100 ] consider the inability of perceptual immersion in the world and arising solipsism toward the former to be the main consequence of the perceptual loss of “inner time-consciousness” in schizophrenia. In conclusion, epistemological solipsism toward the self and natural environmental phenomena furthermore includes epistemological gaps toward the most basal configurations of Being. More precisely, the configuration of space and time within the inner time-consciousness of schizophrenic individuals. Pathological malfunction of inner space and time is linkable to the schizophrenic individuals formerly described experience of existing in another dimension or ontology [ 14 , 20 , 101 ], since the one's existence is fundamentally constituted by certain configurations of space and time.

Epistemological Solipsism: What Is Preserved

In the second stage of epistemological solipsism, all possible perspectives one can take, that is, the FPP, SPP, and TPP are ultimately impaired. Abnormal constraints of perspectives consequently include both the immediate, pre-reflective experience and principal knowledge concerning both the self and the world. What is preserved is the experience of existence itself, the feeling that one is still an existent within Being. Even though the self together with the environment is increasingly perceived to be temporally inaccessible, and a maladaptation of inner space and time to the world's space and time configuration arises, perception of existence and reality is yet maintained. There is thus a medium to medium-high disruption of self-consciousness in the epistemological stage of the self-world structure: experience is either no longer able to intentionally expand beyond the borders of the person into the environment, reflecting isolation of the self (including epistemological solipsism toward the world), nor phenomenal experience can healthily capture the natural environment, that is, by simultaneously keeping a significant sense of self via self-referential perception at the same time alive. Since existence and Being are still present in experience, the ontological stage is still preserved even in epistemological solipsism. In conclusion, this development corresponds to epistemological solipsism toward the self and the environment (2) (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.1, 1 , ​ ,2 2 ).

Existential-Ontological Nihilism: Annihilation of Self-Consciousness

Ontological nihilism: existential outline.

Nothing, as experience, arises as absence of someone or something. No friends, no relationships, no pleasure, no meaning in life, no ideas, no mirth, no money. As applied to parts of the body − no breast, no penis, no good or bad contents − emptiness. ([ 6 ], p. 32)

When reaching the ultimate stage of nihilism in schizophrenia, what possibilities exist to investigate into the FPPs intrinsically subjective nature of this unconceivable condition; notably when one tries to grasp nihilism from a healthy perspective? Is the presumption of any possibility regarding a descriptive-interpretative approach, one that does not originate from the affected individual himself, toward this existential crisis not already impossible right from its onset? We believe that one cannot appropriately describe, interpret, or even understand the “what-it-is-like,” that is, the phenomenal quality of nihilism in schizophrenia. The aim of trying to approximate the existential situation the schizophrenic individual finds her/himself in might represent the only viable option. This approximation contains the characterization of abnormally altered relations between the self and the world. Instead of directly targeting the phenomenal quality of experience and feelings (the relata or elements), which are only accessible to the affected individual, one can investigate the misbalance (as in relations and structure) and severance of the self-world structure. The severance of the latter can then be described in reference to experience.

We suggest and elaborate on the experience of nihilism by dividing the third stage into 5 subparts: (1) existential feelings of nihilism (see section Ontological Nihilism: Existential Feelings); (2) the impairment of the intentional arc (see section Ontological Nihilism: Temporo-Spatial Reduction of the Intentional Arc); (3) the annihilation of self-consciousness (see section Ontological Nihilism: The Annihilation of Self-Consciousness); (4) Christian Scharfetter's ideas on nihilism in schizophrenia (see section Ontological Nihilism: Scharfetter's Ideas on Nihilism in Schizophrenia); and (5) last, the remains of experience − the notion of “blind-consciousness” (see section Ontological Nihilism: The Remains of Experience − The Notion of “Blind-Consciousness”). The transition into the third stage is conceptualized based on the pathological increase of the former 2 stages, that is, phenomenological and epistemological solipsism. Comprehensive epistemological solipsism devours any luminous accessibility toward both one's self and the environment, so that a converging into ontological nihilism manifests. This development touches Being as the deepest stage of one's existence (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.1, 1 , ​ ,2). 2 ). Conceptually, in the stage of ontological nihilism, the self-world structure's most fundamental ontological stage, including the nested phenomenological and epistemological layers, collapses. The comprehensive impairment of all possible perspectives concerning self-consciousness, that is, of the FPP, SPP, and TPP, entails the disruption of a coherent point of view. Metaphorically speaking, a healthy point of view transforms into a “view from nowhere.” Heidegger's [ 7 ] notion of being-in-the-world of our “Dasein” (being-there/here) within the pre-given, self-evident, and natural life-world that human beings share, interact, and practically operate in does no longer apply. An interactive, dynamic, and as Minkowski famously termed “vital contact with reality” [ 87 ], which pre-reflectively guarantees the individual's belonging to the intersubjective life-world as an immediate “lived reality” (instead of autistic and aloof reflection on the former), is transformed into an existential void of nihilism, a diminishing of the lived and intersubjective accessible reality − the “sense of reality.” We display the ultimate collapse of the self-world structure's unification in Figure ​ Figure5 5 .

The third stage of ontological nihilism corresponds to the severance of the self-world structure. Consequently, all possible perspectives of self-consciousness, that is, the FPP, SPP, and TPP, are altogether impaired. Any possible healthy point of view is therefore impaired; hence, the schizophrenic individual experiences himself as dead or decayed. Simultaneously, experience concerning the world contains its doom or that the world has vanished. FPP, first-person-perspective; SPP, second-person-perspective; TPP, third-person-perspective.

Ontological Nihilism: Existential Feelings

What is changed in nihilism is the whole background of one's existence, referring to a shift in Ratcliffe's [ 16 ] notion of “existential feelings.” How can we shortly introduce and link existential feelings with nihilism? First, existential feelings undermine the frequently observed artificial dissociation between the concepts of self/body-world; internal/mind-external/world; subject-object; and cognitive-affective. 2 Instead, existential feelings are the “background orientations through which experience as a whole is structured.” ([ 16 ], p. 38). Second, existential feelings are bodily feelings concerning the relatedness to the world containing the sense of reality regarding one's being-in-the-world. According to Ratcliffe [ 16 ], background feelings, that is, existential feelings, are bodily feelings and at the same time feelings of worldly phenomena, since it is the body that feels (rather than the body being a mere “object” of perception). Ratcliffe's understanding of existential feelings perfectly mirrors the notion of the intrinsically unified self-world structure, as he writes that “a feeling is a relation between body and world, rather than a perception of one in isolation” and that “bodily and worldly aspects of feeling do not respect a clear subject-object distinction.” ([ 16 ], p. 106).

Drawing on Heidegger's [ 7 ] “moods,” Ratcliffe's [ 16 ] existential feelings are not about specific phenomena in the world: neither moods nor existential feelings are intentional states ; instead, moods or existential feelings are phenomenologically conceived most fundamentally, based on the fact that they constitute our being-in-the-world. Healthy moods and existential feelings are a necessary prerequisite concerning the intentional structure of self-consciousness. According to Ratcliffe [ 16 ], one cannot lose existential feelings, but what can happen is an “existential change.” We propose that such an elementary shift of the relatedness or belonging to the world is present in nihilism, which accordingly entails a complete shift of all “higher” or “foreground” emotions regarding the self and object-directed intentional states toward the world. Based on the collapse of the self-world structure's ontological core layer, existential feelings of no longer belonging to the world (to the “Being of beings” by using Heidegger's [ 7 ] terminology) arise. Such densely diminished sense of reality transforms one's existence into a void. “Feelings of nothingness” concerning both the self and the world will emerge.

We further define “feelings of nothingness” as the immediate, pre-reflective, and prelinguistic experience of nihilism. The existential situation of nihilism is immediate and pre-reflective because the schizophrenic individual cannot reflect upon it due to the temporo-spatial minimization of the intentional arc (see section Ontological Nihilism: Temporo-Spatial Reduction of the Intentional Arc), which is mirrored in the formerly elaborated phenomenological as well as epistemological constraints. It is prelinguistic not only because the connection to the social life-world and common sense is disrupted, but likewise based on the basis that existential feelings themselves cannot be articulated or expressed in a way comprehensible for a healthy person that fully lacks the intrinsically subjective nature and experience of existential nihilism. Therefore, existential nihilism can neither be substantially articulated to the therapist nor substantially conceptualized into objective features.

When we conceive existential nihilism in the perspective of existential feelings, especially in Ratcliffe's [ 16 ] understanding of the latter, then experiences and feelings of nihilism in schizophrenia cease to be connected to intentional states of consciousness, since the existential status of nihilism is itself grounded and present within a more fundamental pre-intentional realm of experience (see section Ontological Nihilism: The Remains of Experience–the Notion of “Blind-Consciousness”). Due to its pre-intentional character, feelings of nihilism can undermine the level of intentionality. These experiences and feelings that fall into the schizophrenic individual's realm, and which are noncompatible with well-established conceptual frameworks of phenomenology and psychiatry, were accordingly addressed by Laing as being a journey into the inner world and that “we are so out of touch with this realm that many people can now argue seriously that it does not exist.” ([ 6 ], p. 105).

Ontological Nihilism: Temporo-Spatial Reduction of the Intentional Arc

Traditionally, phenomenology cannot reach out beyond the intentional structure of consciousness due to the fact that phenomenologically conceived intentionality is the necessary predisposition for being conscious about something [ 1 , 21 , 29 , 40 , 41 , 47 , 51 , 52 ]. However, as we declared in the Introduction, we suppose that nihilism in the neuropsychiatric condition of schizophrenia exhibits a deep impairment of the intentional arc of consciousness. By first taking Merleau-Ponty's [ 49 ] concepts of the “intentional arc” and second his notion of the “horizontal structure of experience” into account, we will further elaborate on the temporo-spatial minimization of intentionality.

The intentional arc connects conscious acts of the self with respective objects of the world toward which one guides intentionality. Moran ([ 48 ], p. 595) concisely defines the intentional arc as follows: “This ‘intentional arc' is an overarching framework that connects the self to the world and unifies its life, holding everything together in a coherent, meaningful way.” We propose that within the state of existential nihilism, the intentional arc can no longer fully span across both the self and the world, that is, the intention or goal of conscious acts can no longer reach out to its respective intentional objects. Such fundamental impairment of the intentional arc is equivalent to a comprehensive reduction of the subjective temporo-spatial range of consciousness, that is, the decline in subjective time and space. Vivid and meaningful experience, ranging from the most basic practical purposes up to the highest theoretical abstractions, enters the realm of an existential void if nothing can genuinely be perceived and known in principle beyond comprehensive doubt anymore. Under these circumstances, meaningful perception of phenomena as well as goal-directed behavior, for example, regarding practical purposes, are no longer possible. Providing an example regarding the loss of meaning, the schizophrenic individual may “experience” the therapist and their dialogue, but the significance or the “grasp” of the situation in conjunction with intentional behavior toward their interaction may be inaccessible. Experience loses its goals, values, and ultimately the connection to the world. Profound impairments of intentionality and practical possibilities, therefore, mirror the severance of one's being-in-the-world, our “Dasein” within (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.6), 6 ), since “the experience of being there is not a matter of being plonked into a spatial location but of being practically situated in an interconnected web of purposes, an appreciation of which is inseparable from practical activity.” ([ 16 ], p. 46).

The intentional arc can no longer fully span across both the self and the world. This entails the breakdown of the intentional structure of consciousness, so that the unification of the self and the world dissolves. Conceived from another perspective, the intentional arc cannot “hold” or “carry” self-consciousness across a significant extent of space and time anymore; ultimately, the individual “falls” out of Heidegger's [ 7 ] notion of being-in-the-world into the existential void of nihilism, where one's “Dasein” (being-there/here) is no longer provided.

The horizontal structure of experience refers to possibilities that already inherently exist within immediate and pre-reflective experience. Such possibilities range from the most practical ones, for example, that a chair's practical usability is the possibility to sit on it, to the rather abstract opportunities, for example, the possibilities that life offers regarding one's career choices or personal beliefs. While an expanded horizontal structure concerning the functionality of objects and the significance of experience is offered and taken for granted in healthy subjects, conversely, the schizophrenic individual's horizon in the condition of nihilism is diminished. Paradigmatically, the affected individual is physically in the same room as the therapist, but the schizophrenic individual is not within the common sense, social, or life-world of practical possibilities. He or she does not share any healthy horizontal structure of experience. We tentatively go so far as to suggest that practical possibilities of ordinary life do not merely diminish but that most meaning is epistemologically excluded and hence annihilated. Such exclusion from the world additionally decreases the sense of reality and one's felt belonging to the world.

In the perspective of the intentional arc and the horizontal structure of experience, nihilism can consequently be defined in form of a reduction of graspable as well as self-affecting meaning, a radical diminishing of the lived and intersubjective accessible reality − the “sense of reality.” Such sense of reality comprises the experience of one's vital and meaningful presence within Being in general and belonging to the social life-world in particular. Conversely, the sense of reality concerning one's self and worldly experiences is taken for granted by healthy subjects, since it is guaranteed by a comprehensive temporo-spatial frame, so that intentionality intrinsically connects and merges the person and the world. In nihilism, conversely, this temporo-spatial connection between the self and the world is profoundly diminished (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.1b 1b ).

Ontological Nihilism: The Annihilation of Self-Consciousness

The beginning of stage 3 introduced the severance of the self-world structure, resulting in nihilism. In the section Ontological Nihilism: Existential Feelings, we subsequently described how existential feelings of nothingness that are immediate and pre-reflective can additionally account for an existential change into nihilism. Furthermore, the section Ontological Nihilism: Temporo-Spatial Reduction of the Intentional Arc elaborated on the impairment of the intentional arc. The combination of these pieces might ultimately allow for the deduction that what is phenomenologically conceived to be self-consciousness does no longer exist in existential nihilistic states in schizophrenia. The fundamental impairment of self-consciousness can even be supported by phenomenological psychopathology, precisely by relying on the fact that the possibility of self-consciousness is based on the intact self-world structure [ 21 , 29 ]. The existence of the self-world structure is a necessary predisposition of self-consciousness, forasmuch as the living being contains no separate existence prior to or beyond the world to which it would then connect in a second step. Instead, the living being including healthy self-consciousness is this very relational constituted structure to and with the world [ 24 , 32 , 33 , 36 , 54 , 58 ]. Healthy self-consciousness requires the immersion of being-in-the-world [ 54 ]. Accordingly, Kimura states that “[..] the ‘Subject’ can be effective only as long as the organism continues to live, it certainly belongs to this organism, but it by no means resides inside of it. Its place of being is between the organism and the environment, therefore in a certain sense outside the organism” ([ 37 ], p. 334). Consistently to the notion of self-consciousness as a relational phenomenon between the organism and the world, Jaspers [ 103 ] already declared that the human psyche, that is, self-consciousness, is not an “object” (i.e., an entity), but the integration of both the inner and the outer world. Kean [ 2 ] elucidates the severance of the self's relation to the world in the following quotation:

In my delusion, I cannot die because my true self has already died; in the universal reality, I cannot die because I do not reside in the objective reality. A delusion is the deception from the so-called “reality” to which we entrust our perception. In other words, reality lied to me − which made it no longer objective. I did not only lose my own self, I also lost my reality. There was nothing for me to believe except my nonexistence, over which I had no control. I knew there had been something, which turned into nothing. It was like combining matter with antimatter − you create a state of total annihilation but also a state of unity and stasis. ([ 2 ], p. 6)

Kean states that she did not only lose her self but also her reality. Based on the interwoven relation between the self and the world, one cannot lose one side without a significant impact on the other side. The felt minimization of one's relatedness to the world was accurately captured and described by Jaspers [ 3 ] as der absolute Nihilismus in Psychosen (the absolute nihilism in psychoses):

The patient can have no feeling, as he says, and in doing so he has the most immoderate affects of despair. He is not the former person. He is only a point. Within feelings and delusions, this experience is specified to the richest: the body is rotten, hollow, the food tumbles through an empty space when it is swallowed. The sun has gone out etc. In this state there is only the intensity of the affect, the despair as such. ([ 3 ], p. 265)

Interestingly, Jaspers [ 3 ] distinguished a state of reflective nihilism from a more extreme pre-reflective form of nihilism. Reflective nihilism is present in highly skeptical individuals within the prodromal phase of schizophrenia; here, the schizophrenic individual may be able to somewhat reflect upon his existential state. The pre-reflective form of nihilism, however, only arises in full-blown schizophrenia. In this latter state, we conceive existential nihilism, that today falls under the label of “psychosis” in institutionalized psychiatry.

The pre-reflective form of nihilism is immediately and “lived through” instead of reflectively contemplated. Wherever the skeptical schizophrenic individual within the prodromal phase possibly holds a solipsistic experience or worldview, as frequent psychopathological findings report [ 1 , 22 , 24 , 84 , 101 , 103 ], he still experiences a partial grounding or “hold” of his Dasein so that being-in-the-world is not lost. Jaspers [ 3 ] metaphorically describes that such an individual within the prodromal phase has a skeptical and individualistic (reflective) mind; nonetheless, his mind is not yet throughout and necessarily “skeptical” as it is in the case in the state of pre-reflective “absolute nihilism” within psychosis. It is necessary to identify that pre-reflective and absolute nihilism is not identical to metaphysical, linguistically medicated speculation and reflection concerning Being. Instead, existential nihilism is the severance of the self's unification with the world. Metaphorically, existential nihilism in schizophrenia is a flood wave that affects experience and feelings on their pre-reflective and prelinguistic scale in the sense that it washes being-in-the-world away. Concerning such psychotic experiences, Jaspers conformably stated that “at the beginning of schizophrenic psychoses, skepticism is sometimes not only thought calmly but experienced desperately.” ([ 4 ], p. 247). Existential nihilism consequently reaches far beyond the famous concept of Jaspers' Grenzsituation (border situation), since the collapse of the self-world structure and the impairment of self-consciousness prevent the individual from choosing a coherent and meaningful point of view, as offered by healthy FPP, SPP, or TPP.

Ontological Nihilism: Scharfetter's Ideas on Nihilism in Schizophrenia

More recently, the idea of the self's possible annihilation was similarly shared by Swiss psychiatrist Christian Scharfetter (1936–2012) [ 46 , 104 , 105 , 106 ]. Building on experiential modes of self-awareness by Jaspers [ 103 ], which Scharfetter called “ego-consciousness,” he developed 5 basic dimensions of self-consciousness based on the individual's experiences. Scharfetter [ 46 , 104 , 105 , 106 , 107 , 108 ] conceptualized these 5 dimensions as vitality, activity, consistency/coherence, demarcation, and identity. It is the dimension of “vitality” that is the relevant for nihilism in schizophrenia. Vitality is the sense of being alive, which is abnormally heightened in mania eventually leading to megalomania, while on the contrary, it is reduced or even lost in schizophrenia [ 46 , 104 ]. Vitality reflects a quantitative continuum, where on its extreme ends, specific neuropsychiatric disorders are located. The core disturbance of schizophrenia is accordingly considered to be the ego/self-fragmentation and dissolution by Scharfetter [ 46 , 105 , 106 ]. In its extreme manifestations, the ego/self-fragmentation amounts to a loss of vitality, resulting in the final annihilation of the ego/self and the loss of the phenomenal world [ 46 ]. The annihilation of one's perceived existence seems to be a paradoxical configuration we did not yet touch upon. Strangely, the schizophrenic individual's experience and report of this very doom still exist. According to Scharfetter [ 46 ], the FPP is only left in the form of an “a-personal” and overwhelming suffering: “for the person with schizophrenia, the ‘cogito ergo sum’ of Descartes is not convincing and the fact that he is in dialogue with this therapist is not an argument against his non-being.” ([ 109 ], p. 71).

We can take this ambiguity and the paradox into perspective under the light of Heidegger's conceptualization of “Being” versus “beings.” Following Heidegger's [ 7 ] concepts and terminology, the schizophrenic individual's ontology ( Sein [Being]), which is most fundamental the “Being of beings,” can be separated from his intended ontic meaning or status regarding the empirical reality and natural world ( Seiende [beings]). As for addressing the latter, that is, our shared and social life-world, the schizophrenic individual may lack equivalent conceptualizations and linguistic powers, by which he could articulate the elementary existential change into ontological nihilism (instead of “ontic nihilism”). Concerning the fact that, paradigmatically, such an individual continues to follow a daily routine after having just declared that he is dead and that the world does not exist, Sass [ 1 ] elucidates that “[…] like a philosopher of solipsism who continues to move his pencil as if it were an objective thing and to address his colleagues as if ‘other minds’ really did exist, such a patient may well carry on a semblance of normal life in spite of his own belief in the supposed nonexistence of reality.” ([ 1 ], p. 245).

The schizophrenic individual's overwhelming suffering in nihilism, as described by Scharfetter [ 46 ], as well as the change in his most fundamental existential feeling, can consequently not refer to the sole ontic empirical reality. Instead, such forms of pathology may arise from the constitutional and disrupted ontological layer of existence. In another perspective, this reflects a shift of the individual's existential orientation, precisely his existential feelings when using Ratcliffe's [ 16 ] conceptualizations. Existential feelings serve as the background of one's lived existence, and existential feelings of nihilism destroy any vivid and vital form of self-consciousness. Even though vivid and vital experience is absent in “feelings of nothingness,” it is precisely this nihilistic experience that is perceived . Ratcliffe specifies this phenomenon: “Experience of absence is not the absence of something from experience − the ‘nothing’ as Heidegger recognizes, is ‘there’.” ([ 16 ], p. 72). Consequently, not the absence of any experience is present, but an overarching existential “feeling of nothingness” remains. The drastically diminished sense of reality, the severance of one's belonging to the world, is felt as such . Ratcliffe [ 16 ] declares that philosophical language might be too restricted to provide satisfactory explanations of such felt nothingness. However, explanations, whereas they often appear as vague and metaphorical, can be found in the everyday language of people who are affected by such existential feelings. When considering the above, it might be more comprehensible how intensive experiences and feelings of authentic “nothingness” can converge into the expressions of being dead or that the world is doomed. The understanding of the schizophrenic individual's existential situation in nihilism and his expressions as not being literal statements of his ontic empirical reality, but instead of his existential background of experience, is likewise shared by Ratcliffe: “What the patient is expressing is a radically altered existential orientation, rather than a propositional content” ([ 16 ], p. 167) and that “what is lost is the sense of existence that ordinarily operates as a background to all experience.” ([ 16 ], p. 169).

Ontological Nihilism: The Remains of Experience − The Notion of “Blind-Consciousness”

What remains in the experience and state of nihilism? When converging the above, the experience transforms into a pre-intentional mode that we term “blind-consciousness” due to the lack of intentionality. Subjectivity can no longer provide its transcendental function regarding the sense of reality in general plus any sense of self and the relatedness toward the world in particular. We can only conceive such a pre-intentional state as metaphysical horror − where both the self and the world are no longer accessible in any healthy fashion. Within this state of existence bereft of any possibilities, the schizophrenic individual does not reflectively infer that he is dead and that the world no longer exists; instead, “feelings of nothingness,” or the impairment of the horizontal structure of consciousness regarding one's practical possibilities within the world, is inherently interwoven into this pre-intentional state. One cannot reflect upon it but only immediately go through it.

Consequently, within pre-intentional blind-consciousness, all levels of self-consciousness are fundamentally disrupted: (1) the reflective and linguistically mediated narrative self and (2) the pre-reflective experiential self of immediate experience. In favor of Zahavi's [ 40 , 41 , 42 , 110 ] notion that the reflective and narrative self, for example, mediated by the SPP's introspection, relies on the existence of the most fundamental experiential self, it is evident to conclude that any schizophrenic individual within the pre-intentional level of blind-consciousness reports that his self has died and that the world has vanished (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.7 7 ).

The conceptual distinction between 2 layers of self-consciousness and its annihilation in a third layer allows. The possibility for narrative and thus reflective explanations regarding the individual's self (the narrative self) relies on the healthy and underlying pre-reflective experiential self of the immediate stream of consciousness. Within the stage of ontological nihilism, however, even the experiential self is annihilated. The only remain is a pre-intentional “blind-consciousness” that lacks a coherent, vital, and meaningful subjectivity and including one's relatedness and belonging to the world.

Within the individual's phenomenal world, the reflective narrative self of the social sphere cannot exist anymore once the underlying experiential self of immediate experience and the sense of self thoroughly collapsed. Sass [ 1 ] declares that “[…] schizophrenia does in fact involve a sort of death-in-life […]” regarding the loss of “the very sense of being alive and present both to oneself and the world.” ([ 1 ], p. xxvii). Remaining is a “dead” experience consisting of entire alienation from environmental phenomena in relation to the self and vice versa. The state of pre-intentional blind-consciousness now constitutes the existential void of ontological nihilism. Here, neither the self nor the world remains; nothing further exists beyond this most fundamental pre-intentional layer. Pure, authentic, and throughout feelings of nothingness permeate the individual's experience. The schizophrenic individual's existential situation transforms into a meaningless void, that is , the form of existential nihilism that we target , which conceptually represents the final stage of ontological nihilism concerning Being (3) (shown in Fig. ​ Fig.1, 1 , ​ ,2 2 ).

Conclusively, we wish to underline that any objective classification of nihilistic experiences and feelings in schizophrenia, the characterization as “psychotic delusion” does not fulfill our responsibility and care toward affected individuals. One has to go insofar to declare that not the person expressing his subjectivity, the inner world, where self and the world are annihilated, is the deluded person. On the contrary, following Laing [ 5 , 6 ], the delusion is on the therapist's side once he sweeps the patient's statements aside under the label of “psychosis.” Our conviction builds on 2 reasons: first, we wish to understand the individual's existential situation best possible; this means to lay bare its existential reality − it is real and existent and thus ontological for which reason it should not be denigrated as mere delusion. Second, future studies might offer explanatory power covering the brain's neuronal level to provide insight that the brain's relationship with the world is so fundamentally disrupted in these individuals that one can better account for such inconceivable conditions of consciousness.

In summary, we propose a 3-stage existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia. Relying on first-person accounts, psychopathology, phenomenology, and philosophy in general, we suggest 3 stages that continuously transit and nest into each other. The 3 stages include (1) phenomenological solipsism, (2) epistemological solipsism, and (3) ontological nihilism within an existential framework. They represent disruptions in the phenomenological, epistemological, and ontological realms of the self-world structure in schizophrenia. Future studies are warranted to provide further psychopathological and neuronal support to such an existential 3-stage model of nihilism in schizophrenia. The empirical reality forces us to reject categorical labels including criteria and to instead focus on quantitative temporo-spatial dynamics of consciousness and the brain. Among others, the Fingelkurts brothers recently correctly addressed that “despite the fact that these criteria were initially intended to be simple operationalizations of clinical phenomena, over time, such categorical classifications began to be treated as if they were natural and ontologically (i.e., neurobiologically) […].” ([ 111 ], p. 54). We hereby highlight that further studies concerning nihilistic experiences and feelings warrant the investigation of the brain's temporo-spatial mechanisms regarding its alignment to the world. Finally, neuroscientific research of nihilism in schizophrenia will fall under the broader frameworks of “spatiotemporal neuroscience” [ 112 , 113 ] and “spatiotemporal psychopathology” [ 114 , 115 ]. Further, one may want to compare our model to other occurrences of nihilism, for instance, in depression. Depression exhibits a different kind of self-disorder as featured by increased self-focus rather than the kind of self-fragmentation that permeates schizophrenia [ 116 , 117 ]. How such increased self-focus in depression leads to the decoupling and dissociation of self from the world, we deem essential in our 3-stage model, remains to be shown in the future − “different roads lead to Rome.” Albeit tentatively, our 3-stage model may provide a novel broader framework to investigate changes of self and world in schizophrenia in a more comprehensive way on phenomenological, psychopathological, and neuronal grounds.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Author Contributions

P.K. developed the idea and the 3-stage model and wrote various drafts of the article, while G.N. supervised and structured the text throughout the various stages of the development.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank clinician and psychiatrist Filipe Arantes-Gonçalves for a few useful suggestions on our article. Two anonymous reviewers provided additional remarks that helped to substantially improve the quality of our model.

1 Regarding the hereby treated form of self-consciousness, Zahavi explicates its pre-reflective form as follows: “[…] the experiential self − is not a separately existing entity − it is not something that exists independently of, in separation from, or in opposition to the stream of consciousness −but neither it is simply reducible to a specific experience or (sub)set of experiences; nor is it, for that matter, a mere social construct that evolves through time. Rather, it is taken to be an integral part of our conscious life. More precisely, the claim is that the (minimal or core) self possesses experiential reality and that it can be identified with the ubiquitous first-person character of the experiential phenomena.” [ 42 , p. 18]. This phenomenological concept of self-consciousness is likewise shared by Sass: “This most fundamental sense of selfhood involves the experience of self not as an object of awareness but as an unseen point of origin for action, experience, and thought.” [ 1 , p. xii].

2 Ratcliffe's [ 18 ] conceptualization of existential feelings is well following the concept of the intrinsically unified self-world structure, since within healthy subjects, self-consciousness, including its intentional structure, merges both the self (including the body) and the world in principle. Our “Dasein” is already to be found in the world (being-in-the-world), instead of being prior to the latter. As Ratcliffe remarks: “Finding oneself in a world is more fundamental to the structure of experience than self in isolation from world or vice versa. When the relation between the 2 is changed, both are changed along with it.” [ 18 , p. 65]. Today, Descartes' [ 102 ] famous split between the res cogitans and the res extensa is still implicitly prominent as neo-Cartesianism in Western thinking. Such categorical dissociations fail to recognize Heidegger's phenomenological notions of Dasein and being-inthe-world. To better comprehend the schizophrenic individual's situation in existential nihilism, as equally affecting and diminishing self and worldly experiences, it is necessary to reject the categorical differentiation as being phenomenologically implausible. Consequently, the role of existential feelings regarding diminished up to annihilated self-consciousness, as equally concerning both the self and the world, is highlighted.

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Practical nihilism.

• Sex is very dangerous—if I do it, I could die.
• I don’t want to die.
• I won’t have sex.
• Sex is very dangerous—if I do it, I might kill the woman I do it with.
• I don’t want to kill her.

How do we justify a deduction? Plainly, by showing that it conforms to the general rules of deductive inference… [but on the other hand:] Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive practice. Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular deductive inferences we actually make and sanction. If a rule yields unacceptable inferences, we drop it as invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives from judgments rejecting or accepting particular deductive inferences. 17

Institutional Review Board Statement

Informed consent statement, data availability statement, acknowledgments, conflicts of interest.

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Millgram, E. Practical Nihilism. Philosophies 2023 , 8 , 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8010002

Millgram E. Practical Nihilism. Philosophies . 2023; 8(1):2. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8010002

Millgram, Elijah. 2023. "Practical Nihilism" Philosophies 8, no. 1: 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8010002

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Meaning Nihilism – Is Our Life Absurd?

Kosmische Sinnlosigkeit und die Absurdität unseres Lebens

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David Benatar and Thomas Nagel are both claiming that life is meaningless if judged from a cosmic perspective and both are claiming that our life is absurd. However, they understand ‘the absurdity of life’ in different ways. Benatar’s understanding of absurdity refers to the impossibility to transcend our limits from the cosmic perspective. This is strictly tied to a negative evaluation of our life. According to Benatar we have therefore a reason to regret our existence. Again, Nagel’s absurdity arises from a clash of attitudes we have when we evaluate our life from the subjective and the objective perspective. Absurdity results from the incompatibility of our attitudes regarding our own life. We should therefore approach our lives with irony.

I argue that neither regret nor irony are rationally recommended attitudes we should have to our life. I show that Benatar’s transcending-ones-limits approach to life’s meaning does not necessarily go hand in hand with a negative evaluation of our life. Although a transcending-ones-limits-approach of life’s meaning implies that our life is admittedly meaningless from a cosmic perspective it does not imply that it is to be judged as good or bad. However, the irony that Nagel advises is not recommended either, as subjective and objective attitude do not necessarily collide. As I read Nagel’s position the attitudes must collide because of a difference in evaluative certainty. I think this is not true because the evaluation of life is beset by doubts subjectively as well as objectively.

Zusammenfassung

Unser Leben ist aus kosmischer Perspektive sinnlos – es ist absurd. Diese These vertritt David Benatar in The Human Predicament . Nach Benatar ist es zwar möglich, dass ein Leben von terrestrischer Perspektive aus sinnvoll sein kann, aber von der kosmischen Perspektive aus bleibt uns das verwehrt. Dadurch ist unser Leben etwas, das als schlecht zu qualifizieren ist. Damit setzt er sich z. B. gegen Thomas Nagel ab, der der kosmischen Perspektive für sich genommen nicht eine alleinig ausschlaggebende Rolle in Bezug auf den Lebenssinn zumisst. Nichtsdestoweniger hält Nagel unser Leben für absurd. Die Absurdität resultiert für ihn aus einer unweigerlichen Kollision von Haltungen, die wir aus subjektiver und objektiver Sicht gegenüber dem eigenen Leben einnehmen. Er empfiehlt dem eigenen Leben gegenüber aus diesem Grund die Haltung der Ironie einzunehmen.

Ich argumentiere dafür, dass weder eine ablehnende noch eine ironische Haltung gegenüber unserem Leben in allgemeiner Weise zu empfehlen ist. Ein Verständnis des kosmischen Lebenssinns, so wie es von Benatar unterstellt wird, bedeutet zwar, dass unser Leben von kosmischer Perspektive aus sinnlos ist, das impliziert aber nicht notwendig eine negative Bewertung des Lebens. Aber auch eine Haltung der Ironie, wie Nagel sie vorschlägt, ist nicht allgemein angezeigt, da die subjektive und objektive Perspektive nicht kollidieren müssen. Liest man Nagel so, dass eine Haltungskollision durch einen Unterschied in evaluativer Gewissheit hervorgerufen wird, dann findet nicht notwendig eine Kollision statt, da sich unser Urteil sowohl von subjektiver als auch von objektiver Seite Zweifeln ausgesetzt sieht.

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Can Life Be Meaningful without Free Will?

Benatar and metz on cosmic meaning and anti-natalism, is life’s meaning ultimately unthinkable: guy bennett-hunter on the ineffable.

Apart from the authors discussed in this paper nihilistic answers to the question of the meaning of life - with different philosophical backings and practical consequences - are given for example by classical authors like Arthur Schopenhauer ( 2017 ), Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1980 ) or Albert Camus ( 1942 ) , and more recently for example Michael Smith ( 2006 ). Of course, there are also accounts which claim there is a meaning of life. Again, these positive accounts argue in various ways for different conceptions of a meaning of life (for example: William Lane Craig ( 2013 ) or Guy Kahane ( 2014 )). A related debate discusses the question of meaning in life i.e. what gives meaning to individual lives. Rüther and Muders give an overview of the current debate ( 2014 ).

The term ‘nihilism’ is often used meaning a rejection of all values. In this paper ‘nihilism’ is used more narrowly, only regarding life’s meaning. I take it that both authors can be classified as meaning nihilists – or better cosmic meaning-of-life nihilists. Benatar classifies himself as a cosmic nihilist. He writes: “My view of cosmic meaning is indeed nihilistic. I think that there is no cosmic meaning, If I am right about that, then calling me a nihilist about cosmic meaning is entirely appropriate”. Benatar, David: The Human Predicament. p. 62. Nagel thinks that one’s life is insignificant i.e. that it does not matter from the cosmic perspective. Thus, in a way he is a cosmic nihilist, too. However, Nagel also thinks – and admittedly that is Nagel’s main point - that life is absurd which is a different kind of meaninglessness.

Nozick ( 1981 , 601) points this out.

In order to explain Benatar’s understanding of meaning I will refer also to the approach of Robert Nozick. Nozick prominently advocated an approach similar to Benatar’s in chapter six of his Philosophical Explanations . Because Benatar does positively refer to Nozick’s work himself it seems eligible to develop this kind of understanding of life’s meaning along Nozick’s considerations, too.

That something could be meaningful-in-itself – when meaning is understood in the way of transcendending limits – is difficult to understand. Nozick points out that a being which is limitless “can map onto and so connect with something apparently larger and external which turns out to be itself. Only an unlimited being can have its ‘wider’ context be itself, and so be its own meaning.” (cf. Nozick 1981 , 603) He tries to make this plausible by an analogy to infinite sets which can include itself as a part. However, this analogy seems to be questionable, because connecting is much wider in scope than embedding. Another reason Nozick gives why an unlimited thing could be meaningful-in-itself is that nothing dwarfs its significance. There is nothing bigger or wider and therefore the skeptical question stops. This would imply that the unlimited cannot transcend its limits (because it has none). But, if meaning is understood as a transcendence of limits, the unlimited entity cannot be meaningful-in-itself. Perhaps it could be valuable or significant but not meaningful.

However, the prisoner example is not so convincing in a way. Although we would call the prisoner’s endeavors meaningless, we would do this rather in a sense of unsuccessfulness or pointlessness. If the prisoner knew that his efforts would fail and he would still try to burrow through the wall, we would call his efforts absurd. This suggests that ‘meaninglessness’ and ‘absurdity’ should be conceptually distinguished. A fruitful conceptual differentiation between meaninglessness and absurdity could be made by pointing to the aspect of impossibility right away, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer. According to that suggestion absurdity comes only into play if we know that it is impossible for us to transcend our limits but still try to do so. Thus, the meaninglessness of life is combined with a necessarily futile striving for this kind of meaning. This results in life’s absurdity. However, Benatar also regards the life of those people absurd who cannot or do not try to transcend their limits. Benatar thinks that it is a quite common and reasonable view about absurdity, “according to which those who are unselfconscious can certainly be absurd.” (Benatar 2017 , 21) For him “a life can be absurd or meaningless […] without the being whose life it is realizing that it is so.” (Ibid.) So, Benatar seems to use the notions absurdity and meaninglessness interchangeably. This synonymous use of the terms unfortunately can blur important differences in meaning.

As John Tartaglia points out this understanding of absurdity can be seen as influenced by Camus’ who thinks that the “absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world” (Camus 1942 ; cf. Tartaglia 2016 , 47) Camus‘ absurdity results from a collision between us and the world whereas Nagel’s absurdity stems from a collision in ourselves.

In The Absurd (p. 718) Nagel characterizes a situation in ordinary life as absurd “when it includes a conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and reality”, for example if someone tries to break in a house by all means and only has to open the unlocked door to get in. The philosophical absurdity arises from something universal: “a respect in which pretension and reality inevitably clash for us all.” Ibid.

The term ‘irony’ has manifold meanings, but in his texts about life’s meaning Thomas Nagel does not explain further how he would like his recommendation to be understood. It is open whether he refers here for example to the writings of classical existentialists writings (e.g. to those of Søren Kierkegaard) or to more or less open conceptual intuitions regarding ‘irony’.

It could be argued that transcending at least some of our limits could give meaning to our lives. These specific limits should be identified, and one would have to show in which way the notions of importance, significance, or purpose are related to transcending these limits. A possible connecting element is seen here in a formal characteristic of the notions; that is the relational understanding of importance, significance, or purpose. However, it is questionable whether such a connection exists in a substantial way. It might be that something gives life meaning and that the transcendence of limits is involved, but I doubt, that the transcendence of limits is of direct relevance for giving meaning. Those who assume a substantial and non-derivative, direct relationship ought to present their arguments explicitly.

C. f. Footnote 6 for a possible conceptual difference between absurdity and meaninglessness. ‘Absurdity’ is – like ‘courage’ or ‘cowardice’ – to be seen as a thick concept. It has a descriptive as well as an evaluative content. In judging that someone is a coward or a brave man we have criteria in mind which must be met to make the judgment true, but besides we are expressing a con-attitude or a pro-attitude (at least when we use the terms in a plain way, i.e. not ironically etc.). My suggestion is that judging a life as being absurd is such a judgment, too.

The theoretical reading via theoretical propositional attitudes is incorporated here thanks to the comment of one of the reviewers. If one were to understand the judgments in this way, then there would be a problem in line with the so called ‘preface paradox’ (cf. Makinson 1965 ) I thank Oliver Hallich for pointing that out.

This understanding of evaluative predicates goes back to Richard Hare’s Language of Morals ( 1952 ). However, Hare does not distinguish between the prescriptive content of normative and evaluative predicates (for example ‘ought’ and ‘good’), and therefore for both kinds of predicates he identifies a commandment as being the prescriptive content. I am following here Oliver Hallich, who distinguishes between evaluative predicates expressing a pro-attitude or a con-attitude and normative predicates for which Hare says they entail a commandment. A pro-attitude is an emotion whereas a prescription according to Hare recommends a choice. (cf. Hallich 2008 , 790 f).

He does so, when he parallels the perception of the absurd with epistemological scepticism. (cf. Nagel, 1971 , 722).

To distinguish only between pro- and con-attitudes takes the issue admittedly in a very simplified way. The matter could surely be more complicated. It is a shortcut to classify attitudes in that way but perhaps sufficient for the developed thought.

Harry Frankfurt ( 2006 , 4) for example takes this self-objectification as particularly distinctive of human mentality. Christine Korsgaard ( 1996 ) also regards the reflective structure of human consciousness as an essential human characteristic although her view differs from that of Frankfurt’s. I do not want to take side whether Frankfurt’s, Korsgaard’s or Nagel’s specific conception of the human self is right here because I think that is not necessary for the argument that follows.

Nagel himself notes that he only loosely speaks of a ‘true’ self.

Duncan Pritchard says in a similar way, that Nagel does not argue for the absurdity of life but for the “ opacity of the meaningfulness of one’s life” (cf. Pritchard 2010 , 11), We cannot have a guarantee that our life is meaningful; this stays opaque to one.

For these thoughts about the cognitive deficiency of our wanting see Stemmer ( 1998 ).

Nagel discusses morality and a specific form of aesthetic response (‘nonegocentric respect for the particular’) as possibilities of harmonizing the two viewpoints. However, he considers a permanent harmonizing of the two viewpoints to be almost impossible. (cf. Nagel 1986 a, 221).

‘Fulfilment’ should be understood as a state in which a positive objective attitude and a positive subjective attitude coincide. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that a fulfilment for example in Susan Wolf’s understanding (Cf. Wolf 2010 ) would be quite different, because Wolf is not concerned with the objective attitude Nagel has in mind.

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I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers and particularly Oliver Hallich for giving very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

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Research project What if nothing matters? Nihilism and its implications

Normative nihilism has attracted a fair amount of attention in recent metaethical debate, and it has been subject to considerable criticisms. The project will investigate whether there are plausible responses to these criticisms and whether any form of nihilism about the normative is in the end defensible.

Consider the claims that you have a reason to get out of a burning building or that governments ought to act to reduce climate change. Such claims about what there is reason to do or what we ought to do are normative claims. Normative realists hold that there are objective normative facts, which apply to us regardless of how we feel or think about them. In contrast, normative nihilists deny that there are any such facts. They accept the conclusion that nothing truly matters.

Normative nihilism has attracted a fair amount of attention in recent metaethical debate, and it has been subject to considerable criticisms. The project will investigate whether there are plausible responses to these criticisms and whether any form of nihilism about the normative is in the end defensible. The project will also examine the broader implications of normative nihilism, and of accepting the view, for our normative thought and discourse and for our everyday lives. The overarching aim is to fill several gaps in the literature relating to these issues.

Project description

Purpose and aims Consider the claims that you have a reason to get out of a burning building, that governments ought to act to reduce climate change, and that it is wrong to cheat on tax declarations. Albeit diverse, such claims about what there is reason to do, what we ought to do, what is wrong, and the like, are all normative claims. Normative realists hold that such claims are about normative facts. According to many realists in the contemporary philosophical debate, normative facts are irreducibly normative (e.g., Parfit 2011, 2017). This means, inter alia, that such facts apply to us regardless of how we feel or think about them.

If there are no such facts, then nothing truly matters, according to many realists. Things would still matter to us in the sense that we would still care about various things, but nothing would matter objectively, regardless of what we actually care about; nothing would truly matter. This seems like a dire implication. Some see in it a loss of meaning in life and a cause for despair. Even so, some philosophers—normative nihilists—deny that there are irreducibly normative facts. They accept the conclusion that nothing truly matters.

Normative nihilism has attracted a fair amount of attention in recent metaethical debate, and it has been subject to considerable criticisms. This project will investigate whether there are plausible responses to these criticisms and whether any form of nihilism about the normative is in the end defensible. The project will also examine the broader implications of normative nihilism for our normative thought and discourse and for our everyday lives: Is nihilism about what truly matters something to fear? What could, and should, moral and political discourse look like if we accept that nothing truly matters? These questions should be of interest not only to those who are attracted to nihilism. It is, after all, an epistemic possibility that nothing truly matters and even those who firmly believe otherwise should do some contingency planning for the eventuality that their belief is false.

The project is expected to result in approximately ten articles in high-profile peer-reviewed journals, a monograph with a leading publisher, and an edited volume or a journal special issue. The project will involve collaboration with three international researchers and will organize two workshops in the first two years and an international conference in the final year, at Stockholm University.

State of the Art                                                                                                                                                  The project draws on several different lines of research. First, there is an extensive literature consisting of defences of normative nihilism. Some notable historical sources are Nietzsche(1887) and Hägerström (1911). Recent important contributions include Mackie (1977), Hinckfuss (1987), Garner (1990), Joyce (2001), Olson (2014), Streumer (2017), and the articles in Garner & Joyce (2019).

Another extensive body of research consists of critiques of normative nihilism. Critics typically point to supposedly problematic implications of normative nihilism with respect to different areas. Some examples of such areas are morality (Dworkin 2011), prudence (Fletcher 2018), hypothetical reasons (Bedke 2010), epistemology (Cuneo 2007), aesthetics (Hanson 2018), deliberation (Enoch 2011), speech (Cuneo 2014), love (Keller 2017), politics (Mills 2005), and the meaning of life (Parfit 2011).

These two lines of research are relevant to the project as a whole. We will also be drawing on additional literature more specific to the different parts of the project.

Significance and Scientific Novelty The project aims to fill several gaps relating to normative nihilism in the literature. One issue concerns the characterization of irreducible normativity, the metaphysical queerness of which usually motivates normative nihilism. Two related issues are what this queerness consists in more precisely, and whether it can be spelled out in a way that renders the queerness-objection congenial with the nihilist’s underlying epistemological assumptions. More needs to be said about these issues.

Another gap concerns an important objection to the error theory, which exploits adistinction between normative concepts and our conception of their referents. Even if we conceive of normative properties as irreducibly normative, it does not automatically follow that our normative concepts refer to such properties. This objection raises underexplored issues concerning normative concept-determination.

A further aim of the project is to explore a new version of normative nihilism, inspired by some rarely noticed or discussed parts of J. L. Mackie’s metaethical writings. Mackie’s discussion suggests an interesting new approach in normative semantics and psychology, which could potentially solve several problems that beset extant versions of nihilism.

Another important aim of the project concerns various companions-in-guilt arguments against nihilism. Although a few of these arguments have already been scrutinized by nihilists, many have not. Also, the arguments that have been scrutinized have been considered piecemeal, but it would be profitable to consider them more systematically. An important distinction here is between conceptual and practical implications of nihilism. In other words, sometimes the supposedly problematic implications are taken to be propositions that follow from nihilism itself, whereas in some cases the implications are rather taken to be events that would occur should nihilism be accepted. This distinction is not always appreciated, and yet it is crucial for determining how nihilists might best respond. This distinction is reflected in the division between the project’s two main parts.

Realists often claim that there are reasons to fear nihilism. It is argued that if nihilism is correct then nothing really matters, leaving us in existential despair. One aim of the second part of the project is to develop a tu quoque argument to the effect that there are similar reasons to fear realism. After all, if realism is true we might discover that some normative truths are ones we do not welcome and there will be nothing we can do about it.

Another aim of the second part of the project is to study a relatively unexplored parallel between evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics and “sociological” debunking arguments in political philosophy. In metaethics evolutionary explanations have traditionally been used to undermine the reliability of all moral judgement. In political philosophy sociological explanations are often used by, for example, Marxists to undermine non-Marxist political ideas. By applying insights from metaethics about debunking arguments to issues in recent political philosophy, it will be possible to identify the limits and potential of such arguments in political philosophy.

Preliminary and previous Results The project is continuous with and builds upon our previous work. Olson is the author of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), which gives an historical background of the error theory and scrutinizes the most influential arguments for and against the view. It also develops a conservationist account of moral thought and discourse, and defends it as an alternative superior to abolitionist and fictionalist accounts. In recent work, Olson has developed an extension of conservationism, called negotiationism (Eriksson & Olson 2019). Olson has also recently discussed so-called debunking arguments and their relevance to moral nihilism (Olson forthcoming).

Moberger’s dissertation (2018) explores J. L. Mackie’s metaethics, especially his arguments for moral nihilism. Moberger has also published a novel interpretation of Mackie’s error theory (2017), and a forthcoming paper develops a version of Mackie’s supervenience argument for moral nihilism.

Olsson-Yaouzis has written on the role ideological beliefs play in maintaining oppressive social orders (2010; 2012). Recently he has argued that sociological debunking explanations may be of epistemic relevance under certain circumstances (2018) and that radical political philosophers have little reason to fear nihilism (2019).

Project Description The project has two main parts. The first will be devoted to exploring and defending normative nihilism. Olson will focus on a cognitivist version of nihilism – better known as error theory (Mackie 1977; Joyce 2001; Olson 2014) – according to which normative claims purport to state irreducibly normative facts, rendering all normative claims false. Moberger will instead focus on a non-cognitivist version of nihilism, according to which normative language primarily expresses attitudes of approval and disapproval (Hägerström 1911; Ayer 1936).

The second main part of the project will examine the broader implications of nihilism for normative thought and discourse and for our everyday lives. In particular it focuses on both metaethics and political philosophy, and seeks to bring the two fields into conversation.

Part 1: Exploring and Defending Normative Nihilism 1.1 Cognitivist Normative Nihilism (Olson) Although cognitivist normative nihilism, or error theory about the normative, is a familiar position in the metaethical and metanormative debate, there are several fundamental issues that are yet to be resolved. Here is a sample of such issues that the project will engage with in its first part.

According to error theory about the normative, the concept of a normative reason is irreducibly normative; claims to the effect that there are normative reasons to perform some action, or not to perform it, attribute irreducibly normative properties. But what exactly is it for a property or concept to be irreducibly normative? In Olson (2014), irreducible normativity is explained largely in negative terms. Recently, attempts have been made to give positive accounts of what it is for a concept or property to be irreducibly normative (Eklund 2017; Rosen 2017). It is not clear, however, whether these accounts are congenial with normative nihilism. If they are not, nihilists have some basic explaining to do.

Of course, since error theory is a nihilist view, it endorses the non-existence of (instances of) irreducibly normative properties, and of irreducibly normative facts or truths. Since normative thought and talk purport to attribute such properties and state such facts or truths, normative thought and talk embody systematic error. But what exactly is the argument for the non-existence of (instantiated) irreducibly normative properties and of irreducibly normative facts or truths? Notoriously, error theorists claim that such properties, facts, and truths are, or would be, ontologically queer, and that this is a strong presumption against their existence. Error theorists and other nihilists, as well as their critics, have made several attempts to precisify what the queerness consists in (Garner 1990; Joyce 2001; Shepski 2008; Olson 2014, 2017). This debate is yet to be resolved. It is fair to say, however, that realists also feel the force of the queerness worry. In response, realists like Parfit have argued that irreducibly normative properties, facts, or truths lack ontological implications (Parfit 2017). This claim is deeply problematic (Olson 2018; Bykvist & Olson forthcoming). A related issue that has received less attention is how we are supposed to know that irreducible normativity is queer and that, therefore, there are, or can be, no (instantiated) irreducibly normative properties, or irreducibly normative facts or truths. Moberger (2018) suggests that we can simply ‘see’ that this is so, and also that this is the best interpretation of previous defenders of nihilism. This is a plausible suggestion, but a worry is that it ties error theory or normative nihilism to a kind of rationalist or intuitionist epistemology that does not sit well with its historical roots in empiricist and naturalist views. The question is thus whether error theorists and other nihilists about the normative can offer a plausible philosophical epistemology to defend their own position.

An underexplored response to error theory trades on the distinction between concept and conception (Finlay 2008). Perhaps normative reasons are irreducibly normative according to our common conception of them. This need not imply, however, that the concept of a normative reason is. Admittedly, if the concept of a normative reason is partly constituted by our common conception, it is plausible to maintain that the concept of a normative reason is irreducibly normative if normative reasons are irreducibly normative according to our common conception. But there might be other ways to determine concepts. This issue connects to general questions about concept determination that are highly relevant to normative nihilism and that are yet to be resolved.

1.2 Non-Cognitivist Normative Nihilism (Moberger) The aim in this part of the project is to develop and defend a new version of non-cognitivist nihilism, drawing on the metaethical writings of J. L. Mackie (1946; 1977; 1980; 1982). Although Mackie is usually described as an adherent of, indeed the inventor of, moral error theory, a careful reading reveals that his view is in fact more nuanced (Moberger 2017). While he does think that an erroneous commitment to objective authority permeates our actual moral thought and discourse, he also thinks there is a more fundamental nonobjectivist strand of morality that we can latch onto once we realize the error of our ways. His account of moral language and thought is thus pluralist in that it ascribes to moral judgements variable content.

Mackie’s account of the non-objectivist strand is sketchy but contains several interesting ideas. He suggests that non-objective moral judgements have two features: (1) they ascribe certain descriptive or natural properties to objects of evaluation (such as actions or mental states), and (2) express certain desire-like attitudes of the speaker or thinker in relation to those objects. Mackie’s account of non-objective moral judgements is thus a version of hybrid expressivism (Ridge 2007, Boisvert 2008, Schroeder 2009, Strandberg 2015). But unlike extant versions, Mackie’s version applies only to a subset of moral judgements–the non-objective ones. Also, Mackie’s hybrid expressivism differs from extant versions in the way it construes the moral judgements in question. According to Mackie, non-objective moral judgements are intimately related to what he calls “the institution of morality” (1977: ch. 3). As Mackie uses the term, an institution is a form of social practice, in which the participants conform to certain behavioural patterns, and put socially backed (and perhaps enforced) pressure on each other to thus conform. Just like the institution of chess requires that its participants do not move rooks diagonally, the morality institution requires of its participants not to steal, kill, break promises, etc. According to Mackie, when we make non-objective moral judgements we “speak within the institution” (1977: 68), thus using moral terms to describe institutional requirements while simultaneously endorsing those requirements, where the endorsement part is a matter of having and expressing certain desire-like attitudes. Thus, if we say that it is wrong to steal, speaking within the morality institution, then we are stating that there is an institutional requirement not to steal and also expressing our endorsement of the requirement in question (Moberger 2017: §4).

This Mackiean pluralist hybrid-expressivist nihilism is admittedly complicated in comparison with more standard views. But there is no obvious reason to think that a human phenomenon like moral thought and discourse should have a simple explanation. More importantly, the Mackiean view has several virtues and can potentially solve many problems:

Metaphysics. Like all versions of moral nihilism, the Mackiean view avoids commitment to objectively authoritative normativity. This is a good thing, since such normativity is metaphysically bizarre in several ways (Moberger 2018; forthcoming).

The Moorean objection . The view allows moral nihilists to escape a potentially devastating Moorean objection, according to which it is much more likely that it is indeed wrong to pour gasoline on a cat and set it on fire, than that there are no objective moral facts as nihilists claim. Thus, insofar as our first-order moral convictions presuppose objective moral facts, then so much the worse for moral nihilism. Unlike the error theorist version of nihilism that Mackie is usually ascribed, the pluralist hybrid-expressivist version straightforwardly escapes this objection, since it dissolves the conflict between nihilism and our first-order moral convictions (Moberger 2017: §5; 2018: 117–119).

Academic vs. everyday morality . The Mackiean view can explain the discrepancy between the way moral discourse is conducted within academic philosophy versus many everyday settings. Academic philosophers tend to pursue moral inquiry as if it were a straightforward kind of philosophical inquiry (Shafer-Landau 2006). They draw careful distinctions, formulate theories, give arguments, and appeal to intuitions via elaborate thought experiments. This is the kind of methodology you would expect only if the inquiry in question is directed toward objective truth, just as philosophy in general plausibly is. Moral reflection in ordinary life, on the other hand, is often much more emotional and practically oriented. When we argue with our partner about whose turn it is to do the dishes, or when we censor a colleague for a sloppy work ethic, we are arguably not interested in what the objective moral facts require. More plausibly we are invoking reciprocity norms provided by the morality institution for the kind of relationship that we have, while simultaneously endorsing those norms. In short, in everyday contexts we often use moral language to put pressure on each other rather than to engage in philosophical reflection. Pluralist views such as Mackie’s have the upper hand with respect to this discrepancy.

Motivational internalism/externalism . The Mackiean view can potentially accommodate both sides of the debate concerning motivational internalism, i.e. the view that there is a necessary connection between moral convictions and (at least some degree of) motivation to act accordingly. Both internalism and externalism are supported by powerful intuitions, and only pluralist views such as Mackie’s can accommodate them all. While externalism is plausible for objective moral judgements, internalism is plausible for non-objective ones (cf. Francén Olinder 2010).

Continuity . The Mackiean view secures continuity between morality and other seemingly normative practices. The kind of account that Mackie offers for non-objective moral judgements is highly plausible in the case of judgements about fashion, etiquette, chess, spelling, grammar, and so forth. When we say or think that a word is misspelled or that a chess move is illegitimate, we are plausibly invoking a conventional rule while simultaneously endorsing it. It would be surprising indeed if moral judgements were objective through and through and thus entirely discontinuous with such practices, as moral realists would have it.

Truth . Previous research has assumed that truth is applicable to moral sentences across the board. Unlike early emotivists such as Ayer (1936), non cognitivists have increasingly employed deflationist or “quasi-realist” strategies in order to accommodate objectivist features of moral language, talk of truth being the prime example (Blackburn 1984; Gibbard 2003). Moberger will argue that this is a mistake. While talk of moral truth is part and parcel of academic moral philosophy, it arguably appears infelicitous in everyday moral contexts. “You ought to do the dishes tonight” or “You owe it to your colleagues to show up on time” sound fine, whereas “It is true that you ought to do the dishes tonight” and “It is true that you owe it to your colleagues to show up on time” sound infelicitous. But there is nothing infelicitous, as opposed to merely cumbersome, in adding “It is true that” to ordinary factual claims such as “The Earth is round” or “2 + 2 = 4” (or indeed to normative claims made by a philosopher in a seminar setting). This suggests that much of the motivation behind quasirealism rests on a failure to distinguish between different kinds of moral discourse (cf. Gill 2009).

In summary, the Mackiean view presents a thought-provoking and promising picture of moral thought and discourse that is worth exploring.

1.3 Companions-in-guilt arguments against Normative Nihilism (Moberger and Olson) Another important task within the project’s first main part will be to examine and respond to the many companions-in-guilt arguments recently offered against moral nihilism. These are concerns for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist versions of nihilism.

A growing number of philosophers hold that arguments against moral facts generalize to other areas of philosophy. Such arguments about the purported generalizations of arguments for moral nihilism are often called companions-in-guilt arguments. What they have in common is that they point to unobvious implications of moral nihilism that are unappealing enough to license rejection of the view. For example, it has been argued that arguments against moral facts apply with equal force to epistemic facts—i.e., facts about what there are reasons to believe (Cuneo 2007; Rowland 2012)—and to hypothetical reasons (Bedke 2010). As a consequence, the debate concerning nihilism about morality has broadened its focus to normativity more generally. Defenders of moral nihilism have advocated normative nihilism in response to the companions-in-guilt arguments just mentioned (Olson 2014, Streumer 2017).

Very recently, critics of normative nihilism have employed various companions-in-guilt arguments to establish that the view has untenable implications. It has been argued that arguments against moral facts, and more generally against normative facts, also have force against prudential reasons (Fletcher 2018), and that they challenge the possibilities of such  diverse activities and phenomena as speech (Cuneo 2014) and love (Keller 2017). These particular companions-in-guilt arguments have not yet received adequate treatment from defenders of normative nihilism. Our working hypothesis is that there is in each case a satisfactory response. In order to corroborate it, however, nihilists must enter thorny debates about prudence, about normative aspects of speech act theory, and about philosophical accounts of love and cognate emotions. This has not yet been done. It is not unlikely that cognitivist and non-cognitivist versions of nihilism will have to combat the various companions-in-guilt challenges in different ways. Whether and to what extent this is so will be explored within this part of the project.

Part 2: Existential and Political Implications of Normative Nihilism                                                                                                                     The second main part of the project addresses implications of nihilism for our everyday lives and for everyday normative thought and discourse. It consists of two major sub-parts. The first concerns fear of nihilism and how it may be redeemed. The second sub-part concerns the implications of nihilism for everyday normative thought and discourse.

2.1 Fear of Nihilism, Fear of Realism (Olson, Olsson-Yaouzis) It is a familiar thought that belief in nihilism will bring in its wake chaos, disorder, and despair, both at the individual and societal level. This worry goes back at least to Dostoevsky, and has more recently been expressed by Derek Parfit, who believed that if nihilism is true, his life (and many others’) have been wasted. The project will examine a hitherto unexplored tu quoque response to the fear of nihilism, according to which realism may also be something to fear. If normative truths are discovered rather than invented, as realists believe, there is at least an epistemic possibility that the normative truth is one that we do not welcome. We might discover, for example, that humankind ought to go out of existence, or that certain parts of humanity ought to be enslaved, or the like. If realism is correct, there is nothing we can do to change such truths. From this point of view, nihilism may appear liberating. There are precedents of this kind of optimistic attitude to nihilism (Nietzsche 1887; Hägerström 1911). If this line of thought can be substantiated, the kind of fear of nihilism that one encounters in popular culture as well as in philosophical debates seems irrational or unwarranted.

2.2 Implications of Normative Nihilism: Politics (Olsson-Yaouzis) Morality is a subcategory of the normative, and it is a common thought that if nihilism about the normative is accepted, the only rational thing to do is to abolish morality. Indeed, abolitionists have welcomed this conclusion, since they hold that morality’s impact on our lives is all things considered destructive (Hinckfuss 1987; compare also Nietzsche 1887 on slave morality). Other nihilists have argued, however, that morality is too useful to be abandoned and that moral thought and discourse therefore should be preserved in some form (Joyce 2001; Olson 2014).

This part of the project will examine a new argument for local abolitionism. It will be suggested that since different groups have different interests, members of one group may have reason to adopt fictionalism whereas members of other groups have reason to adopt abolitionism. Furthermore, members of a group may have interests to adopt abolitionism in one domain but not in another. Below is a sketch of the line of argument that will be explored.

It is common both in metaethics and political philosophy to come across so-called debunking arguments, which purport to show that certain beliefs fail to track moral truth reliably. In metaethics, sceptics use evolutionary debunking arguments to show that all moral judgments are unreliable (Street 2006; Joyce 2001). In political philosophy, ‘radical’ philosophers use historical or sociological debunking arguments to show that some political beliefs are unreliable (Mills 2005; Geuss 2008). In both cases, the underlying idea seems to be that evolutionary or sociological aetiologies pose an epistemological challenge for a defender of a set of moral judgments.

It is doubtful whether debunking explanations can establish the kind of scepticism or nihilism their proponents hope for (White 2010; Olson forthcoming). Interestingly, however, such explanations may play an important role in examining what should be done about moral discourse and thought if nihilism is accepted. The sociological explanations are structurally similar to the evolutionary explanations used by some error theorists to motivate conservationism or fictionalism. In both cases the prevalence of particular beliefs (moral/political) are explained by the benefits conferred to certain groups (our ancestors/the elite). However, there are differences that warrant further investigation. Although everyone probably benefits from beliefs that have been selected because they benefitted our ancestors, it is less clear that all of us benefit from (political) beliefs that have been selected because they benefit privileged groups. To the extent that the political beliefs obscure inequalities, members of historically disadvantaged groups may have prudential reasons to reject these beliefs.

Of course, this does not by itself show that members of historically disadvantaged groups should embrace abolitionism rather than fictionalism or conservationism. However, when a member of a historically disadvantaged group employs moralized discourse in the political domain, she may conversationally implicate a commitment to moral realism. This is problematic insofar as she may convey that it is worthwhile to search for a theory of justice. In communicating that it is worthwhile to look for such a theory she may legitimize the ideology-producing work of mainstream political philosophers. Because this form of ideologyproduction is not in the best interests of historically disadvantaged groups, they may have prudential reasons to accept abolitionism in the political domain.

Finally, because different groups have different interests, it is possible that members of one group have reasons to become abolitionists, whereas members of another group have reasons to become fictionalists or conservationists about moral thought and discourse. Furthermore, a group may have reasons to take up one attitude in one domain and another attitude in another domain. For example, moral error theorists can have strong reasons to be conservationists about moral thought and discourse in the “personal” domain and accept utterances and thoughts of the sort “It’s morally wrong to tell a lie” and “I morally ought to keep promises.” However, the same group of moral error theorists may also realize that, in the political domain, when we discuss what policies to adopt, moral terms obscure the influence of group interests on policy suggestions; therefore, she may have reason to abolish moral discourse and thoughtfrom the political realm. 2.3 Implications of Normative Nihilism: Aesthetics (Moberger, Olson, Olsson-Yaouzis) Aesthetics is also often taken to be a subcategory of the normative, just like morality is. There is also a strong historical tradition that links morality closely to aesthetics (Hutcheson 1725; Hume 1751, 1757). Louise Hanson has recently argued that realism about morality is strongly suggestive of realism about aesthetics (Hanson 2018). This suggests that nihilism about morality is, similarly, strongly suggestive of nihilism about aesthetics. But it is not clear that the arguments for normative nihilism that are currently at the forefront of the metanormative debate transfer easily to aesthetics: Can it be maintained that aesthetic properties, facts, or truths are irreducibly normative and that aesthetic claims purport to attribute such properties and state such facts or truths? How should we understand and assess such views about aesthetic discourse?

If indeed nihilism about the aesthetic is true; that is, if nothing has any aesthetic properties, and if there are no aesthetic facts or truths, an important question that arises concerns the implication for our everyday aesthetic thought and discourse. We have seen that there is a host of suggestions for how to think about morality if nihilism is accepted—among them are abolitionist, fictionalist, and conservationist accounts of moral thought and discourse. But we cannot be sure that these accounts are straightforwardly applicable to aesthetic thought and discourse. For one thing, the effects and functions of actual aesthetic thought and discourse may not be sufficiently similar to those of moral thought and discourse to motivate conservationism, or a transition to abolitionism or fictionalism, about aesthetics. There is also a possibility that a kind of partial abolitionism, described in the preceding subsection, is called for in the case of aesthetics.

In general, the implications for aesthetics of normative nihilism is an underexplored topic (Kivy 2015 is a notable exception). This is one area in which the project aims to break new ground, and to cross-fertilize metaethics and meta-aesthetics.

Project members

Project managers.

Jonas Olson

Richard Rowland

Research Fellow

Louise Hanson

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The Logic of Nihilism

Nolen Gertz

Nihilism is often defined as an ideological rejection of commonly-held traditions, customs, values, and ideals. In other words, nihilists are those who claim that there is no God, that knowledge is impossible, that morality is an illusion, and that life is meaningless. However, nihilism can also be thought of as a way of thinking and arguing, as a rhetorical strategy for winning debates, and even for winning elections. Given the current state of world affairs it is necessary to try to identify precisely how nihilism can function, not only as a rejection of logic, but as a logic of its own.

Nihilism vs. Logic

The aim of logic is to be able to judge arguments with regard to their structure rather than with regard to their appearance. Since we can be easily swayed by rhetoric that sounds pleasing to us, it can be difficult to determine whether we agree with an argument because it is true or because we want it to be true. Logic therefore aims to help remove this difficulty by providing us with an objective methodology for judging arguments rationally. By focusing on the question of how conclusions are reached, we can be free from the bias that surrounds the question of whether we like the conclusions that are reached.

Nihilism arises however when we begin to doubt whether we can ever be free from bias, whether objectivity is possible, and whether rationality is as pure as philosophers like Kant would have us believe. If logic was invented because humans could not be trusted to judge the truth of arguments on their own, then, so argues the nihilist, why should we trust humans to be able to judge the truth of logic? Logic operates by reducing arguments to their essential structure in order to judge arguments like math problems. But if math problems often feel divorced from reality, then isn’t logic similarly a way to focus on abstractions in order to avoid the messiness of the real world?

These concerns about logic were famously dramatised on Star Trek through Spock and his fellow Vulcans. The Vulcans were supposed to be an alien species that was so devoted to logic that they turned it into a religion, a religion that required the ritualistic sacrifice, not of virgins, but of emotions. It was even revealed that the Vulcans came to worship logic precisely because of its ability to free them from their emotions, and so logic brought peace to a once war-torn world. Yet in replacing war with logic we are clearly supposed to see that the Vulcans also replaced life with logic. Transforming logic from a means-to-an-end into an end-in-itself entails that the peacefulness of the Vulcans is founded not on having resolved strife but on having become indifferent to it. Since to be emotional — either in the form of hate or of love — is to be illogical, the Vulcans replaced antagonism with apathy.

Similarly, in The Will to Power , Nietzsche argues that logic can be seen as normative, as based on a concern not with what reality is , but with what reality ought to be . Aristotle argued that the basis of logic is the principle of non-contradiction, or the idea that something cannot be simultaneously true and false. This principle is an axiom since it cannot be proven but only asserted, as it is what must be presupposed by all logical statements. Nietzsche argues however that the principle itself presupposes that reality must conform to this principle, and that this “must” therefore operates like an imperative, demanding that reality be logical rather than chaotic.

If logic can be undermined through such radical skepticism, through doubting either what it can achieve or what its foundations are, then this can create a space for the nihilistic rejection of logic. In rejecting logic however it is important to realise that the nihilist does not stop using logic, or, to be more precise, does not stop using the word “logic”. Both what Plato described as sophistry and what Freud described as rationalisation can become for the nihilist what is described as logic. For the nihilist, the logical concern for determining the soundness of arguments is replaced by the simple determination that if an argument sounds good then it must be logical .

The nihilist does not reject logic by, for example, contesting the truth of the principle of non-contradiction, but rather by simply not caring about the principles of logic. Logic is a field of study that has existed for centuries, but for the nihilist it is only meaningful insofar as it can be useful, and for a nihilist it is only useful because its vocabulary sounds convincing to others. By emptying all meaning from logic, the nihilist reduces logic to a set of hollowed out words — “Invalid!” “Fallacious!” “Subjective!” — that can be thrown into arguments to try to bully others so they stop arguing or to frustrate people so they stop arguing. Either way, the nihilist wins, which is something that the nihilist does care about.

Nihilism as Logic

But it is vital to realise that, for the nihilist, winning does not mean winning an argument. Lots of people reduce logic to a mere tool to win arguments. Just think of anyone on a debate team. But for a nihilist, winning an argument is no different than losing an argument. For in rejecting logic as meaningless the nihilist also rejects arguing as meaningless. It is for this reason that the nihilist wants to win, not by ending an argument, but by ending arguing itself , by making arguing as a practice into an undesirable and meaningless pursuit.

It might seem like a contradiction to argue that a nihilist would care about ending arguing as a practice, or that a nihilist would care about anything whatsoever. Nihilism is after all typically associated with the “Who cares?” way of life. But nihilism is not apathy. Nihilism is about not caring in the sense of not wanting to care about reality . Because arguing requires that we (1) be concerned with reality in order to judge the truthfulness of arguments, and (2) open ourselves up to criticism, the nihilist seeks to evade arguing as part of the larger nihilistic concern to evade reality in order to evade anything that can cause the nihilist pain. And to evade arguing, the nihilist must make arguing as undesirable for others as it is for the nihilist.

The nihilistic destruction of logic is achieved by attacking traditional logic with a new logic, the logic of nihilism. To understand the logic of nihilism, let’s look at the following argument — an argument that one is likely to come across quite regularly nowadays on Twitter or Facebook — as an example:

All dangerous people should be kept out of our country.

Immigrants are dangerous people.

Therefore, immigrants should be kept out of our country.

This argument seems logical insofar as its conclusion follows from its premises (1 + 2 = 3). For this reason it is tempting to debate the logic of this argument by focusing on the question of whether the premises are in fact true. This is typically done by offering counter-examples and counter-evidence, such as by listing the names of famous immigrants who were not dangerous people. Or by giving statistics about the crime rates of immigrants compared to the rest of the population.

So what’s wrong with engaging in this kind of logical debate? First, there is the danger that comes with accepting the framing of this argument. By focusing on premise (2), premise (1) gets ignored. This creates the impression that premise (1) has at least been tacitly accepted as true. Such an impression can help to make the logic behind this argument seem reasonable to others and thus help to gain support for continuing to push this kind of argument.

Second, there is the danger that comes with accepting the language of this argument. By debating premise (2) with regards to the question of whether it is factually accurate, the idea of treating “immigrants” as an acceptable way of lumping multiple groups of people into one abstract category is given further credence. Similarly, the listing of famous immigrants can make them seem, on the one hand, like exceptions, and on the other hand, like immigrants matter only if they are famous rather than because they are human beings. Furthermore, the use of crime statistics as counter-evidence can help to further strengthen the association in people’s minds of immigration with crime.

Third, there is the danger that comes with accepting that the person who put forth this argument is actually interested in a good faith debate. By debating the person who made this argument, the person is made to be seen by others as someone worthy of debate and therefore worthy of attention. And it is quite likely that attention was what was truly sought after in putting forth this argument in the first place. Consequently, whether the person who made this argument is able to win the debate over this argument is not what really matters here so much as the ability to trick people into wasting their time and attention on bad faith arguments.

There is growing awareness of these and other dangers involved in trying to engage in logical debate in an ever-worsening climate of bad faith arguments. Because of this, people are increasingly warning others to not engage, to not debate, to not “feed the trolls”. And here lies the true danger, and the true logic of nihilism. For the logic of nihilism is not to be found in the creation of bad faith arguments, but rather in the exploitation of bad faith arguments.

Thanks to the rise of social media and the spread of paranoia about trolls, about bot farms, about propaganda campaigns, it has become more and more difficult to know when to debate, what to debate, or who to debate. Since anyone offering an argument could be seeking followers rather than facts, or seeking to confuse rather than to clarify, it has become impossible to know the difference between good faith and bad faith arguments. In this way it is not only social media that has come to be seen as toxic, but debate itself has come to be seen as toxic.

Consequently, what is felt to be safe is to not offer counter-evidence, to not test the truth of statements, to not engage in debate. Even fact-checking has come to be seen as something that can be weaponised. If someone makes a seemingly outrageous claim, it seems safest to just ignore it and move on, or to take a screenshot and make a joke out of it for one’s friends and followers. In other words, what is felt to be safe is to avoid the temptation to argue. Because it is one’s knowledge of logic that is often the source of that temptation — just think of how tempting it is to tell someone they’re using “begs the question” wrong — knowledge of logic comes to feel increasingly undesirable. And this is how the logic of nihilism, the logic of evading rather than engaging in the practice of arguing, can replace traditional logic.

How Nihilism Conquered the World

Simone de Beauvoir warned in her Ethics of Ambiguity that nihilism can spread like a disease. This metaphor can create the impression that nihilism is something painful and debilitating. Yet precisely the opposite is true and this is what makes it so easy for nihilism to spread. For what must be appreciated is how painless, how comforting nihilism is.

Not arguing is of course a much more relaxing way to spend one’s time than is arguing, just as avoiding reality is a much less stressful way to live than is confronting reality. This simple fact can help explain why the idea that arguing may not only be counter-productive, but may even be dangerous, can be enough to convince people to reject logic and to embrace nihilism. In this way nihilism comes to seem less like defeatism and more like common sense. Or to put it another way, nihilistic defeatism becomes increasingly normalised as common sense. Just think of how often nowadays people express seemingly innocuous tips like “Don’t bother arguing, it’s pointless!” or “Don’t worry so much, it’s unhealthy!”

The danger here, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, is that democracy only survives so long as people argue with each other, and withers away when people start to prefer personal interests to political duties. This is why Arendt was so concerned about the rise of bureaucracy as indicative of how “politics” had come to be seen as something to avoid, as something to let elected representatives worry about so that the rest of the population could instead focus on trying to lead happy, healthy lives.

For this reason Arendt warned against what she called “desert psychology”: the attempt to avoid suffering rather than confront it by viewing suffering only from the perspective of the personal as something that can be cured psychologically, rather than seeing it as structural and as something that can only be dealt with politically. Arendt described this psychologising attitude as creating a “desert” because of how the individualism it invites distances people from each other, replacing the public life of democracy with the private lifelessness of a desert.

Nihilism can therefore not only replace traditional logic with a logic of its own, but can also replace traditional politics with a politics of its own. Rather than a democracy of civic engagement and public debates, nihilism invites us to embrace a democracy of bureaucratic engagement and expert debates. Just as the logic of nihilism helps to convince us that arguing is bad for us, a risk not worth taking, it also helps to convince us that arguing should be left to others, to those who can take such risks because they know better.

In this way the logic of nihilism creates a reductive binary through which to view democracy: either a political argument is worthy of being debated and so should be left to experts to debate, or a political argument is not worthy of being debated and so can be ignored. Regardless of what happens to be the case with any particular argument, this deflated democracy can allow citizens to remain unconcerned and feel safe staying out of it, which is precisely what nihilism aims to achieve. The only thing that citizens in such a democracy need concern themselves with politically then is voting for the experts who will debate so we don’t have to. The problem of course is that the question of who to vote for is also a political argument, and so the logic of nihilism requires that this argument too should either be left to experts (i.e., pundits and polling) or simply ignored (i.e. not participating and not paying attention).

It should perhaps come as no surprise therefore that such a hollowed-out democracy would lead, on the one hand, to the rise of fascism, and on the other hand, to the rise of AI. In a world where politics is seen as too complicated and too dangerous for the average citizen to participate in, the sudden arrival of someone (or something) that can make politics much simpler and much safer is very appealing. Fascism makes politics much simpler by turning the world into a binary opposition of nationalistic heroes and globalistic traitors and by offering to make elections obsolete by turning democracy into a dictatorship. AI makes politics much safer by turning the world into a binary opposition of objective machines and biased humans and by offering to make elections obsolete by turning democracy into a technocracy.

The danger of the dictatorships of the past has made a future with technocracy seem all the more appealing. But if it is the same nihilistic impulse that is leading us to desire to be ruled by either fascists or by algorithms, then there might not be as big a difference between these alternatives as we might think. Whether it is a tyrant or a technology that saves us, all that matters from the perspective of nihilism is that we are saved. The question we need to be asking therefore is not who can save us, or what can save us, but rather, what is it that we think we need saving from? Because the answer seems to be that we need to be saved from ourselves, to be saved from our nihilistic impulses.

Because of his opposition to what he described as the “herd mentality”, Nietzsche thought the way to overcome nihilism was by becoming self-reliant rather than depending on others to tell us what to do and what to think. Though Arendt credited Nietzsche with the discovery of nihilism she criticised his diagnosis of it, as she argued that his sought-after individualism could never combat nihilism but only contribute to it. Arendt and de Beauvoir both argued instead that we should think of nihilism as political rather than personal and that the answer to nihilism must consequently be sought in the public square rather than in the private sphere. If we are to stop nihilism from taking over the world then we must work together to find ways to reinvigorate the political way of life.

But accomplishing this goal requires that we first find a way to reinvigorate public debate and the practice of arguing. According to Arendt, politics exists only when we argue with each other as a way to combine our limited experiences into a shared understanding of the world. In other words, we can take a lesson from nihilism and realise that winning and losing arguments doesn’t really matter. Rather what should matter to us is that we view arguing not as combative but as constructive. Arendt warned that nihilism is an ever-present danger inherent to thinking, which, unlike Socratic dialogue, is aimed not at seeking truth, but at seeking the end of thinking. So, as shocking as this may sound coming from a philosophy professor, we can save the world from nihilism if we can keep alive the desire to think and argue together about it.

Nolen Gertz is assistant professor of applied philosophy at the University of Twente and author of Nihilism and Technology (Rowman-Littlefield International, 2018) and of Nihilism (MIT Press, 2019).

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Reflections on Existential Nihilism in J. D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye and Dostoevsky's Notes From Underground

Hermeneutical and philosophical reflections upon how these two literary works across time, space and dominating ideologies can be reconciled in treating the human condition in terms of ontological and epistemological nihilism.

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Unlearning Nihilism Conference / Joint Event of Royal Holloway's Centre for Continental Philosophy and The New Centre for Research & Practice / Senate House Library

Evrim Bayındır , Carl Christian Olsson

Ø Call for Papers The term “nihilism” has received conflicting definitions throughout the history of modern European thought. Its first appearance is in Jacobi’s pessimism, where it is considered to be the inevitable consequence of German idealism and is defined as a horrific loss of meaning and reality. In contrast, Russian revolutionaries, feminists and anarchists found the meaning of nihilism not only in the recognition of the meaninglessness of the established powers, but above all in acts conducive to revolution. Later, many continental philosophers — following Nietzsche — understood nihilism as the establishment of values superior to and hostile to life, and hence the overcoming of nihilism became a basis for a radical critique of metaphysics and power. Today, however, while currents such as new materialism, speculative realism, afro-pessimism, non-philosophy, and neo-rationalism have retained these objectives, nihilism has either been cast to the wayside or provocatively embraced with inspiration from neurobiology, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy. Nihilism can thus be conceived of as one of the inflexion points from which the continental and its beyond are to be articulated as distinct discourses. This conference will be a space to discuss, learn and unlearn how numerous manifestations of nihilism have been addressed throughout the history of philosophy. With that being said, nihilism has always been a theme that has taken on not only conceptual but also artistic and cultural forms, a theme underlying the theory and practice of the sciences and a theme present in political, spiritual, and theological thought. Hence, by bringing together various metaphysical, aesthetical, epistemological and western and non-western theoretical perspectives, this conference is also an attempt to think about conflicting narratives of the renunciation and embrace of nihilism as a problem across disciplines. We invite proposals for 20-minute paper presentations from researchers, scholars and practitioners working in different fields, using different interpretations of nihilism. Contributions can respond to the following themes, but also to many others: • Historical and comparative studies in nihilism (ancient and medieval philosophy, German idealism, Nietzsche, existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstruction) • Lived experience and nihilism (phenomenology of the body, spiritual techniques, Eros and Thanatos, psychoanalysis) • Nihilism in sociology, human geography, anthropology and other social sciences •Political philosophy and nihilism (anarchism, feminism, post-Marxist thought, capitalist realism, real abstraction, foundations of community, value of life, bio-politics, resistance and revolution, queer theory) • Nihilism, theology, and Eastern philosophy (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, yogic and other perspectives on creation, being and nothingness) • Post-continental thought and nihilism (new materialism, speculative realism, object-oriented ontology, accelerationism, afro-pessimism, non-philosophy, neo-rationalism) • Scientific theory, epistemology and nihilism (scepticism, scientific realism, information theory, cognitive sciences) • Aesthetics and nihilism (existentialist and Russian literature, decadence and the arts) • Analytic approaches (defining nihilism, nihilistic consequences of the pluralisation of logic)

Studium - Il nichilismo contemporaneo. Eredità, trasformazioni, problemi aperti

Rocco Sacconaghi

Open Philosophy

Andrea Lehner

This essay confronts Ray Brassier's vindication of nihilism with other two important but frequently underexamined philosophical attempts to overcome nihilism: Hans Jonas' and Keiji Nishitani's. By putting these different takes on nihilism into dialogue, it explores some blind spots in Brassier's position, as well as some of the practical consequences, for our current planetary situation, of undertaking a radical divorce between the normative and the natural that results from his radical nihilism. The article opts for a more moderate acceptance and eventual self-overcoming of nihilism, according to which, even if natural entities are indifferent to human reasons and meanings, this does not entail that nature is bereft of a human-independent normative dimension. In other words, the essay argues that care must be taken not to confuse criticisms of an anthropocentric conception of reasons and meanings with the belief that meaning is completely absent from the natural world. Thus, the central contention of the article is that, given our current climate and ecological catastrophe, one of the most pressing tasks of contemporary philosophy is to understand normativity in non-anthropocentric ways, so that humans are no longer considered as the only entities that respond to normativity. Such an attitude conceives humans as estranged normative creatures amidst a meaningless, indifferent natural world, toward which they would have no ethical responsibilities. The essay finishes by suggesting ways in which to develop an account that does not fall into this ethical vacuum.

International Journal of Social Science Research and Review (IJSSRR)

Adnan Shakur

Amidst the grand tapestry of existence, our Homo sapiens nature drives us to chase our dreams with fervor. Yet, amidst the tangled web of challenges and setbacks, our once-vibrant aspirations often wane, leaving us adrift on the journey of life. The struggle to accept our circumstances breeds stress, planting the seeds of despair that sprout into the depths of depression. In this perilous realm, where selfawareness and the essence of being falter, a haunting specter emerges: the dark nexus of depression and the tragic allure of suicide. This research paper delves into the captivating realm of existentialism by examining the profound insights embedded within the writings of two extraordinary literary figures, Earnest Hemingway and Jibanananda Das. Drawing from the philosophical foundations of existentialism, this study unravels the nuanced existential themes present in selected works by both authors. By juxtaposing Hemingway's celebrated modernist prose and Das' evocative Bengali poetry, we uncover their shared contemplations on the human condition, selfhood, freedom, and the relentless pursuit of meaning. Through meticulous analysis, we explore the divergent manifestations of existentialist thought in their respective cultural and historical contexts. This interdisciplinary exploration not only offers a fresh perspective on Hemingway's profound insights into human existence but also sheds light on the lesserknown yet equally potent existentialist undercurrents in Das' timeless compositions. By intertwining the literary and philosophical dimensions, this research paper aims to enrich our understanding of existentialism and its transformative influence on these renowned writers, ultimately emphasizing the enduring relevance of existential philosophy in contemporary literature and human experience.

fatmeh alawneh

In this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that post-metaphysical philosophy should cease its attempts to imitate the formal rules of science and rather intensify its dialogue with art, especially literature. I will draw on the philosophy of Gianni Vattimo, according to whom we should accept nihilism and admit that no theoretical narrative is true in the sense of corresponding to reality. Acceptance of nihilism amounts to the acceptance of radical contingency, where no line of argument is everlasting. As philosophical thinking is weakened in this manner, and as it lets go of the presumption of its own validity, a new era will arrive in the dialogue between philosophy and literature by their fusion.

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• Copy URL https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/fact-checking-warnings-from-democrats-about-project-2025-and-donald-trump

Fact-checking warnings from Democrats about Project 2025 and Donald Trump

This fact check originally appeared on PolitiFact .

Project 2025 has a starring role in this week’s Democratic National Convention.

And it was front and center on Night 1.

WATCH: Hauling large copy of Project 2025, Michigan state Sen. McMorrow speaks at 2024 DNC

“This is Project 2025,” Michigan state Sen. Mallory McMorrow, D-Royal Oak, said as she laid a hardbound copy of the 900-page document on the lectern. “Over the next four nights, you are going to hear a lot about what is in this 900-page document. Why? Because this is the Republican blueprint for a second Trump term.”

Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential nominee, has warned Americans about “Trump’s Project 2025” agenda — even though former President Donald Trump doesn’t claim the conservative presidential transition document.

“Donald Trump wants to take our country backward,” Harris said July 23 in Milwaukee. “He and his extreme Project 2025 agenda will weaken the middle class. Like, we know we got to take this seriously, and can you believe they put that thing in writing?”

Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, Harris’ running mate, has joined in on the talking point.

“Don’t believe (Trump) when he’s playing dumb about this Project 2025. He knows exactly what it’ll do,” Walz said Aug. 9 in Glendale, Arizona.

Trump’s campaign has worked to build distance from the project, which the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, led with contributions from dozens of conservative groups.

Much of the plan calls for extensive executive-branch overhauls and draws on both long-standing conservative principles, such as tax cuts, and more recent culture war issues. It lays out recommendations for disbanding the Commerce and Education departments, eliminating certain climate protections and consolidating more power to the president.

Project 2025 offers a sweeping vision for a Republican-led executive branch, and some of its policies mirror Trump’s 2024 agenda, But Harris and her presidential campaign have at times gone too far in describing what the project calls for and how closely the plans overlap with Trump’s campaign.

PolitiFact researched Harris’ warnings about how the plan would affect reproductive rights, federal entitlement programs and education, just as we did for President Joe Biden’s Project 2025 rhetoric. Here’s what the project does and doesn’t call for, and how it squares with Trump’s positions.

Are Trump and Project 2025 connected?

To distance himself from Project 2025 amid the Democratic attacks, Trump wrote on Truth Social that he “knows nothing” about it and has “no idea” who is in charge of it. (CNN identified at least 140 former advisers from the Trump administration who have been involved.)

The Heritage Foundation sought contributions from more than 100 conservative organizations for its policy vision for the next Republican presidency, which was published in 2023.

Project 2025 is now winding down some of its policy operations, and director Paul Dans, a former Trump administration official, is stepping down, The Washington Post reported July 30. Trump campaign managers Susie Wiles and Chris LaCivita denounced the document.

WATCH: A look at the Project 2025 plan to reshape government and Trump’s links to its authors

However, Project 2025 contributors include a number of high-ranking officials from Trump’s first administration, including former White House adviser Peter Navarro and former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Ben Carson.

A recently released recording of Russell Vought, a Project 2025 author and the former director of Trump’s Office of Management and Budget, showed Vought saying Trump’s “very supportive of what we do.” He said Trump was only distancing himself because Democrats were making a bogeyman out of the document.

Project 2025 wouldn’t ban abortion outright, but would curtail access

The Harris campaign shared a graphic on X that claimed “Trump’s Project 2025 plan for workers” would “go after birth control and ban abortion nationwide.”

The plan doesn’t call to ban abortion nationwide, though its recommendations could curtail some contraceptives and limit abortion access.

What’s known about Trump’s abortion agenda neither lines up with Harris’ description nor Project 2025’s wish list.

Project 2025 says the Department of Health and Human Services Department should “return to being known as the Department of Life by explicitly rejecting the notion that abortion is health care.”

It recommends that the Food and Drug Administration reverse its 2000 approval of mifepristone, the first pill taken in a two-drug regimen for a medication abortion. Medication is the most common form of abortion in the U.S. — accounting for around 63 percent in 2023.

If mifepristone were to remain approved, Project 2025 recommends new rules, such as cutting its use from 10 weeks into pregnancy to seven. It would have to be provided to patients in person — part of the group’s efforts to limit access to the drug by mail. In June, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a legal challenge to mifepristone’s FDA approval over procedural grounds.

WATCH: Trump’s plans for health care and reproductive rights if he returns to White House The manual also calls for the Justice Department to enforce the 1873 Comstock Act on mifepristone, which bans the mailing of “obscene” materials. Abortion access supporters fear that a strict interpretation of the law could go further to ban mailing the materials used in procedural abortions, such as surgical instruments and equipment.

The plan proposes withholding federal money from states that don’t report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention how many abortions take place within their borders. The plan also would prohibit abortion providers, such as Planned Parenthood, from receiving Medicaid funds. It also calls for the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure that the training of medical professionals, including doctors and nurses, omits abortion training.

The document says some forms of emergency contraception — particularly Ella, a pill that can be taken within five days of unprotected sex to prevent pregnancy — should be excluded from no-cost coverage. The Affordable Care Act requires most private health insurers to cover recommended preventive services, which involves a range of birth control methods, including emergency contraception.

Trump has recently said states should decide abortion regulations and that he wouldn’t block access to contraceptives. Trump said during his June 27 debate with Biden that he wouldn’t ban mifepristone after the Supreme Court “approved” it. But the court rejected the lawsuit based on standing, not the case’s merits. He has not weighed in on the Comstock Act or said whether he supports it being used to block abortion medication, or other kinds of abortions.

Project 2025 doesn’t call for cutting Social Security, but proposes some changes to Medicare

“When you read (Project 2025),” Harris told a crowd July 23 in Wisconsin, “you will see, Donald Trump intends to cut Social Security and Medicare.”

The Project 2025 document does not call for Social Security cuts. None of its 10 references to Social Security addresses plans for cutting the program.

Harris also misleads about Trump’s Social Security views.

In his earlier campaigns and before he was a politician, Trump said about a half-dozen times that he’s open to major overhauls of Social Security, including cuts and privatization. More recently, in a March 2024 CNBC interview, Trump said of entitlement programs such as Social Security, “There’s a lot you can do in terms of entitlements, in terms of cutting.” However, he quickly walked that statement back, and his CNBC comment stands at odds with essentially everything else Trump has said during the 2024 presidential campaign.

Trump’s campaign website says that not “a single penny” should be cut from Social Security. We rated Harris’ claim that Trump intends to cut Social Security Mostly False.

Project 2025 does propose changes to Medicare, including making Medicare Advantage, the private insurance offering in Medicare, the “default” enrollment option. Unlike Original Medicare, Medicare Advantage plans have provider networks and can also require prior authorization, meaning that the plan can approve or deny certain services. Original Medicare plans don’t have prior authorization requirements.

The manual also calls for repealing health policies enacted under Biden, such as the Inflation Reduction Act. The law enabled Medicare to negotiate with drugmakers for the first time in history, and recently resulted in an agreement with drug companies to lower the prices of 10 expensive prescriptions for Medicare enrollees.

Trump, however, has said repeatedly during the 2024 presidential campaign that he will not cut Medicare.

Project 2025 would eliminate the Education Department, which Trump supports

The Harris campaign said Project 2025 would “eliminate the U.S. Department of Education” — and that’s accurate. Project 2025 says federal education policy “should be limited and, ultimately, the federal Department of Education should be eliminated.” The plan scales back the federal government’s role in education policy and devolves the functions that remain to other agencies.

Aside from eliminating the department, the project also proposes scrapping the Biden administration’s Title IX revision, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. It also would let states opt out of federal education programs and calls for passing a federal parents’ bill of rights similar to ones passed in some Republican-led state legislatures.

Republicans, including Trump, have pledged to close the department, which gained its status in 1979 within Democratic President Jimmy Carter’s presidential Cabinet.

In one of his Agenda 47 policy videos, Trump promised to close the department and “to send all education work and needs back to the states.” Eliminating the department would have to go through Congress.

What Project 2025, Trump would do on overtime pay

In the graphic, the Harris campaign says Project 2025 allows “employers to stop paying workers for overtime work.”

The plan doesn’t call for banning overtime wages. It recommends changes to some Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA, regulations and to overtime rules. Some changes, if enacted, could result in some people losing overtime protections, experts told us.

The document proposes that the Labor Department maintain an overtime threshold “that does not punish businesses in lower-cost regions (e.g., the southeast United States).” This threshold is the amount of money executive, administrative or professional employees need to make for an employer to exempt them from overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In 2019, the Trump’s administration finalized a rule that expanded overtime pay eligibility to most salaried workers earning less than about $35,568, which it said made about 1.3 million more workers eligible for overtime pay. The Trump-era threshold is high enough to cover most line workers in lower-cost regions, Project 2025 said.

The Biden administration raised that threshold to $43,888 beginning July 1, and that will rise to $58,656 on Jan. 1, 2025. That would grant overtime eligibility to about 4 million workers, the Labor Department said.

It’s unclear how many workers Project 2025’s proposal to return to the Trump-era overtime threshold in some parts of the country would affect, but experts said some would presumably lose the right to overtime wages.

Other overtime proposals in Project 2025’s plan include allowing some workers to choose to accumulate paid time off instead of overtime pay, or to work more hours in one week and fewer in the next, rather than receive overtime.

Trump’s past with overtime pay is complicated. In 2016, the Obama administration said it would raise the overtime to salaried workers earning less than $47,476 a year, about double the exemption level set in 2004 of $23,660 a year.

But when a judge blocked the Obama rule, the Trump administration didn’t challenge the court ruling. Instead it set its own overtime threshold, which raised the amount, but by less than Obama.

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Study: Dialyl-sulfide and trans-chalcone prevent breast cancer by targeting SULT1E1 and HIF1a-MMPs

by Impact Journals LLC

A new research paper was published in Genes & Cancer on August 9, 2024, titled "Dialyl-sulfide with trans-chalcone prevent breast cancer prohibiting SULT1E1 malregulations and oxidant-stress induced HIF1a-MMPs induction."

In some breast cancers, altered estrogen-sulfotransferase (SULT1E1) and its inactivation by oxidative stress lead to modified E2 levels. Simultaneously, hypoxia-inducible tissue-damaging factors (HIF1α) are induced. The expression of these proteins/genes was verified in human breast cancer tissues, and combinations of SULT1E1-inducing drugs were tested for their potential protective effects.

In this study, the oxidative stress neutralizer chalcone (trans-1,3-diaryl-2-propen-1-ones) and the SULT1E1 inducer pure diallyl sulfide (from garlic, Allium sativum) were tested in both in-vitro and in-vivo rat models to prevent cancer-related changes.

In their research paper , researchers Aarifa Nazmeen, Sayantani Maiti and Smarajit Maiti from Oriental Institute of Science and Technology, Haldia Institute of Health Sciences, and AgriCure Biotech Research Society in Midnapore, India, reveal for the first time that advanced cancer tissues with elevated SULT1E1 protein levels may be reactivated in a reducing environment initiated by chalcone but remain dormant in an oxidative environment.

The current study explores the redox-dependent regulation of SULT1E1 and the potential role of estradiol in breast cancer tissues of postmenopausal women. This process has been linked to the induction of HIF1α and the activation of MMP2/9.

"In an attempt towards the therapeutic approach , we have demonstrated that Dialyl-sulfide is a good inducer of SULT1E1 gene and protein which significantly decreased the HIF1α and MMPs," said the researchers.

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THIS SUBREDDIT IS CLOSED || The official Discord is still open here: https://discord.gg/F36vaxj There is also a community on lemmy.world here: https://lemmy.world/c/nihilism We have closed the subreddit in protest of the upcoming API changes that will kill off third party apps and negatively impact Reddit's users.

Research on Nihilism as symptom of mental illness.

From a psychology lens, the rationalizations we make about the world are mere symptoms of deeper things. Thus philosophy is merely a reflection of our deeper mental state.

Having studied through this lens for years, I have determined that nihilism is very, very highly correlated to specific mental illness, and I'm currently working on research too determine if nihilism is caused by underlying mental illness. Feelings of meaninglessness are not universal, and are actually signs of very specific mental health problems.

This research actually came about after I noticed that Zen and Nihilisim both had similar observations about the world, yet Zen correlates too extremely healthy individuals, and nihilism correlates too very unhealthy individuals. This shifted my view of philosophy from idle abstractions, to cultural artifacts.

It's fascinating, yet unsurprising, that depressed people would cling to the rationalization of depression, rather than systems that help depression. Choosing to lean into their illnesses rather than out of.

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MIT engineers’ new theory could improve the design and operation of wind farms

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The blades of propellers and wind turbines are designed based on aerodynamics principles that were first described mathematically more than a century ago. But engineers have long realized that these formulas don’t work in every situation. To compensate, they have added ad hoc “correction factors” based on empirical observations.

Now, for the first time, engineers at MIT have developed a comprehensive, physics-based model that accurately represents the airflow around rotors even under extreme conditions, such as when the blades are operating at high forces and speeds, or are angled in certain directions. The model could improve the way rotors themselves are designed, but also the way wind farms are laid out and operated. The new findings are described today in the journal Nature Communications , in an open-access paper by MIT postdoc Jaime Liew, doctoral student Kirby Heck, and Michael Howland, the Esther and Harold E. Edgerton Assistant Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering.

“We’ve developed a new theory for the aerodynamics of rotors,” Howland says. This theory can be used to determine the forces, flow velocities, and power of a rotor, whether that rotor is extracting energy from the airflow, as in a wind turbine, or applying energy to the flow, as in a ship or airplane propeller. “The theory works in both directions,” he says.

Because the new understanding is a fundamental mathematical model, some of its implications could potentially be applied right away. For example, operators of wind farms must constantly adjust a variety of parameters, including the orientation of each turbine as well as its rotation speed and the angle of its blades, in order to maximize power output while maintaining safety margins. The new model can provide a simple, speedy way of optimizing those factors in real time.

“This is what we’re so excited about, is that it has immediate and direct potential for impact across the value chain of wind power,” Howland says.

Modeling the momentum

Known as momentum theory, the previous model of how rotors interact with their fluid environment — air, water, or otherwise — was initially developed late in the 19th century. With this theory, engineers can start with a given rotor design and configuration, and determine the maximum amount of power that can be derived from that rotor — or, conversely, if it’s a propeller, how much power is needed to generate a given amount of propulsive force.

Momentum theory equations “are the first thing you would read about in a wind energy textbook, and are the first thing that I talk about in my classes when I teach about wind power,” Howland says. From that theory, physicist Albert Betz calculated in 1920 the maximum amount of energy that could theoretically be extracted from wind. Known as the Betz limit, this amount is 59.3 percent of the kinetic energy of the incoming wind.

But just a few years later, others found that the momentum theory broke down “in a pretty dramatic way” at higher forces that correspond to faster blade rotation speeds or different blade angles, Howland says. It fails to predict not only the amount, but even the direction of changes in thrust force at higher rotation speeds or different blade angles: Whereas the theory said the force should start going down above a certain rotation speed or blade angle, experiments show the opposite — that the force continues to increase. “So, it’s not just quantitatively wrong, it’s qualitatively wrong,” Howland says.

The theory also breaks down when there is any misalignment between the rotor and the airflow, which Howland says is “ubiquitous” on wind farms, where turbines are constantly adjusting to changes in wind directions. In fact, in an  earlier paper in 2022, Howland and his team found that deliberately misaligning some turbines slightly relative to the incoming airflow within a wind farm significantly improves the overall power output of the wind farm by reducing wake disturbances to the downstream turbines.

In the past, when designing the profile of rotor blades, the layout of wind turbines in a farm, or the day-to-day operation of wind turbines, engineers have relied on ad hoc adjustments added to the original mathematical formulas, based on some wind tunnel tests and experience with operating wind farms, but with no theoretical underpinnings.

Instead, to arrive at the new model, the team analyzed the interaction of airflow and turbines using detailed computational modeling of the aerodynamics. They found that, for example, the original model had assumed that a drop in air pressure immediately behind the rotor would rapidly return to normal ambient pressure just a short way downstream. But it turns out, Howland says, that as the thrust force keeps increasing, “that assumption is increasingly inaccurate.”

And the inaccuracy occurs very close to the point of the Betz limit that theoretically predicts the maximum performance of a turbine — and therefore is just the desired operating regime for the turbines. “So, we have Betz’s prediction of where we should operate turbines, and within 10 percent of that operational set point that we think maximizes power, the theory completely deteriorates and doesn’t work,” Howland says.

Through their modeling, the researchers also found a way to compensate for the original formula’s reliance on a one-dimensional modeling that assumed the rotor was always precisely aligned with the airflow. To do so, they used fundamental equations that were developed to predict the lift of three-dimensional wings for aerospace applications.

The researchers derived their new model, which they call a unified momentum model, based on theoretical analysis, and then validated it using computational fluid dynamics modeling. In followup work not yet published, they are doing further validation using wind tunnel and field tests.

Fundamental understanding

One interesting outcome of the new formula is that it changes the calculation of the Betz limit, showing that it’s possible to extract a bit more power than the original formula predicted. Although it’s not a significant change — on the order of a few percent — “it’s interesting that now we have a new theory, and the Betz limit that’s been the rule of thumb for a hundred years is actually modified because of the new theory,” Howland says. “And that’s immediately useful.” The new model shows how to maximize power from turbines that are misaligned with the airflow, which the Betz limit cannot account for.

The aspects related to controlling both individual turbines and arrays of turbines can be implemented without requiring any modifications to existing hardware in place within wind farms. In fact, this has already happened, based on earlier work from Howland and his collaborators two years ago that dealt with the wake interactions between turbines in a wind farm, and was based on the existing, empirically based formulas.

“This breakthrough is a natural extension of our previous work on optimizing utility-scale wind farms,” he says, because in doing that analysis, they saw the shortcomings of the existing methods for analyzing the forces at work and predicting power produced by wind turbines. “Existing modeling using empiricism just wasn’t getting the job done,” he says.

In a wind farm, individual turbines will sap some of the energy available to neighboring turbines, because of wake effects. Accurate wake modeling is important both for designing the layout of turbines in a wind farm, and also for the operation of that farm, determining moment to moment how to set the angles and speeds of each turbine in the array.

Until now, Howland says, even the operators of wind farms, the manufacturers, and the designers of the turbine blades had no way to predict how much the power output of a turbine would be affected by a given change such as its angle to the wind without using empirical corrections. “That’s because there was no theory for it. So, that’s what we worked on here. Our theory can directly tell you, without any empirical corrections, for the first time, how you should actually operate a wind turbine to maximize its power,” he says.

Because the fluid flow regimes are similar, the model also applies to propellers, whether for aircraft or ships, and also for hydrokinetic turbines such as tidal or river turbines. Although they didn’t focus on that aspect in this research, “it’s in the theoretical modeling naturally,” he says.

The new theory exists in the form of a set of mathematical formulas that a user could incorporate in their own software, or as an open-source software package that can be freely downloaded from GitHub . “It’s an engineering model developed for fast-running tools for rapid prototyping and control and optimization,” Howland says. “The goal of our modeling is to position the field of wind energy research to move more aggressively in the development of the wind capacity and reliability necessary to respond to climate change.”

The work was supported by the National Science Foundation and Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy.

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• Unified momentum model software
• Howland Lab
• Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Related Topics

• Civil and environmental engineering
• Renewable energy
• Climate change

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