religious diversity essay

Definition of Religion as a Form of Diversity

Introduction, religion as a form of diversity.

Religions are sets of personal or community institutionalized system of attitudes, principles, beliefs, convections and practices in adoring faith.Religion diversity has taken forefront focus since the history of world’s major modern religions and traditional beliefs. In today’s world of politics, democracy and increased globalization, religions has taken a contentious agenda in many countries and communities.

World religions are numerous and different in beliefs and convections. However, according to theological principles, religion diversity is rampant in modern societies. Religious leaders and sociologies often ask questions on whether there is a popular religion. The major idea is the fact that religious diversity challenges the prospects for religion understanding.

This easy tries to evaluate whether religion should or can be considered as a form of diversity. Particularly, the idea revolves on how religion can change things in the society. If it is capable of changing, is it for better or for worse?

Religion is a practice of exhibiting the true relationship between man and his creator, provider and protector. Usually, religion is way of life or traditional convection towards God and plays a crucial part or role in lives of most humankind population. Religion and religion diversity are expressed by believers to cause strong opinions and emotions in all environments.

Religion diversity can simply refer to the development of religions that depend on the cultures. In modern societies, religion and its diversity is attached to public institutions. Public institution may include the government, political parties, and family institutions. In addition, schools and public health centers are also associated with religion and its diversity.

Many constitutions around the globe guarantee freedom of religious or faith of choice. All parts of the worlds including Europe and America are serious religious faith seekers. The major religion beliefs in the world are the Judaism, Christianity and Islamic. These beliefs are widely spread in all corners of the planet. Most interestingly, these religion beliefs have regions that are dominated by a particular religion.

In America and Europe, Christianity influences conduct more that it does to other continent and countries. Islamic religion in Middle East influences more that any other religion. According to studies done in most parts of world, people believe in God, practice religion and consider religion as a single most factor to growth in their lives. All countries practices nearly all religions found in the world.

Christianity records the highest level of diversity in many countries. Christianity is divided into Roman Christians and the Protestants. Protestants are diverse to grow major other religions such as, seventh day, Jehovah witness, gospel followers, Unitarians, Mormons, Christian scientists and others.

Other Christianity diversification includes the Catholics, Anglicans, Jews, Presbyterians, Quakers, and Calvinists among many others. This diversity has increased rapidly over decades that have made countries to recognize freedom in faith in constitutions and other rule of laws.

History reveals that religions diversity runs countries at a risk of divisions. One historical event recorded is the Americanization event. During Americanization time, Catholics immigrants fought at Protestants and other denominations were forced to migrate to other countries.

In the ancient empires, rulers were well supported by majority religion, which meant to sabotage growth of other less popular religions. In this regard, religion has provided some commonality to purpose. Important aspect in religion diversity is their role to dividing and unifying populations.

Dramatic political or social growing diversity related to religions may lead to drastic shift in country’s masterpiece towards conflicts. Similarly, the prevalence of religion may prompt tolerance and commitment in facilitating religion maneuvers on some country’s vital issues and fight for respect to fellow religion diversities. Therefore, religion should be considered as a form of diversity.

To make things change in a country, region diversity depends on two factors. One is the organization either public or private, and how denominations or churches are organized. Secondly is the divergence in beliefs, practices and rituals in their religion organizations.

Religion as a form of diversity is one with difficulties. Today’s world is making religion diversities be more visible than how they were in the past decades or olden days. In addition, the diversity has raised concerns over reactions towards countries economic or social policies and other related individuals practices.

The role of religion is commonality to citizens and uniformity in cultures. Diversity in faiths will can results to divisions and conflicts. Therefore, religions can be considered as form of diversity. Besides, its diversity can change a country from good to worse.

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IvyPanda . (2018) 'Definition of Religion as a Form of Diversity'. 31 May.

IvyPanda . 2018. "Definition of Religion as a Form of Diversity." May 31, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/religion-diversity/.

1. IvyPanda . "Definition of Religion as a Form of Diversity." May 31, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/religion-diversity/.

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IvyPanda . "Definition of Religion as a Form of Diversity." May 31, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/religion-diversity/.

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Religious Diversity (Pluralism)

With respect to many, if not most issues, there exist significant differences of opinion among individuals who seem to be equally knowledgeable and sincere. Individuals who apparently have access to the same information and are equally interested in the truth do in fact affirm incompatible perspectives on, for instance, significant social, political, and economic issues. Such diversity of opinion, though, is nowhere more evident than in the area of religious thought. On almost every religious issue there are honest, knowledgeable people who hold significantly diverse, often incompatible beliefs.

Religious diversity of this sort can fruitfully be explored in many ways —for instance, from psychological, anthropological, or historical perspectives. The current discussion, however, will concern itself primarily with those key issues surrounding religious diversity with which philosophers, especially analytic philosophers of religion, are most concerned at present. Specifically, our discussion will focus primarily on the following questions: How pervasive is religious diversity? Does the reality of this diversity require a response? Can a person who acknowledges religious diversity remain justified in claiming just one perspective to be correct? If so, is it morally justifiable to attempt to convert others to a different perspective? Can it justifiably be claimed that only one religion offers a path into the eternal presence of God? How should religious diversity be approached in public education? The answers to such questions are not simply academic; they have practical implications. They increasingly have great impact on how we treat others, both personally and corporately.

The main goal of this discussion, it is important to note, is not to support a given perspective on these issues. It is to clarify the issues and explore differing perspectives.

1. The Pervasiveness of Religious Diversity

2. possible responses to religious diversity, 3. religious diversity and epistemic obligation, 4. religious diversity and justified belief, 5. religious diversity and apologetics, 6. religious diversity and religious tolerance, 7. religious diversity and the eternal destiny of humankind, 8. religious diversity in public education, 9. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Most religions are theistic in the sense that they posit the existence of a personal Supreme Being (God) or set of personal deities, although within some belief systems normally labeled religions—for example, Buddhism—there is no belief in such a being. Monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam agree that there is a sole God. Polytheistic religions such as Taoism, Japanese Shinto, and Chinese folk religion hold that there are multiple deities (gods). While Hinduism typically recognizes many gods and goddesses, it is not polytheistic. Those varieties of Hinduism that count these many deities as aspects of a single God can be considered monotheistic. Other strands of Hinduism are henotheistic, worshiping one deity but recognizing many others. While much of what follows is applicable to any theistic religion, the focus will be on the diversity issues that arise predominately in those religions that believe in a sole personal Supreme Being (God).

While there is obviously widespread diversity of thought among these monotheistic religions (theistic systems) on such issues as the God’s nature and character, the relationship between divine control and human freedom, the extent to which God unilaterally intervenes in our world, and how God would have us live, it is being increasingly recognized that widespread diversity of thought on all these issues also exists just as clearly, and in exactly the same sense, within basic theistic systems. For example, within Christianity, believers differ significantly on the nature of God. Some see God as all-controlling, others as self-limiting, and still others as incapable of unilaterally controlling any aspect of reality. Some believe God to have infallible knowledge only of all that has occurred or is occurring, others claim God also has knowledge of all that will actually occur, while those who believe God possesses middle knowledge add that God knows all that would actually occur in any possible context. Some believe the moral principles stipulated by God for correct human behavior flow from God’s nature or character and thus that such principles determine God’s behavior, while others believe that God acts in accordance with a different set of moral rules than those moral rules given to humans; that for God what is right is simply whatever God does. Some believe that only those who have consciously “given their lives to Christ” will spend eternity in God’s presence. Others believe that many who have never even heard the name of Jesus will enter God’s presence, while others yet do not even believe subjective immortality (a conscious afterlife) to be a reality. Muslims also differ significantly among themselves on these same divine attributes (Aijaz 2015). Consider, for example, the wide variety of Muslim perspectives on such issues as the autonomy of the individual when interpreting the Qur’an, how best to apply core Islamic values to modern life, and the status of women. We find equally pervasive, significant intra-system diversity in Hinduism (Sharma 2011) and Judaism (Shatz 2011).

Moreover, there is also an increasing awareness that the practical import of intra-theistic diversity is just as significant as is that of inter-theistic diversity. For most Christians, for instance, the practical significance of retaining or modifying beliefs about God’s power or knowledge is just as great as retaining or modifying the belief that Christianity is a better theistic explanatory hypothesis than Islam. In fact, as Dennis Potter points out, whether there are actually differing inter-theistic perspectives on a given issues often depends on which intra-theistic perspectives we are considering (Potter 2013). So both types of diversity will be given equal attention in our discussion

One obvious response to religious diversity of any form is to maintain that since there exists no divine reality—since the referent in all religious truth claims related to the divine is nonexistent—all such claims should be considered false. Another possible response, sometimes put forth by religious relativists, is that there is no singular truth when considering mutually incompatible religious claims about reality; more than one of the conflicting sets of specific truth-claims can be correct concurrently (Runzo 1988, 351–357). However, most current discussions of religious diversity presuppose a realist theory of truth—that there is a truth to the matter.

Unfortunately there is no standard way to categorize responses to the diversity of perspectives on religious truth claims. Religious exclusivism and religious pluralism appear in most categorizations, but not always with the same meanings. Religious inclusivism also sometime appears, but primarily in discussions about sufficient conditions for spending eternity with God, as it does in the discussion below (section 8) on the Eternal Destiny of Humankind. Accordingly, our general discussion of religious truth claims will focus on three basic categories: religious exclusivism, religious non-exclusivism, and religious pluralism. For our purposes, individuals are religious exclusivists when they believe that their perspective on some disputed inter-theistic truth claim—for example, that Allah is the true God—or some disputed intra-theistic truth claim—for example, that the Christian God cannot control free human choice—to be the truth or at least closer to the truth than any other competing religious perspective on this issue. [ 1 ] Individuals are religious non-exclusivists with respect to a disputed religious truth claim when they deny that any given religious perspective on this claim is superior to all other competing religious perspectives on this issue. Finally, individuals are religious pluralists with respect to a given inter-theistic or intra-theistic truth claim when they maintain not only (as non-exclusivists) that no single religious perspective is superior to all others but also make a positive claim about the truth of the matter. The nature of this claim depends on the type of issue in question. If the issue is one on which it is possible that the perspectives of more than one religion or variant thereof could be true—for example, the sufficient conditions for spending eternity in God’s presence—pluralists claim that the religious perspectives of more than one basic theistic system or variant thereof can justifiably be considered equally close to the truth (Marbaniang 2010). If the issue is one on which there can be only one actual truth to the matter, but we have no objective means of determining exactly what that truth is—for example, the actual nature of God—pluralists claim that the perspectives of more than one basic theistic system or variant thereof can justifiably be considered to reflect some aspect of this truth (Byrne 2011, 36–7). [ 2 ]

No philosopher denies that the awareness (realization) of seeming religious diversity sometimes does in fact have an impact on exclusivists—from causing minor uneasiness to significantly reducing their level of confidence in the truth of certain beliefs to precipitating belief abandonment. This is simply an empirical claim about psychological states and behaviors (Alston 1988, 442–446; Plantinga 2000, 189).

How should, though, exclusivists coming to an awareness of religious diversity—the awareness that seemingly sincere, knowledgeable individuals differ with them on an issue of religious significance—respond to the reality of such diversity? How should, for instance, the devout Hindu or Christian who comes to realize that others who seem as knowledgeable and devout hold incompatible religious perspectives respond? Or how should Christians who believe the Bible clearly portrays a God with total control over all aspects of reality respond to the realization that other seemingly sincere, devout, “Bible-believing” Christians see the Bible as clearly portraying a God who has chosen not to control what occurs in those contexts in which humans have been granted meaningful moral freedom? Can exclusivists justifiably disregard such diversity? If not, are exclusivists under some obligation to attempt to resolve such epistemic conflicts—engage in belief assessment (or reassessment) with openness to possible revision? Or would it at least be a good idea to do so?

Within the relevant “epistemology of disagreement literature,” we find significantly different responses. There are, of course, religious individuals (and groups) who believe it is inappropriate to subject religious beliefs to assessment of any sort. Certain individuals (sometimes called fideists) have argued, for instance, that religious beliefs are not of a type properly subjected to rational assessment and/or that assessing such beliefs demonstrates a lack of faith (Peterson et al. 2013, 65–69). But few philosophers currently hold this position. Most maintain that exclusivists have at least the right to assess their beliefs in the face of religious diversity.

There continues, however, to be significant debate on whether exclusivists are under an obligation to engage in such belief assessment. Some philosophers agree with Robert McKim that “disagreement about an issue or area of inquiry provides reason to think that each side has an obligation to examine beliefs about the issue” (McKim 2001, 140). The underlying assumption here is that when perspectives on any issue, be they personal, social, economic, political, or religious, have important consequences for that person or others, then individuals are under an obligation to find the truth of the matter—to maximize truth. Individuals, in this case religious exclusivists, can only attempt to maximize truth or avoid error in the face of diverse claims, it is argued, if they attempt to resolve the conflict.

The contention here, it must be emphasized, is not that such resolution is always possible or that exclusivists must necessarily give up their belief if no resolution is forthcoming. Discussion concerning those issues is yet to come. The claim, rather, is only that the exclusivist is obligated at the very least to assess the evidence for and against the beliefs in question and to try to “get a sense of the appeal and of the concern of those who advocate them” (McKim 2001, 146).

Others philosophers disagree. For example, Alvin Plantinga acknowledges that if proponents of a specific religious perspective have no reason to doubt that those with whom they disagree really are on equal epistemic footing, then they are under a prima facie obligation to attempt to resolve the conflict. However, Plantinga denies that Christian exclusivists need ever acknowledge that they are facing true epistemic parity—need ever admit that they actually are differing with true epistemic peers. Although Christian exclusivists, we are told, may grant that those with whom they are in disagreement have not violated any epistemic duty and may know of no arguments that would convince others of their wrongness while maintaining their rightness, exclusivists are likely to believe that they “have been epistemically favored in some way.” They might believe, for instance, that they have been graced by ‘the Internal Witness of the Holy Spirit’; or

… perhaps he [they] think the Holy Spirit preserves the Christian church from serious error, at least with respect to the fundamentals of Christian belief; or perhaps [they think] that [they have] been converted by divine grace, so that [they] now see what was once obscure to [them]—a blessing not so far bestowed upon the dissenters (Plantinga 1997, 296).

Moreover, if any beliefs of this type are true, Plantinga contends, then Christian exclusivists are quite probably “in a better position, epistemically speaking,” than those who reject the exclusivistic belief in question. Therefore, since it cannot be demonstrated that Christian belief of this sort is very likely false, Christian believers remain justified in maintaining that the proponents of other religious perspectives are not actually on an equal epistemic footing. The same, Plantinga acknowledges, might well be true for exclusivists in other religious belief systems (Plantinga 1997, 296). [ 3 ]

The strength of this line of reasoning depends in part on the debatable issue of who shoulders the burden of proof on the question of equal epistemic footing. Those siding with Plantinga argue in essence that unless exclusivists must acknowledge on epistemic grounds that are (or should be) accepted by all rational people that those holding incompatible beliefs are actually on equal footing, exclusivists can justifiably deny that this is so and thus need not engage in belief assessment (Kim 2011). Those supporting obligatory belief assessment argue that exclusivists are the ones who shoulder the burden of proof. Unless it can be demonstrated on epistemic grounds that are (or should be) accepted by all rational people that proponents of the competing perspectives are not actually on equal epistemic footing, exclusivists must consider their challengers on equal epistemic footing and are thus obligated to engage in belief assessment (Basinger 2002, 26–27). Or, to state this important distinction another way, it is Plantinga’s contention that we need not acknowledge that those with whom we disagree are actually on equal epistemic footing unless it can be demonstrated objectively that they are equally knowledgeable and sincere, while his critics maintain that we must acknowledge that those with whom we disagree are on equal epistemic footing unless we have an objective means of demonstrating that we are in fact more knowledgeable and/or sincere than they. Most philosophers of religion side with the critics in this case and thus assume that actual peer conflict cannot be denied (Byrne 2011, 30).

Another influential type of challenge to obligatory belief assessment in the face of religious diversity has been raised by Jerome Gellman. The focus of his challenge centers on what he identifies as rock bottom beliefs. Such beliefs, as Gellman defines them, are the epistemic givens in a religious belief system—the assumed, foundational truths upon which all else is built. Gellman grants that if a religious belief affirmed by an exclusivist is not rock bottom (is not a foundational assumption), then it may well be subject to obligatory belief assessment in the face of religious diversity. However, he argues, since belief assessment only makes sense when one isn’t certain that the belief in question is true, and since rock bottom religious beliefs are among the foundational truths—the basic, assumed truths—in an exclusivist’s epistemic system, no assessment is necessary. Rather, when exclusivists encounter a challenge to such a belief—for example, a challenge to their rock bottom belief in God’s ultimate control over all earthly affairs—they can, utilizing the G. E. Moore switch, justifiably maintain that because their rock bottom belief is true, the competing belief can justifiably be rejected (Gellman 1993, 345–364; Gellman 1998, 229–235).

Furthermore, Gellman has added, even if we grant that rock bottom beliefs are at times open to belief assessment, exclusivists need not engage in such assessment in the face of religious diversity unless they find that the awareness of such diversity is causing them to lose significant confidence in their own perspective. In the absence of this type of internal conflict, they “may rationally invoke [their] unreflective religious belief to defeat opposing religious claims, without having to consider the question any further” (Gellman 2000, 403).

It would seem, though, that even those who are sympathetic to Gellman’s general line of reasoning would want to limit its scope. Many religious beliefs held by exclusivists have practical consequences. That is, exclusivist beliefs are not isolated cognitive assumptions; they motivate behavior. For instance, there are many theists worldwide who not only still believe that men have some sort of God-given, inherent authority over women, or that certain ethnic groups have God-given superiority, or that certain sexual orientations are perversions of God’s ideal, or that humans have God-given authority over the rest of nature, or that God desires heretics to be silenced, they also act on these beliefs. However, it seems safe to assume that most exclusivists, including Gellman, believe that some of these actions are morally wrong and ought to be stopped to the extent possible. In such cases, it is difficult to imagine many exclusivists maintaining that those who hold the beliefs on which these acts are based have no need to reassess these beliefs unless they personally feel a need to do so. It seems, rather, that most exclusivists would want those holding such beliefs to at the very least engage in significant belief reassessment, even if they don’t at present personally feel a need to do so.

Some philosophers/theologians assume that belief assessment, when conducted properly, can often resolve epistemic peer conflict (Byrne 2011, 31; Aijaz 2017). But what if we assume that while the consideration of criteria such as self-consistency and comprehensiveness can rule out certain options, there exists no set of criteria that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within religious perspectives) in a neutral, nonquestion-begging fashion (Peterson et al. 2013, 69–74)? In what epistemic position does this then place the exclusivist? Or to use the phrasing preferred in the current “epistemology of disagreement” debates, to what extent, if any, is it reasonable for exclusivists to retain their exclusivistic beliefs when it is acknowledged that epistemic peers disagree? [ 4 ]

The answer, as some see it, is that exclusivists can no longer justifiably maintain that their exclusivistic beliefs are true. J.L. Schellenberg, for example, argues that because no more than one among a set of incompatible truth claims can be true, disputants in a debate over such claims are justified in continuing to maintain that their claim is true only if they possess nonquestion-begging justification — justification based on assumptions and lines of reasoning acceptable to both parties — for believing the incompatible claim of any competitor to be false. However, since disputants in no religious conflicts possess such justification, disputants cannot be justified “in holding their own claim to be true.” Or, As Schellenberg states this conclusion in another context, we must conclude that in the absence of objective, nonquestion-begging justification, none of the disputants in religious conflicts “has justification for supposing the others’ claims false” (Schellenberg 2000, 213). David Silver comes to a similar conclusion: “[Exclusivists] should provide independent evidence for the claim that they have a special source of religious knowledge ... or they should relinquish their exclusivist religious beliefs” (Silver 2001, 11).

In more recent discussions, this perspective is sometimes labeled “(strong) Conciliationism” (Christensen 2007, 2016; Feldman 2006) or the “Equal Weight View” (Cohen 2013). When exclusivists and their epistemic peers disagree and exclusivists can offer no independent reasons that establish their position, then exclusivists should acknowledge that their perspective has no greater epistemic weight than those of their epistemic competitors and either suspend judgment or abandon their exclusivistic position and grant equal epistemic status to all the self-consistent, comprehensive perspectives in play.

Others have not gone this far, arguing rather that while exclusivists need not abandon religious belief in the face of unresolved conflict, they must, or at least be willing to, hold their exclusive religious beliefs more tentatively (with less confidence). Philip Quinn argues, for instance, that acknowledged epistemic parity necessarily has a negative (epistemically humbling) impact on the level of justification for any religious belief system. Such parity does not necessarily reduce justification below a level sufficient for rational acceptability. But for those proponents of a religion who are “sufficiently aware of religious diversity, the justification that the [religion] receives from its sources is a good deal less than would be the case were there no such diversity” (Quinn 2005a, 137). James Kraft agrees, arguing that when individuals acknowledge that those with whom they disagree are equivalently informed and capable and have made no obvious mistakes in reasoning, their confidence in their perspective is rightly reduced (Kraft 2007)

The tentativeness this reduction in confidence produces, McKim tells us, does not entail never-ending inquiry. What it means, rather, is that in the face of unresolved religious diversity, a person should be open to the possibility “that one or more of the [alternatives] may be correct … that the position one had thought to be correct may be wrong [while] one of the other positions may be right” (McKim 2001, 154–55). Joseph Runzo and Gary Gutting agree. According to Runzo, “all faith commitments must be held with the humbling recognition that they can be misguided, for our knowledge is never sure” (Runzo 1993, 236). Gutting argues that only interim, not decisive assent is justified in the face of unresolved diversity and that “those who give merely interim assent must recognize the equal value, as an essential element in the continuing discussion, of beliefs contrary to theirs” (Gutting 1982, 108). Moreover, argues McKim, such tentativeness in the face of diversity has an important payoff. It can lead to deep tolerance: the allowance “that those with whom you disagree are people whom it is worthwhile to approach with rational arguments” (McKim 2001, 178) And personal tolerance of this sort, we are told, may well lead to a more tolerant and open society that will permit and even encourage a diversity of opinion on all issues, including opinions on religious matters. [Whether this is in fact the case will be considered in detail in Section 6.]

William Alston represents an even more charitable response to exclusivism. His perspective is based on what he sees as a crucial distinction between two types of epistemic disputes: those in which “it is clear what would constitute non-circular grounds for supposing one of the contestants to be superior to the others” and those in which it is not. In the former case—in those cases in which there is a commonly accepted “procedure for settling disputes”—it isn’t clear, he acknowledges, that it is rational for individuals to continue to maintain that their position is superior (Alston 1988, 442–443).

However, as Alston sees it, there exists no such common ground for settling basic epistemic disputes over religious truth claims, and this, he contends, alters the situation drastically. It still remains true, he grants, that the reality of religious diversity diminishes justification. But the fact that “we are at a loss to specify [common ground]” means, he argues, that with respect to those religious perspectives that are self-consistent, it is not “irrational for one to remain an exclusivist”—not irrational for proponents of any religious perspective to continue to hold that their perspective is true. That is, as Alston sees it, given the absence of common ground for resolving disputes, the proponent of any self-consistent religious perspective can justifiably continue to believe this perspective to be true “despite not being able to show that it is epistemically superior to the competition” (Alston 1988, 443–446). Stated differently yet, Alston grants that objective evidence is necessary for justified belief when the debated issue is one for which such evidence is available. But when objective evidence is not available—as is the case for most important religious contentions—it cannot be required for justified belief.

In fact, at one point he goes even further. Because there exists at present no neutral ground for adjudicating religious epistemic conflicts, it is not only the case, Alston argues, that exclusivists are justified (rational) in continuing to consider their own perspective superior. Since we do not even know in most cases what a non-circular reason for demonstrating superiority would look like, the “only rational course” for exclusivists “is to sit tight” with the beliefs “which [have] served so well in guiding [their] activity in the world.” Or, to generalize this point, Alston speaks for those who maintain that, given the absence of common ground for adjudicating disputes concerning self-consistent religious perspectives, it is not rational for exclusivists to stop maintaining that their system is superior (Alston 1988, 444). [ 5 ]

Philip Quinn represents yet another, increasingly popular approach. While he agrees with Alston that in the face of diversity exclusivists may well be justified in continuing to “sit tight”—in continuing to maintain that their religious perspective is true—he denies that this is the only rational course of action available (Quinn 2000, 235–246). The basis for this position is his distinction between a pre-Kantian and a Kantian understanding of religious belief. To have a pre-Kantian understanding of religious belief is to assume that we have (or at least can have) access to the truth as it really is. It is to believe, for instance, that we do (or at least can in principle) know what God is really like. To have a Kantian understanding of religious belief is to assume that although there is a literal noumenal reality, our understanding of this reality (and thus our truth claims about this reality) will of necessity be relative to the cultural/social/psychological lenses through which our conceptualization of this noumenal reality is processed. It is to believe, for instance, that although there is a divine reality about which we can make truth claims, our understanding of (and thus our truth claims about) this divine reality will necessarily to some extent be conditioned by the ways in which our environment (our culture in the broadest sense) has shaped our categories of thought (Quinn 2000, 241–242).

Alston, Quinn contends, is essentially working off of a pre-Kantian model of religious belief when he encourages religious exclusivists to sit tight in the face of peer conflict since, in the absence of any objective basis for determining which perspective is right, the exclusivist has no sufficient reason not to do so. Quinn does not deny that this pre-Kantian approach is justifiable and thus does not deny that someone who follows Alston’s advice to sit tight is rational in doing so. However, Quinn believes that “it should not be taken for granted that any of the [contending perspectives] in its present form is correct.” Hence, he believes it is equally justifiable for an exclusivist to adopt a Kantian approach to religious belief. Specifically, he believes it is equally justifiable for an exclusivist to assume that whatever any of us can know about the truth of the matter will never be a description of religious reality that is free of significant cultural/social/psychological conditioning. Accordingly, it is also rational, he maintains, for exclusivists encountering diverse truth claims to “seek a more inclusivist or pluralistic understanding of their own faith” by modifying their beliefs to bring them “into line with such an understanding” (Quinn 2000, 242).

In short, as Quinn sees it, those who hold a position such as Alston’s have left us, at least implicitly, with a false dilemma: either we find common ground on which we can objectively determine which religious perspective is the truth or we sit tight with what we have. However, Quinn holds that, once we realize it is perfectly reasonable for a person to assume that the proponent of no religious perspective has (or even could have) an accurate understanding of divine reality as it really is, another rational alternative appears. We then see that it is also perfectly rational for people to begin to revise their own phenomenological perspective on the truth in a way that will allow for greater overlap with the phenomenological perspectives of others.

The approach to conflicting religious perspectives Quinn outlines has in fact become increasingly popular in exclusivistic circles. Consider, for example, the ongoing debate among Christians over how God brought the rest of reality into existence. Some still claim the Bible clearly teaches that God created the “heavens and the earth” in six twenty-four hour periods about ten thousand years ago. Others still maintain that the fact that “a day is to the Lord as a thousand years” (Psalms 90:4) means that while God is directly responsible for what the Bible says was created each “day,” it is most reasonable to believe that the time frame for each instance of creative activity could well have been millions, or even billions, of years. And then there are those who still hold that God’s direct creative activity consisted primarily of orchestrating the “Big Bang.” However, more recently, many Christians have taken a more Kantian approach. Based on their assumption that we may well not have access, even through Scripture, to exactly how God was involved in the creative process, they have modified what is to be considered essential to Christianity on this issue. Rather than affirming any of the specific explanations of how God created all else, they affirm a more general contention compatible with each of these specific explanations: that God is in some manner directly responsible for the existence of all else. They have, in Quinn’s terms, thinned their core theologies in a way that reconciles the divergent perspectives. [We will see in sections below that this emphasis on working toward common belief is sometimes cited as a way to minimize differing perspectives on the eternal destiny of humans (Section 7) and to approach diversity of thought on controversial issues in education (Section 8).]

Everyone realizes, though, that moving toward a thinner theology can resolve the epistemic tension produced by religious diversity only to a certain extent. Let’s assume that it is perfectly reasonable, and possibly even preferable, for exclusivists to thin their theologies in an attempt to minimize that core of truths that must be accepted to remain proponents of the specific theological perspectives in question, to be an exclusivist—even a strongly Kantian exclusivist—is still to believe that one’s religious perspectives on some religious beliefs are superior in the sense that they are in some important way closer to the truth than are the competing perspectives of others. Accordingly, while thinning their theology may be a rational choice that can minimize conflict for exclusivists, no one is arguing that a certain amount of epistemic conflict will not remain.

Finally, we find at the far end of the spectrum those who deny that acknowledged peer conflict does in fact require exclusivists to abandon their exclusivism or even reduce confidence in their exclusivistic perspectives. The key to this position is a distinction between personal (private) evidence and public evidence (evidence available to all persons involved in the dispute). It is granted that individuals will often find themselves in epistemic disputes with persons who are epistemic peers in the sense that they are (1) equally intelligent, thoughtful, and free from obvious bias and (2) equally familiar with all the relevant public evidence. But it is normally acknowledged that the final judgments made by participants in such disputes are not made solely on this public evidence. Such judgments are based also on personal beliefs to which only each participant has access. Jennifer Lackey notes, for instance, that individuals in an epistemic dispute have greater access to the reliability of their own belief-forming faculties than do their epistemic competitors (Lackey 2010). Ernest Sosa talks of a gulf between the private and public domains (Sosa 2010). Peter van Inwagen speaks of “incommunicable insight that the others, for all their merits, lack” (van Inwagen 1996). And the weight of this private evidence, it is argued, can make it reasonable for individuals to retain their beliefs (including exclusivistic religious beliefs) with the same level of confidence, even in the face of acknowledged peer disagreement in the public sense.

Some critics, of course, will maintain that this is primarily a verbal victory. The question, remember, is whether exclusivists who acknowledges that epistemic peers hold incompatible perspectives can continue to justifiably maintain with full confidence that their perspective is superior. And it will seem to some that to claim that participants in epistemic disputes have access to relevant personal evidence not available to their epistemic competitors is in fact simply to acknowledge that the dispute is really not among true epistemic peers in the sense originally intended—that is, in the sense that all parties are assessing the same body of evidence.

Let us assume that exclusivists are justified in retaining their exclusivistic belief in the face of religious diversity. Ought they stop there or can they justifiably go further? Can they justifiably try to convince others of their rightness—can they justifiably try to convert others to their perspective? And if so, are they in any sense obligated to do so?

Most who believe that such proselytization is not justified challenge the moral character of exclusivists who attempts to convince those with whom they differ to accept their perspective as the sole truth. For instance, Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that “except at the cost of insensitivity or delinquency, it is morally not possible actually to go out into the world and say to devout, intelligent fellow human beings [that] we believe that we know God and we are right; you believe that you know God, and you are totally wrong” (Smith 1976, 14). And when Runzo claims that exclusivism can be “highly presumptive” and “morally repugnant” (Runzo 1988, 348) or John Hick maintains that exclusivists often manifest a sort of arbitrariness or arrogance (Hick 1989, 235), they too appear to be challenging the moral character of those who attempt to convert others to their perspective.

Not surprisingly, most exclusivists deny that it is insensitive or arrogant or presumptive for exclusivists to attempt to convince others that the exclusivistic perspective is alone the correct one. Since we are justified in believing our position to be superior to others—closer to the truth—it is difficult to see, exclusivists argue, how our attempts to convince others that they should agree can be considered arrogant or presumptive or insensitive, especially if we believe that it is important for the welfare of those we are attempting to convert that they do so. Moreover, exclusivists continue, while it is surely true that some conversion is attempted for what we would all agree are morally inappropriate reasons—for instance, for financial gain or to gain power over others—there is little empirical evidence that exclusivists in general have these motives. It is probably true, rather, that many, if not most, exclusivists who proselytize do so primarily because they believe they have what others need and are willing (sometimes at great personal cost) to share it with them.

Are, though, exclusivists required to proselytize? Many exclusivistic religious systems do require proselytization, and most philosophers who believe that exclusivists are justified in retaining their exclusivistic beliefs in the face of religious diversity believe also that these exclusivists can justifiably feel obligated to attempt to “convert” their epistemic competitors. With very few exceptions, though, philosophers deny that exclusivists are under any general obligation to proselytize, regardless of whether the exclusivistic system in question demands or encourages such proselytization. [ 6 ]

Religious intolerance, defined as the practice of keeping others from acting in accordance with their religious beliefs, is not new. However, there is concern world-wide over the increasing amount, and increasingly violent nature, of such behavior. Accordingly, there is understandably a renewed interest in fostering religiously tolerant environments in which individuals with differing religious perspectives can practice their faiths unencumbered.

A number of philosophers have turned their attention to the relationship between religious diversity and religious tolerance, with the main focus on whether acknowledgement of, and subsequent reflection on, religious diversity might lead to greater religious tolerance. The main argument supporting the claim that acknowledged diversity can foster tolerance was proposed by Philip Quinn (Quinn 2001, 57–80; 2002, 533–537; 2005a, 136–139). He maintained that (1) serious reflection on the undeniable reality of religious diversity will necessarily weaken people’s justification for believing that their religious perspective is superior to the perspectives of others and that (2) this weakened justification can, and hopefully will for some, lead to greater religious tolerance—for example, will lead to a more accepting, less confrontational attitude toward others.

Both of Quinn’s contentions have been challenged. The claim that reflection on the acknowledged reality of religious diversity reduces individuals’ justified confidence in the superiority of their position has been subject to at least two types of criticism. As noted earlier in our discussion of religious diversity and epistemic obligation (section 3), some philosophers agree with Alvin Plantinga that the proponents of a given religious perspective need not grant that their competitors are actually on an equal epistemic footing and are thus justified in continuing to maintain that their perspective is superior without further reflection (Plantinga 1997, 296).

Other philosophers do not deny that proponents of differing religious perspectives are on an equal epistemic footing or that reflection on these diverse perspectives might in some cases actually cause individuals to become less certain that their perspective is superior. They do deny, however, that there is any necessary epistemic connection between acknowledged diversity and a weakening of justified personal commitment. That is, they argue, proponents of a given religious perspective can acknowledge both that (1) those holding perspectives differing from their own are epistemic peers and that (2) they are not in a position to demonstrate objectively that their position is superior and yet can justifiably continue to maintain that (3) their perspective is, in fact, superior (Hasker 2008).

Quinn’s second contention—that weakened justification in the superiority of a perspective has the promising potential for fostering religious tolerance—has also been challenged. For instance, William Lane Craig, Robert McKim, and Keith Yandell have all argued that if individuals weaken their conviction that the specific teachings of their religion are correct, including the relevant moral teachings that prohibit intolerance, it might in turn actually make it more likely that they will engage in intolerant behavior as it may well deflate the very confidence in the relevant beliefs needed for inspiring tolerance (Craig 2008; McKim 2008; Yandell 2008).

Others, such as William Hasker, have questioned whether Quinn’s challenge to those who hold firmly to the superiority of their religious perspectives—that the reality of religious diversity requires that they hold their perspectives less firmly—will have the effect Quinn intended. It was his hope that those challenged in this fashion would “soften” their exclusivistic convictions and thus be less likely to engage in intolerant behavior. But might not just the opposite occur? Might not those told that the reality of religious diversity reduces their justified confidence in their beliefs feel threatened and thus, in an attempt to “stand up for the truths” they still firmly believe, become even more intolerant of those with other perspectives (Hasker 2008)?

Those sympathetic to Quinn’s position do not deny that some who find the justification for their religious beliefs challenged might for that reason find themselves with a weaker basis for refraining from intolerant behavior or become even more intolerant in defense of the beliefs they continue to hold firmly. But those sympathetic to Quinn’s “pathway from diversity to tolerance” maintain that acknowledged religious diversity can, and often does, foster in individuals (1) greater respect for their epistemic competitors and their positions and (2) a more flexible, inclusive understanding of their own position. And those who respect their competitors and have a more inclusive understanding of their own perspectives, they add, are less likely to engage in inappropriate intolerant religious behavior (Basinger 2008; Dormandy 2020).

The discussion of religious diversity thus far has been framed in terms of truth claims (in terms of justified belief) because it is increasingly recognized by philosophers as the best way to access the most important questions that the reality of such diversity forces upon us. Historically, however, there has been one specific “diversity issue” with which philosophers of religion have been most concerned: the question of the eternal destiny of humankind, that is, the question of who can spend eternity in God’s presence—who can obtain salvation.

Those who are religious exclusivists on this question claim that those, and only those, who have met the criteria set forth by one religious perspective can spend eternity in God’s presence. [ 7 ] Adherents of other religious perspectives, it is acknowledged, can affirm truth related to some or many issues. But with respect to the question of salvation (one’s eternal destiny), a person must come to understand and adhere to the unique way. Or, to be more specific, as salvific exclusivists see it, the criteria for salvation specified by the one correct religious perspective are both epistemologically necessary in the sense that those seeking salvation must be aware of these conditions for salvation and ontologically necessary in the sense that these conditions must really be met (Peterson et al. 2013, 322). [ 8 ]

It is important to note, though, that not only Christians are salvific exclusivists. For example, just as Christian salvific exclusivists maintain that only those who respond appropriately to requirements set for in Christian belief can spend eternity in God’s presence, Muslim salvific exclusivists maintain that “whether a person is ‘saved’ or not is principally determined by whether he or she responded appropriately to Islamic belief” (Aijaz 2014, 194).

Also important to note is that differing, sometimes even conflicting, exclusivistic claims can exist within the same world religion. For instance, significant intra-Christian debate has centered historically on the eternal fate of young children who die. For some, the answer was (and still is) that all children who die are separated from God eternally. Others have believed that God “elects” some for heaven and allows the rest to spend eternity in hell, while still others have held that only the deceased children of believers are allowed to enter heaven or that salvation for children who die is tied to the sacrament of baptism. A more common belief today among Christians, though, is that all those who die in early childhood (or die having possessed only the mental capacities of young children) enter automatically into God’s eternal presence (Basinger 1992, 4).

But what of those “adults” who die having never been aware of the salvific conditions of the one true religion? Is it not clearly unjust for exclusivists to claim that they cannot spend eternity with God because they have not met the criteria for salvation stipulated by this religion? For salvific inclusivists, the answer is yes. Like exclusivists, inclusivists believe that eternal existence in God’s presence is only possible because of the salvific provisions noted in the one true religion. However, they do not maintain “that only the believers or practitioners of that religion, during their earthly lives, will be redeemed” (Benton 2020). Religious inclusivists allow that some adherents of other religions can be saved because of these provisions, even if the individuals in question haven’t made the personal commitments normally stipulated as necessary to appropriate these salvific provisions. Put in philosophical language, as inclusivists see it, particular salvific events may be ontologically necessary for salvation in the sense that salvation cannot occur without them but not epistemically necessary in the sense that one need not know about them to be saved or liberated (Moser 2011; Peterson et al. 2013, 334).

Probably the best known Christian proponent of this inclusivist perspective is Karl Rahner. Christianity, he argues, cannot recognize any other religion as providing the way to salvation. However, since God is love and desires everyone to be saved, God can apply the results of Jesus’s atoning death and resurrection to everyone, even to those who have never heard of Jesus and his death or have never acknowledged his lordship. Just as adherents to pre-Christian Judaism were able, through the redemptive acts of Jesus of which they were not aware, to enter God’s presence, so, too, is it possible for adherents of other religions to enter God’s presence, even though they are not aware of the necessary redemptive acts of Jesus that makes this possible (Peterson et al. 2013, 334–335).

Inclusivists, it should be noted, differ on the conditions such “anonymous Christians” must meet. Some stipulate, for instance, that those who have never heard “the gospel” still have both some innate knowledge of God and the freedom to establish a relationship with God and, therefore, that the eternal destiny of those in this category is dependent on the extent to which they commit as much as they know of themselves to as much as they know of God through, or even apart from, a religion other than Christianity. Other inclusivists don’t want to be as specific, maintaining only that, because God is just, there will surely be some adherents of other religions who will be in God’s presence because they have met some set of divine conditions they have it within their power to meet. But all agree these “anonymous Christians” are the recipients of supernatural grace.

Murtadha Mutahhari is a respected proponent of Muslim inclusivism. He maintains that non-Muslims are at a disadvantage because it is the Islamic Divine Law that leads people to God. Those who fully understand this law (Islam) but choose not to accept the truth will be damned. However, in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence, God will be merciful to those who seek the truth but from whom, through no fault of their own, the reality of Islam remains hidden. Such people cannot be called unbelievers; they are rather “dispositional Muslims” since it is possible to possess the requisite spirit of submission without being Muslim in name. These individuals will receive the divine grace necessary to achieve salvation from Hell (Mutahhari 2006; Legenhausen 1997). Others go so far as to question whether Muslims can justifiably be exclusivists (Aijaz 2014).

Salvific pluralists, however, find such reasoning no more convincing than that offered by exclusivists. Inclusivists are right, pluralists grant, to say that individuals need not necessarily know of or fulfill certain requirements normally specified in a given religion to attain salvation. But inclusivists, like exclusivists, are wrong to argue that this salvation is, itself, possible only because of certain conditions or events described in the one true religion. There is no one true religion and, therefore, no single path to eternal existence with God.

Why, though, ought we consider this pluralistic salvific hypothesis more plausible than that offered by the exclusivist or inclusivist? According to Hick, the most influential proponent of pluralism, three factors make a pluralistic perspective the only plausible option. First, and foremost, he argues, is the reality of transformation parity. An efficacious salvific process is not just other-world centered—does not simply give individuals a “ticket” to eternal existence with God. It begins “the transformation from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness” in this life (Hick 1984, 229). That is, an efficacious salvific process changes lives in the sense that it begins to turn people from thinking about, and acting only to enhance, their own personal well-being to viewing themselves as responsible participants in a much greater, more expansive reality. In short, an efficacious salvific process makes its participants better people. And all the evidence we have, Hick maintains, shows that many religions are equally transformational, given any general standard for positive transformation we might want to consider (Hick 1989, chapter 3).

There continues to be debate, however, over whether the same basic personal transformation actually does occur within various religions—over whether there is real transformational parity. Few claim that there is a strong experiential basis for denying such transformational parity or that it can be demonstrated on other objective, nonquestion-begging grounds that such parity does not exist. However, proponents of many basic theistic systems claim that while transformational parity may appear to be the case, this is actually not so—that is, claim that the transformation within their systems actually is qualitatively different than that produced by allegiance to other systems. It is sometimes argued, for instance, that the transformation within other systems will not last, or at least that this transformation, while possibly real and even lasting for a given individual, is not what it could have been for that individual within the one true theistic system. And some exclusivists have argued that unless it can be demonstrated in an objective, nonquestion-begging sense that they are not justified in affirming a religious perspective that makes such claims (which even Hick does not attempt to demonstrate), they are justified in denying that such parity actually exists (Clark 1997, 303–320).

It can also be argued that focusing on transformational parity can be used as an argument against salvific pluralism. The basis for this claim is the fact that people making a “secular” (non-religious) commitment to some goal, value, or metaphysical perspective—be it concern for the environment or world hunger or emotional health—often appear to have their lives transformed in ways quite similar to the ways in which the lives of religious believers are transformed. They, too, appear to have changed from self-centeredness to a focus on reality outside of self. If this is so, however, then might it not be that the religious transformational parity we observe is simply a sub-set of the general transformational parity we find among individuals who commit themselves to any perspective on life that centers reality outside of self, and thus that it is just as plausible to assume that all religious transformational parity is the result of some form of internal conceptual realignment than the result of some form of connection with an external divine reality? And if this is the case, then transformational parity is at least weakened as support for any salvific perspective, whether pluralistic, inclusivistic, or exclusivistic.

Seeming transformational parity is not, however, Hick’s only reason for believing non-pluralistic salvific perspectives to be untenable. A credible perspective, he tells us, must account for the fact, “evident to ordinary people (even though not always taken into account by theologians) that in the great majority of cases—say 98 to 99 percent—the religion in which a person believes and to which he adheres depends upon where he was born” (Hick 1980, 44). Given this fact—given that “religious allegiance depends in the great majority of cases on the accident of birth”—it seems implausible to hold that “being born in our particular part of the world carries with it the privilege of knowing the full religious truth” (Hick 1997a, 287).

This contention, though, has also been challenged. No one denies that the admittedly high correlation between where and when individuals are born and the religious perspective they affirm is relevant and might in fact negatively affect an exclusivist’s confidence. But many exclusivists deny that a pluralistic explanation should be seen as the only plausible option. As they see it, exclusivists need not consider the high place-time/religious allegiance correlation in question in isolation from other relevant beliefs. For example, Christian exclusivists need not consider this correlation in isolation from their basic belief that the Bible is an authoritative source of truth and that the Bible teaches that only the Christian perspective contains a totally accurate view of reality. And it is justifiable, some maintain, for exclusivists to consider the plausibility of such relevant background beliefs to outweigh the seeming counterevidence posed by the correlation in question (Plantinga 2000, 187; Plantinga 1997, 198).

Finally, Hick argues, a credible religious hypothesis must account for the fact, of which “we have become irreversibly aware in the present century, as the result of anthropological, sociological, and psychological studies and the work of philosophy of language,” that there is no one universal and invariable pattern for the interpretation of human experience, but rather a range of significantly different patterns or conceptual schemes “which have developed within the major cultural streams.” When considered in this light, a “pluralistic theory becomes inevitable” (Hick 1984, 232).

While no one denies that culture shapes reality to some extent, it can again be argued that when comparing the plausibility of specific beliefs, we must consider not only these specific beliefs themselves but also the basic background beliefs in which they are embedded. Thus, even if we grant that a pluralistic response to the obvious shaping power of culture is preferable to any exclusivistic response when such shaping power is considered in isolation, it isn’t clear that exclusivists must acknowledge that Hick’s hypothesis is so strong that it renders implausible the whole set of basic background beliefs out of which the exclusivist’s response to the profound shaping influence of culture on religious belief arises. Hence, it isn’t clear that exclusivists can’t justifiably reject Hick’s contention that a pluralistic cultural/religious interpretation of reality must inevitably be considered superior.

Hick argues for salvific pluralism on what might best be called metaphysical or epistemological grounds. Other philosophers, however, have attempted to make a moral case for salvific pluralism (or at least against salvific exclusivism.) For instance, Kenneth Himma has argued that moral considerations require Christian salvific exclusivism to be rejected (Himma 2002, 1–33). It follows both from God’s perfection and conceptual truths about punishment, Himma maintains, that God would not punish individuals who are not morally culpable for their behavior. But those with non-Christian beliefs are generally not morally culpable for the fact that they hold these beliefs. Not only is it not the case that any objective line of reasoning demonstrates the Christian (or any other religious) path to salvation to be the correct one, religious traditions are, themselves, extremely elastic. That is, because of the shaping, foundational nature of basic religious belief, devout proponents of any given religion are capable of (in fact, usually simply find themselves) offering self-consistent responses to almost any challenge to their salvific perspective, no matter how strong or damaging this challenge might seem on the surface. Furthermore, sociological, psychological, and anthropological studies have confirmed that while one’s basic religious beliefs are not inevitable, they are quite often to a significant extent “beyond the direct volitional control of the believer” (Himma 2002, 18). So we must conclude, argues Himma, that it would not be morally just for the Christian God to deny salvation to devout people of other faiths.

Not surprisingly, many inclusivists and pluralists will find this basic line of reasoning persuasive. However, some (although not all) exclusivists reject the basic moral assumption on which Himma’s argument is based: that we are in a position to correctly identify some of the basic moral principles that guide God’s interaction with us as humans. Specifically, while many Christian exclusivists do believe that God’s behavior is guided by the same basic principles of justice and fairness that are so fundamental to our human moral thinking, this is not true for all. There is a strong Christian tradition that holds that God is under no obligation to treat any individual in what we would consider a just, fair fashion. God can do what God wants (including how God responds to those who haven’t affirmed Christian beliefs) for whatever purposes God has. What God does is right simply because God does it. [ 9 ] Even among those Christian exclusivists who come to acknowledge Himma’s basic point—that a just God cannot condemn those who aren’t culpable for their non-Christian beliefs—the response has normally not been to reject their overall exclusivistic perspective. It is often simply assumed, rather, that “God’s ways are above our ways” in some manner unfathomable to the human mind.

However, even if we were to agree with pluralists that both exclusivists and inclusivists are wrong to claim that the basis for true salvation can be found in only one religion, the question of what type of pluralistic hypothesis we ought to affirm remains. Hick, himself, favors what might be called a selective pluralism that centers on the world’s great religions. Hick has never denied that the major world religions—Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam—make conflicting truth claims. In fact, he believes that “the differences of belief between (and within) the traditions are legion” and has often discussed these conflicts in great detail (Hick 1983, 487). His basic pluralistic claim, rather, is that such differences are best seen as differing ways in which differing cultures have conceived of and experienced the one ultimate divine Reality. Each major religious perspective “constitutes a valid context of salvation/liberation; but none constitutes the one and only such context” (Hick 1984, 229, 231).

Why, however, select only the paths offered by the world’s great religions as ways to salvation? For Hick, the answer lies in the fact that, unlike “Satanism, Nazism, the Order of the Solar Temple, etc.,” the world’s great religions offer paths that lead us away from “hatred, misery, aggression, unkindness, impatience, violence, and lack of self-control” to love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control (Hick 1997b, 164). Some, though, see this sort of ethical standard for acceptable salvific perspectives to be as arbitrary as the standard for acceptable paths to salvation set forth by exclusivists or inclusivists (Meeker 2003, 5). In fact, some have questioned whether, given this rather specific ethical criterion for assessing the salvific adequacy of religions, Hick’s perspective should actually be considered pluralistic at all.

S. Mark Heim, for instance, argues that pluralists such as Hick are really inclusivists in disguise in that they advocate only one path to salvation—the transformation from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness—and thus in essence deny that diverse religions have real, fundamental salvific differences. A better, more honest salvific pluralism, we are told, is to acknowledge that each religion has its own path to salvation that may be either similar to or different from that of other religions. That is, a more honest pluralistic perspective is to deny that the seemingly different salvific paths offered by various religious traditions are all just culturally distinct manifestations of the same fundamental path and maintain instead that salvific paths of various religions remain incompatible, but equally valid ways to achieve salvation. It is acknowledged that this is not to say, of course, that all the details of all the salvific paths are actually true since some of the relevant claims are inconsistent. But the appropriate response to this is not to claim there is one true path to salvation. It is rather to claim that many distinct paths, while remaining distinct, can lead to salvation (Heim 1995).

Critics, however, wonder whether part of this seeming disagreement is verbal in nature. Heim can appear to be bypassing the question of whether there is some sort of final, ultimate eschatological salvific state that the proponents of various religious perspectives will all experience, emphasizing rather that many distinct religious paths can liberate people (produce salvation) here and now (Peterson et al. 2013, 333). Hick, on the other hand, seems most concerned with the nature of salvific reality—with what it means to experience salvation—while not denying that there exist in this world distinct ways that remain distinct to access this ultimate reality.

Public education in Western culture has always been to some extent a “melting pot.” [ 10 ] But the increasing number of students with non-Western cultural values and religious traditions is causing public school educators to grapple in new and sometimes uncomfortable ways with the challenges such diversity poses. Some of these challenges are practical—e.g., should Muslim girls be allowed to wear hijabs, should schools designate only Christian religious holy days as school holidays? The focus of this section, however, will be a pedagogical question of increasing interest in the philosophy of education: How ought the increasing religious diversity to which students are exposed affect public school curricula?

Most public school educators agree that increasing student understanding of diverse religious perspectives is important as this will have positive social outcomes. It is often argued, for instance, that helping students better understand the increasing diversity, including religious diversity, they face will better prepare them to live in a peaceful, productive manner with those with differing cultural and/or religious values (Kunzman 2006).

Many educators, however, want to go further. It is also important, they maintain, for students to clarify their feelings about other religions and their followers. Specifically, they want to foster a more empathetic understanding of other religious perspectives, an understanding that encourages students to appreciate the other religions from the perspective of an adherent of that religion (Kunzman 2006). While few challenge this as a valid goal, there is, though, continuing controversy over one common method by which educators attempt to engender this type of empathy in students. As some see it, while having students think about diverse religions is an important step past the mere dissemination of factual information toward empathetic understanding, having students directly experience these religions in some way—for instance, having students visit a local mosque or having a representative from a Hindu Temple share with students in a class—is also necessary (or at least very desirable). Not surprisingly, though, while no one denies that these forms of direct experience might broaden a student’s empathetic understanding of a religion, concerns have been raised.

First, some believe that having students experience a religion, even as “observers,” can test the limits of the separation of church and state. While the intent of having students attend a mosque or having a Buddhist talk with students is seldom to “promote” a religion, the line between “exposure” and intended or unintended promotion (and even proselytization), they maintain, is a fine one. This is especially the case given the widely varying communication skills and deeply embedded values and preconceptions of the teacher and/or the representatives of a given religion to whom students might be exposed. Second, there is growing ethical concern that to experience a religion as an observer might in some cases trivialize or demean the religion in question. Some Native Americans, for instance, are becoming increasingly concerned with the growing desire of “outsiders” to seek understanding of their religion(s) by watching or experiencing sacred ceremonies since such observation, they believe, can trivialize these ceremonies (Kasprisin 2003: 422).

Is it justifiable for the public school educator to go even further than the dissemination of accurate information and the attempted engendering of empathetic understanding? Specifically, ought an educator attempt to bring it about that all students affirm a core set of “appropriate” beliefs about other religions and their adherents?

It is clearly the case that almost all public school educators currently do attempt to bring it about that students hold certain beliefs related to pervasive human characteristics, such as race, gender, and disabling conditions. Students are encouraged, for instance, to continue to believe, or come to believe, that engaging in intolerant or discriminatory behavior is wrong and that they should affirm, or come to affirm, the inherent worth and rights of the disabled, those of other racial/ethnic backgrounds, etc. So if the desire is simply to also encourage students to believe it wrong to treat those of other religions in intolerant or discriminatory ways and to believe it right to accept those of other religions as persons with equal inherent value, few will object.

However, need teachers stop there? Might there not be other beliefs about religions and their adherents that public school educators can justifiably attempt to bring it about that all students accept? We can extrapolate from some work on religious diversity by Robert Wuthnow to introduce two beliefs that some might propose fit into this category. As Wuthnow sees it, the most appropriate response to the increasing religious diversity we face in the United States is what he labels “reflective pluralism” (Wuthnow 2005: 286–307). To engage in this sort of reflection, he tells us, is not simply to become better informed, or to strive to “live peacefully with those with whom one disagrees” (be tolerant), or even to attempt to develop an empathetic understanding of diverse religions. It is to engage intentionally and purposefully with “people and groups whose religious practices are fundamentally different from one’s own” (Wuthnow 2005: 289). And such engagement, as he understands it, includes both (1) the recognition that since all of our beliefs, including our religious beliefs, depend on a point of view “shaped by the culture in which we live,” we should not regard our “own position[s] as inherently superior” and (2) “a principled willingness to compromise” in the sense that we must be willing to move out of our social and emotional comfort levels “in order to arrive at a workable relationship with another person” (Wuthnow 2005: 292).

The benefit of this form of engagement, we are told, is not only that it can minimize the likelihood of the sorts of “religious tensions, conflicts, and violence [that] have been so much a part of human history” (Wuthnow 2005: 293). Such reflective engagement also allows us to focus on “the shared concerns for basic human dignity” found in the teachings of many of the world’s religions, which can furnish a basis for inter-religious cooperation to combat social ills and meet basic social needs (Wuthnow 2005: 294).

It is important to note that Wuthnow does not explicitly claim or deny that encouraging students in a public school setting to become reflective pluralists would be appropriate. But not only does he highlight two increasingly popular pluralistic claims about religions—(1) that the beliefs of many religions are equally valid expressions of faith, expressions that adherents of these religions should be allowed or even encouraged to maintain and (2) that religious believers of all faiths should identify and focus on what these religions have in common—he highlights what such pluralists often note as the main benefits of widespread affirmation of these beliefs: a reduction in violent religious conflicts and an increase in socially beneficial inter-religious cooperation. And these outcomes are clearly quite compatible with what we have seen to be a key reason why public school educators want to increase student understanding of other religions—namely, their desire to better prepare students to live in a peaceful, productive manner in social contexts that will increasingly be characterized by religious diversity. Accordingly, since it seems reasonable to believe that widespread acceptance of the validity of diverse religious perspectives and increased focus on the commonalities in diverse religions might well result in more peaceful, mutually beneficial interaction among followers of diverse religions, the question of whether public school teachers can justifiably attempt to bring it about that students affirm the beliefs in question appears worthy of exploration.

Let’s first consider the contention that many religions contain equally valid expressions of faith. Even if we make the debatable assumption that this is true, it won’t be clear to many that public school teachers could justifiably attempt to bring it about that their students believed this to be so. The problem is that various religions affirm conflicting doctrinal beliefs on significant issues. For example, while conservative Christians maintain that one must affirm certain beliefs about the saving power of Christ to spend eternity in God’s presence, conservative Muslims strongly deny this. Orthodox Christians and Muslims are taught not only that the sacred scriptures of other religions contain false beliefs; they are often encouraged to try to convert those of other religions to their religious perspective. And while many Muslims and Christians believe in a personal supernatural creator and personally immortality, some Buddhists deny both. This, however, means that an educator can justifiably attempt to convince students that all religions are equally valid expressions of faith only if she or he can justifiably attempt to convince conservative proponents of some of these religions that some of their core doctrinal beliefs need to be modified or rejected. To attempt to do this in a public school setting will be seen by many as violating the prohibition against both restricting the free exercise of religion and promoting a given religion (Basinger 2010)

Might it not, though, at least be justifiable for a public school educator to encourage students to respect the right of adherents to other religions to retain their current religious beliefs? If we interpret this as asking whether an educator can justifiably encourage students not to attempt to prohibit adherents to other religions from expressing and acting in accordance with their beliefs, a positive response is noncontroversial since this is only to say once again that educators should encourage students to be tolerant. However, to encourage respect for the religious beliefs of others often carries with it the explicit or implicit assumption that it is inappropriate, if not unethical, to attempt to convince adherents of one religion to convert to another. And for a public school educator to attempt to convince all students that it is wrong to proselytize will again be seen by some as placing this educator in the legally and morally questionable position of attempting to convince some students to reject or modify what for them is a very fundamental, core religious belief.

Perhaps, however, there is a different, less controversial option for those educators who want to do more than simply encourage tolerance of expression and empathetic understanding. Is it not at least justifiable for the public school teacher to attempt to point out the important common values affirmed by most of the world’s major religions, values that we can all accept and should all desire to see lived out? Is it not justifiable for an educator to point out, for instance, that most of the world’s major religions prohibit such things as killing, lying, stealing, dehumanizing racism, and sexual exploitation, and that these same religions encourage such things as helping those in need and treating adherents of other religions with respect. To do so, it has been argued, would not simply be of value within the classroom or community. Since religious convictions clearly influence social, political, and economic activity on a global scale, emphasizing the shared common values of religions has the potential to facilitate better global relationships. And to encourage such relationships is surely an appropriate goal of public education (Shingleton 2008).

Some, of course, will see any focus on “positive commonalities” as yet another thinly veiled attempt to encourage students to modify their current religious beliefs in ways that make such beliefs more accommodating of other religious perspectives. However, most see no legal or ethical reason why a teacher should not expose students to the “positive commonalities” in diverse religious perspectives, and many see this as a helpful step.

As we have seen, discussions of religious diversity lend themselves to no easy answers. The issues are many, the arguments complex, and the responses varied. It would be hard, though, to overstate the practical significance of this topic. While some (many) issues that philosophers discuss have practical implications for how we view ourselves and treat others, none is more relevant today than the question of religious diversity. Religious convictions have not only motivated impassioned behavior in the past—behavior that has affected significantly the lives of many—such convictions clearly continue to do so today. So continuing philosophical discussions of religious diversity that clarify issues and assess arguments have the potential to be of great practical value.

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• Global Religious Diversity

Half of the Most Religiously Diverse Countries are in Asia-Pacific Region

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• Methodology

Several years ago, the Pew Research Center produced estimates of the religious makeup of more than 200 countries and territories, which it published in the 2012 report “ The Global Religious Landscape .” The effort was part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which analyzes religious change and its impact on societies around the world. As part of the next phase of this project, Pew Research has produced an index that ranks each country by its level of religious diversity.

Comparing religious diversity across countries presents many challenges, starting with the definition of diversity. Social scientists have conceived of diversity in a variety of ways, including the degree to which a society is split into distinct groups; minority group size (in share and/or absolute number); minority group influence (the degree to which multiple groups are visible and influential in civil society); and group dominance (the degree to which one or more groups dominate society). Each of these approaches can be applied to the study of religious diversity. 1

This study, however, takes a relatively straightforward approach to religious diversity. It looks at the percentage of each country’s population that belongs to eight major religious groups, as of 2010. 2 The closer a country comes to having equal shares of the eight groups, the higher its score on a 10-point Religious Diversity Index.

The choice of which religious groups to include in this study stems from the original research that was done for “The Global Religious Landscape” report. That study was based on a country-by-country analysis of data from more than 2,500 national censuses, large-scale surveys and official population registers that were collected, evaluated and standardized by Pew Research staff and, in the case of European countries, by researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria.

In order to have data that were comparable across many countries, the study focused on five widely recognized world religions – Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism – that collectively account for roughly three-quarters of the world’s population. The remainder of the global population was consolidated into three additional groups: the religiously unaffiliated (those who say they are atheists, agnostics or nothing in particular); adherents of folk or traditional religions (including members of African traditional religions, Chinese folk religions, Native American religions and Australian aboriginal religions); and adherents of other religions (such as the Baha’i faith, Jainism, Shintoism, Sikhism, Taoism, Tenrikyo, Wicca and Zoroastrianism).

Some efforts to measure religious diversity have attempted to take into account subgroups of the major religious traditions. 3 The main challenge in looking at religious diversity in this way is the serious data limitations for subgroups within religions other than Christianity. For most countries, Pew Research was able to generate estimates for four main types of Christians – Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and the remainder as an “other” category. 4 For some countries with large Muslim populations, Pew Research has estimated the size of two main subgroups – Sunnis and Shias – but these are only approximations, expressed in ranges. 5 Beyond Christians and Muslims, cross-national demographic data on religious subgroups are generally not available. For this reason, the study is limited to the eight major categories described above.

As noted in previous Pew Research reports, some of the faiths that have been consolidated into the “folk religion” and “other religion” categories have millions of adherents around the world. However, in the overwhelming majority of countries, these religions are not specifically measured in censuses, large-scale surveys or population registers.

Religious Diversity Index

The Religious Diversity Index is a version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is commonly used in environmental and business studies to measure the degree of ecological diversity or market concentration. The main difference is that Religious Diversity Index scores are inverted so that higher scores indicate higher diversity. (For more details on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the methods used to calculate the Religious Diversity Index scores, see the Methodology .)

The 10-point Religious Diversity Index is divided into four ranges: Countries with scores of 7.0 and higher (the top 5%) are categorized as having a “very high” degree of religious diversity. Countries with scores from 5.3 to 6.9 (the next highest 15% of scores) are categorized as having a “high” level of diversity. 6 Countries with scores from 3.1 to 5.2 (the following 20% of scores) are categorized as having “moderate” diversity, while the rest are categorized as having “low” diversity.

How Countries Ranked

Looking at the percentage of each country’s population that belongs to the eight major religious categories included in the study, 12 countries have a very high degree of religious diversity. Six of the 12 are in the Asia-Pacific region (Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, China and Hong Kong); five are in sub-Saharan Africa (Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Ivory Coast, Benin and Mozambique); and one is in Latin America and the Caribbean (Suriname). No countries in Europe, North America or the Middle East-North Africa region have a very high degree of religious diversity as measured in this study.

Of the 232 countries in the study, Singapore – an island nation of more than 5 million people situated at the southern tip of Malaysia – has the highest score on the Religious Diversity Index. About a third of Singapore’s population is Buddhist (34%), while 18% are Christian, 16% are religiously unaffiliated, 14% are Muslim, 5% are Hindu and <1% are Jewish. The remainder of the population belongs to folk or traditional religions (2%) or to other religions considered as a group (10%).

According to the new index, the United States has a moderate level of religious diversity, ranking 68th among the 232 countries and territories included in the study. Counting both adults and children, Christians constitute a sizable majority of the 2010 U.S. population (78%). Of the seven other major religious groups, only the religiously unaffiliated claim a substantial share of the U.S. population (16%). 7 All other religious groups combined account for about 5% of Americans. (The U.S. would register as considerably more diverse if subgroups within Christianity were counted. 8 )

By contrast, France has a high degree of religious diversity, ranking 25th among the 232 countries. Christians make up 63% of France’s 2010 population, and two other groups account for sizable shares: the religiously unaffiliated (28%) and Muslims (8%). Iran, whose population is almost entirely Muslim, falls into the low diversity category.

To see how all 232 countries scored on the Religious Diversity Index, see Appendix 1 (PDF) .

Religious Diversity by Region

Religious diversity differs substantially by geographic region. Among the six regions analyzed in this study, the Asia-Pacific region has the highest level of religious diversity, followed by sub-Saharan Africa. Europe and North America have a moderate level of religious diversity, while the Latin America-Caribbean and Middle East-North Africa regions have a low degree of religious diversity.

To see Religious Diversity Index scores for countries and regions, see Appendix 2 (PDF) and Religious Diversity Index Scores by Country table . That appendix also includes the percentage of each country’s population that belongs to each of the eight major religious groups in the study. For more information on the size, share and geographic distribution of each of the major religious groups, see Pew Research’s 2012 report “ The Global Religious Landscape .”

• See Johnson, Todd M. and Brian J. Grim. 2013. Chapter 3: Religious Diversity. The World’s Religions in Figures: An Introduction to International Religious Demography. Wiley-Blackwell, pages 93-108. The Pew Research study builds on the methodology developed by Johnson and Grim, a former senior researcher at the Pew Research Center. ↩
• Membership in each religious group is based on self-identification. It relies on the number of people around the world who view themselves as belonging to various religious groups. The study does not attempt to measure the degree to which members of these groups actively practice their faiths or how religious they are. For definitions of the religious groups, see the Pew Research Center’s December 2012 report “ The Global Religious Landscape .” ↩
• See Grim, Brian J., Vegard Skirbekk, and Jesus Crespo Cuaresma. 2013. “Deregulation and Demographic Change: A Key to Understanding Whether Religious Plurality Leads to Strife.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion volume 9, article 8. ↩
• See the Pew Research Center’s December 2011 report “ Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Christian Population .” ↩
• For more information, see Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates in the Pew Research Center’s October 2009 report “ Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population .” ↩
• In this report, 16% of countries ended up in the “high” category because of tie scores. ↩
• As noted in the text, the figures in this report are for 2010. The Pew Research Center’s latest religious affiliation estimates for the U.S. show that just under 20% of the adult population is religiously unaffiliated, part of a trend toward disaffiliation that has accelerated over the past five years. For more information, see the Pew Research Center’s July 2013 report “ Growth of the Nonreligious ” and October 2012 report “ ‘Nones’ on the Rise .” Note, however, that Pew Research surveys include only adults ages 18 and older, while Pew Research demographic estimates take into account people of all ages. For more details, see “Age Structure Procedures” in the Methodology of the December 2012 report “ The Global Religious Landscape .” ↩
• For more information on the religious breakdown of U.S. adults, see the Pew Research Center’s 2008 report “ U.S. Religious Landscape Survey .” ↩

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How to Write a College Diversity Essay – Examples & Tips

What is a diversity essay for college?

If you are preparing for your college application, you have probably heard that you sometimes need to submit a “diversity essay,” and you might be wondering how this is different from the usual admission essay. A diversity essay is a college admissions essay that focuses on the applicant’s background, identity, culture, beliefs, or relationship with a specific community, on what makes an applicant unique, and on how they might bring a fresh perspective or new insights to a school’s student body. Colleges let applicants write such essays to ensure diversity in their campus communities, to improve everyone’s learning experience, or to determine who might be eligible for scholarships that are offered to students from generally underrepresented backgrounds. 

Some colleges list the essay as one of their main requirements to apply, while others give you the option to add it to your application if you wish to do so. At other schools, it is simply your “personal statement”—but the prompts you are given can make it an essay on the topic of diversity in your life and how that has shaped who you are.

To write a diversity essay, you need to think about what makes you uniquely you: What significant experiences have you made, because of your background, that might separate you from other applicants? Sometimes that is obvious, but sometimes it is easy to assume our experiences are normal just because we are part of a community that shares the same circumstances, beliefs, or experiences. But if you look at your life from the perspective of someone who is not part of that community, such as an admissions officer, they can suddenly be not-so-common and help you stand out from the crowd.

Diversity Essay Examples and Topics

Diversity essays come in all shapes and formats, but what they need to do is highlight an important aspect of your identity, background, culture, viewpoints, beliefs, goals, etc. You could, for example, write about one of the following topics:

• Your home country/hometown
• Your cultural/immigration background
• Your race/ethnicity
• Your unique family circumstances
• Your religion/belief system
• Your socioeconomic background
• Your disability
• Your sex/gender
• Your sexual orientation
• Your gender identity
• Your values/opinions
• Your experiences
• Your extracurricular activities related to diversity

In the following, we ask some general questions to make you start reflecting on what diversity might mean for you and your life, and we present you with excerpts from several successful diversity-related application essays that will give you an idea about the range of topics you can write about.

How does diversity make you who you are as a person or student?

We usually want to fit in, especially when we are young, and you might not even realize that you and your life experiences could add to the diversity of a student campus. You might think that you are just like everyone around you. Or you might think that your background is nothing to brag about and are not really comfortable showcasing it. But looking at you and your life from the point of view of someone who is not part of your community, your background, culture, or family situation might actually be unique and interesting. 

What makes admission committees see the unique and interesting in your life is an authentic story, maybe even a bit vulnerable, about your lived experiences and the lessons you learned from them that other people who lived other lifes did not have the chance to learn. Don’t try to explain how you are different from others or how you have been more privileged or less fortunate than others—let your story do that. Keep the focus on yourself, your actions, thoughts, and feelings, and allow the reader a glimpse into your culture, upbringing, or community that gives them some intriguing insights. 

Have a look at the excerpt below from a diversity essay that got an applicant into Cornell University . This is just the introduction, but there is probably no admissions officer who would not want to keep reading after such a fascinating entry. 

He’s in my arms, the newest addition to the family. I’m too overwhelmed. “That’s why I wanted you to go to Bishop Loughlin,” she says, preparing baby bottles. “But ma, I chose Tech because I wanted to be challenged.” “Well, you’re going to have to deal with it,” she replies, adding, “Your aunt watched you when she was in high school.” “But ma, there are three of them. It’s hard!” Returning home from a summer program that cemented intellectual and social independence to find a new baby was not exactly thrilling. Add him to the toddler and seven-year-old sister I have and there’s no wonder why I sing songs from Blue’s Clues and The Backyardigans instead of sane seventeen-year-old activities. It’s never been simple; as a female and the oldest, I’m to significantly rear the children and clean up the shabby apartment before an ounce of pseudo freedom reaches my hands. If I can manage to get my toddler brother onto the city bus and take him home from daycare without snot on my shoulder, and if I can manage to take off his coat and sneakers without demonic screaming for no apparent reason, then it’s a good day. Only, waking up at three in the morning to work, the only free time I have, is not my cup of Starbucks.  Excerpt from “All Worth It”, Anonymous, published in 50 Successful IVY LEAGUE Application Essays Fourth Edition, Gen & Kelly Tanabe, SuperCollege, 2017 .

How has your identity or background affected your life?

On top of sharing a relevant personal story, you also need to make sure that your essay illustrates how your lived experience has influenced your perspective, your life choices, or your goals. If you can explain how your background or experience led you to apply to the school you want to submit the essay to, and why you would be a great fit for that school, even better. 

You don’t need to fit all of that into one short essay, though. Just make sure to end your essay with some conclusions about the things your life has taught you that will give the admissions committee a better idea of who you now are—like the author of the following (winning) admissions essay submitted to MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) .

[…] I always thought that I had it the worst out of all my family members because I was never allowed to get anything lower than what my brother or a cousin had gotten in a class. My parents figured if they could do it, so could I, and if not on my own then with a little of their help. It was not until recently that I realized the truth in this. In my short life I have seen my father go from speaking no English to excelling in it. I have heard countless stories about migrant farmers such as Cesar Chavez and my grandfather who had nearly nothing, yet persisted and succeeded. […] When I had trouble speaking Spanish and felt like abandoning my native tongue, I remembered my mother and how when she came to the United States she was forced to wash her mouth out with soap and endure beatings with a ruler by the nuns at her school for speaking it. When I couldn’t figure out tangents, sines, and cosines I thought about my father and how it took him nearly a year to learn long division because he was forced to teach it to himself after dropping out and starting to work in the 4th grade. […] All these people, just from my family, have been strong role models for me. I feel that being labeled “underprivileged” does not mean that I am limited in what I can do. There is no reason for me to fail or give up, and like my parents and grandparents have done, I’ve been able to pull through a great deal. My environment has made me determined, hard working, and high aiming. I would not like it any other way. From “Lessons From the Immigration Spectrum”, Anonymous, MIT, published in 50 Successful IVY LEAGUE Application Essays Fourth Edition, Gen & Kelly Tanabe, SuperCollege, 2017 .

How will your diversity contribute to the college campus and community?

The admissions committee would like to know how your identity or background will enrich the university’s existing student body. If you haven’t done so, researching the university’s organizations and groups and what specific courses the university offers might be a good idea. If you are applying to a large public school, you could mention that you are looking forward to broadening not just your horizon but also your community. Or maybe your college of choice has a specialized program or student organization that you feel you will fit right into and that you could contribute to with your unique background.

Tailoring your answer to the university you are applying to shows that you are serious and have done your research, and a university is obviously looking for such students. If you can’t find a way to make your essay “match” the university, then don’t despair—showing the admissions committee that you are someone who already made some important experiences, has reflected on them, and is eager to learn more and contribute to their community is often all that is needed. But you also don’t need to search for the most sophisticated outro or conclusion, as the following excerpt shows, from an admission essay written by an applicant named Angelica, who was accepted into the University of Chicago . Sometimes a simple conviction is convincing enough. 

[…] The knowledge that I have gained from these three schools is something I will take with me far beyond college. My roommate, across-the-hall mates, and classmates have influenced my life as much as I hope to have impacted theirs. It is evident to me that they have helped me develop into the very much visible person I am today. I have learned to step outside of my comfort zone, and I have learned that diversity is so much more than the tint of our skin. My small mustard-colored school taught me that opportunity and success only requires desire. I would be an asset to your college because as I continue on my journey to success, I will take advantage of every opportunity that is available to me and make sure to contribute as much as I can, too. Now I am visible. Now I am visible. Now I am visible, and I want to be seen. From “No Longer Invisible” by Angelica, University of Chicago, published in 50 Successful IVY LEAGUE Application Essays Fourth Edition, Gen & Kelly Tanabe, SuperCollege, 2017 .

Tell stories about your lived experience

You might wonder how exactly to go about writing stories about your “lived experience.” The first step, after getting drawing inspiration from other people’s stories, is to sit down and reflect on your own life and what might be interesting about it, from the point of view of someone outside of your direct environment or community.

Two straightforward approaches for a diversity-related essay are to either focus on your community or on your identity . The first one is more related to what you were born into (and what it taught you), and the second one focuses on how you see yourself, as an individual but also as part of society.

Take some time to sit down and reflect on which of these two approaches you relate to more and which one you think you have more to say about. And then we’d recommend you do what always helps when we sit in front of a blank page that needs to be filled: Make a list or draw a chart or create a map of keywords that can become the cornerstones of your story.

For example, if you choose the “community” approach, then start with a list of all the communities that you are a part of. These communities can be defined by different factors:

• A shared place: people live or work together
• Shared actions: People create something together or solve problems together
• Shared interests: People come together based on interests, hobbies, or goals
• Shared circumstances: people are brought together by chance or by events

Once you have that list, pick one of your communities and start asking yourself more specific questions. For example: 

• What did you do as a member of that community? 
• What kinds of problems did you solve , for your community or together?
• Did you feel like you had an impact ? What was it?
• What did you learn or realize ? 
• How are you going to apply what you learned outside of that community?

If, instead, you choose the “identity” approach, then think about different ways in which you think about yourself and make a list of those. For example:

My identity is as a… 

• boy scout leader
• hobby writer
• babysitter for my younger siblings
• speaker of different languages
• collector of insightful proverbs
• Japanese-American
• other roles in your family, community, or social sub-group

Feel free to list as many identities as you can. Then, think about what different sides of you these identities reveal and which ones you have not yet shown or addressed in your other application documents and essays. Think about whether one of these is more important to you than others if there is one that you’d rather like to hide (and why) and if there is any struggle, for example with reconciling all of these sides of yourself or with one of them not being accepted by your culture or environment.

Overall, the most important characteristic admissions committees are looking for in your diversity essay is authenticity . They want to know who you are, behind your SATs and grades, and how you got where you are now, and they want to see what makes you memorable (remember, they have to read thousands of essays to decide who to enroll). 

The admissions committee members likely also have a “sixth sense” about whose essay is authentic and whose is not. But if you go through a creative process like the one outlined here, you will automatically reflect on your background and experiences in a way that will bring out your authenticity and honesty and prevent you from just making up a “cool story.”

Diversity Essay Sample Prompts From Colleges

If you are still not sure how to write a diversity essay, let’s have a look at some of the actual diversity essay prompts that colleges include in their applications. 

Diversity Essay Sample #1: University of California

The University of California asks applicants to choose between eight prompts (they call them “ personal insight questions “) and submit four short essays of up to 350 words each that tell the admission committee what you would want them to know about you . These prompts ask about your creative side (#2), your greatest talent (#3), and other aspects of your personality, but two of them (#5 and #7) are what could be called “diversity essay prompts” that ask you to talk about the most significant challenge you have faced and what you have done to make your community a better place .

The University of California website also offers advice on how to use these prompts and how to write a compelling essay, so make sure you use all the guidance they give you if that is the school you are trying to get into!

UC Essay prompt #5. Describe the most significant challenge you have faced and the steps you have taken to overcome this challenge. How has this challenge affected your academic achievement?

Things to consider: A challenge could be personal, or something you have faced in your community or school. Why was the challenge significant to you? This is a good opportunity to talk about any obstacles you’ve faced and what you’ve learned from the experience. Did you have support from someone else or did you handle it alone?

UC Essay prompt #7. What have you done to make your school or your community a better place?  

Things to consider: Think of community as a term that can encompass a group, team, or place—like your high school, hometown, or home. You can define community as you see fit, just make sure you talk about your role in that community. Was there a problem that you wanted to fix in your community? Why were you inspired to act? What did you learn from your effort? 

Diversity Essay Sample #2: Duke University

Duke University asks for a one-page essay in response to either one of the Common Application prompts or one of the Coalition Application prompts, as well as a short essay that answers a question specific to Duke. 

In addition, you can (but do not have to) submit up to two short answers to four prompts that specifically ask about your unique experiences, your beliefs and values, and your background and identity. The maximum word count for each of these short essays on diversity topics is 250 words.

Essay prompt #1. We seek a diverse student body that embodies the wide range of human experience. In that context, we are interested in what you’d like to share about your lived experiences and how they’ve influenced how you think of yourself. Essay prompt #2. We believe there is benefit in sharing and sometimes questioning our beliefs or values; who do you agree with on the big important things, or who do you have your most interesting disagreements with? What are you agreeing or disagreeing about? Essay prompt #3. What has been your best academic experience in the last two years, and what made it so good? Essay prompt #4. Duke’s commitment to diversity and inclusion includes sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. If you’d like to share with us more about your identity in this context, feel free to do so here.

Duke University is looking for students with a variety of different experiences, backgrounds, interests, and opinions to make its campus community diverse and a place where ambition and curiosity, talent and persistence can grow, and the admissions committee will “consider what you have accomplished within the context of your opportunities and challenges so far”—make sure you tell them!

Diversity Essay Sample #3: University of Washington

The University of Washington asks students for a long essay (650 words) on a general experience that shaped your character, a short essay (300 words) that describes the world you come from and how you, as a product of it, might add to the diversity of your future university and allows you to submit additional information on potential hardships or limitations you have experienced in attaining your education so far. The University of Washington freshman writing website also offers some tips on how to (and how not to) write and format your essays.

Essay prompt [required] Tell a story from your life, describing an experience that either demonstrates your character or helped to shape it.

Short response prompt [required] Our families and communities often define us and our individual worlds. “Community” might refer to your cultural group, extended family, religious group, neighborhood or school, sports team or club, co-workers, etc. Describe the world you come from and how you, as a product of it, might add to the diversity of the UW.

Additional information about yourself or your circumstances [optional] You are not required to write anything in this section, but you may include additional information if something has particular significance to you. For example, you may use this space if:

– You have experienced personal hardships in attaining your education

– Your activities have been limited because of work or family obligations

– You have experienced limitations/opportunities unique to the schools you attended

The University of Washington’s mission is to enroll undergraduates with outstanding intellectual abilities who bring different perspectives, backgrounds, and talents to the campus to create a “stimulating educational environment”. The diversity essay is your chance to let them know how you will contribute to that.

Diversity Essay Sample #4: University of Michigan

At the University of Michigan, a diversity college essay that describes one of the communities (defined by geography, religion, ethnicity, income, or other factors) you belong to is one of two required essays that need to be submitted by all applicants, on top of the Common Application essay. 

Diversity essay prompt. Everyone belongs to many different communities and/or groups defined by (among other things) shared geography, religion, ethnicity, income, cuisine, interest, race, ideology, or intellectual heritage. Choose one of the communities to which you belong, and describe that community and your place within it.

The University of Michigan prides itself in “looking at each student as a whole package” and recruiting the most dynamic students, with different backgrounds, interests, and passions, into their college, not just the ones with the highest test scores. They also give consideration to applicants from currently underrepresented groups to create diversity on campus and enrich the learning environment for all students—if that sounds like you, then here is your opportunity to tell your story!

Frequently Asked Questions about Diversity Essays

What topics should i avoid in my college diversity essay.

Since the point of a diversity essay is to show the admissions committee who you are (behind your grades and resume and general educational background), there are not many topics you need to avoid. In fact, you can address the issues, from your own perspective, that you are usually told not to mention in order not to offend anyone or create controversy. 

The only exception is any kind of criminal activity, especially child abuse and neglect. The University of Washington, for example, has a statement on its essay prompt website that “ any written materials that give admissions staff reasonable cause to believe abuse or neglect of someone under the age of 18 may have occurred must be reported to Child Protective Services or the police. ”

What is most important to focus on in my diversity essay?

In brief, to stand out while not giving the admissions committee any reason to believe that you are exaggerating or even making things up. Your story needs to be authentic, and admissions officers—who read thousands of applications—will probably see right through you if you are trying to make yourself sound cooler, more mature, or more interesting than you are. 

In addition, make sure you let someone, preferably a professional editor, read over your essays and make sure they are well-written and error-free. Even though you are telling your personal story, it needs to be presented in standard, formal, correct English.

How long should a diversity essay be?

Every school has different requirements for their version of a diversity essay, and you will find all the necessary details on their admissions or essay prompts website. Make sure you check the word limit and other guidelines before you start typing away!

Prepare your college diversity essay for admission

Now that you know what a diversity essay is and how you find the specific requirements for the essays you need to submit to your school of choice, make sure you plan in advance and give yourself enough time to put all your effort into it! Our article How to Write the Common App Essay can give you an idea about timelines and creative preparation methods. And as always, we can help you with our professional editing services , including Application Essay Editing Services and Admission Editing Services , to ensure that your entire application is error-free and showcases your potential to the admissions committee of your school of choice.

For more academic resources on writing the statement of purpose for grad school or on the college admission process in general, head over to our Admissions Resources website where we have many more articles and videos to help you improve your essay writing skills.

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Religious Diversity: A Philosophical Defense of Religious Incluvism

2010, European Journal for Philosophy and Religion

Faced by the challenge of religious plurality, most philosophers of religion view pluralism and exclusivism as the most accepted and fully developed positions. Th e third alternative, the model of inclusivism, held especially within the catholic tradition, has not received adequate attention in the debates in philosophy of religion, perhaps as it is based solely on theological grounds. In this essay I off er a philosophical defense of the position of religious inclusivism and give reasons why this position represents the most appropriate position in the face of confl icting religious truth claims.

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Religious diversity is a key topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. One way religious diversity has been of interest to philosophers is in the epistemological questions it gives rise to. In other words, religious diversity has been seen to pose a challenge for religious belief. In this study four approaches to dealing with this challenge are discussed. These approaches correspond to four well-known philosophers of religion, namely, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The study is concluded by suggesting four factors which shape one’s response to the challenge religious diversity poses to religious belief.

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Religious Diversity: What Is the Issue?

Some General Reflections from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Religion

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• Perry Schmidt-Leukel  

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“ E xcuse me, but what’s the question? Isn’t religious diversity normal?” This is the title Rita Gross, an American scholar of religion, feminist, and practicing Buddhist, gave to one of her essays on religious pluralism. 1 One possible answer to her rhetorical question might be that not everything “normal” is unproblematic. Disease, for example, is certainly normal but is by no means unproblematic. We do not regard diseases as desirable; we try to avoid them, and once we get one, we take measures to get rid of it. Of course, what Gross has in mind is that a major part of the problem of religious diversity is the inability of the religions—or at least of some religions—to regard religious diversity as unproblematic. In this she is certainly right. 2 However, those religions may have a point. Why should they see religious diversity as unproblematic? As “normal,” sure. But hence unproblematic? This is far from clear. Critics of religion also consider religious diversity normal but not unproblematic. Therefore, we need to be specific about why and in what sense both religious people and their critics tend to regard religious diversity as problematic and to what extent their views have an impact on how to assess religious diversity.

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A Critical Look at Religious Diversity and Responding to Its Challenges

A Perspective on Religious Diversity

What Is Religion?

See R. Gross, “Excuse Me, but What’s the Question? Isn’t Religious Diversity Normal?” in The Myth of Religious Superiority. Multifaith Explorations of Religious Pluralism , Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2005), 75–7.

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I am much less confident on whether she is right in claiming that, by and large, religious diversity is of no problem to Buddhism. On this see P. Schmidt-Leukel, ed., Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions (St. Ottilien, Germany: EOS, 2008);

P. Schmidt-Leukel, ed., Buddhism and Religious Diversity (Critical Concepts in Religious Studies), 4 vols. (New York: Routledge, 2012).

Cf. William A. Christian, Meaning and Truth in Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 60ff., 86.

J. Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1993), 164.

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Cf. Robert Cummings Neville, Behind the Masks of God. An Essay Toward Comparative Theology (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1991).

Cf. B. Russell, “Is There a God?” (1952), available at http://www.cfpf.org.uk /articles/religion/br/br_god.html

Cf. A. Flew, There Is A God. How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York: HarperOne, 2007).

A. Flew, God and Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1966), 126.

This is the main thesis of J. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion. Human Responses to the Transcendent (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1989).

J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and Against the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 15.

On the classification of religious attitudes along those lines, see P. Schmidt-Leukel, “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism. The Tripolar Typology—Clarified and Reaffirmed,” in The Myth of Religious Superiority. Multifaith Explorations of Religious Pluralism , ed. P. Knitter, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2005), 13–27.

“The intolerance of almost all religions which have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary principle of polytheists.” Hume, A Natural History of Religion , IX. See also: Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), and, somewhat modified,

J. Assmann, Die mosaische Unterscheidung oder der Preis des Monotheismus (München, Germany: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003).

Cf. Langdon Gilkey’s description of religious pluralism as that “new understanding of plurality” which “includes and adds the concept of ‘parity,’ or ‘rough parity,’ to that of plurality.” L. Gilkey, “Plurality and Its Theological Implications,” in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Religions , ed. J. Hick and P. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987), 37–50, 37.

This implies an understanding of syncretism that includes a spectrum of forms: from crude mixing of select religious elements to a well-balanced and consistent acceptance of two different religious allegiances by one person. I treat both issues (multireligious identity and syncretism) in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4 of P. Schmidt-Leukel, Transformation by Integration. How Inter-faith Encounter Changes Christianity (London: SCM Press, 2009).

Quoted from: Nancy K. Frankenberry, ed., The Faith of Scientists in their Own Words (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 389. Religious justifications of force have been frequently analyzed. See, for example,

M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence , 3rd rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003);

C. Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (San Francisco: Harper, 2003);

P. Robinson, ed., Just War in Comparative Perspective (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003);

P. Schmidt-Leukel, ed., War and Peace in World Religions (London: SCM, 2004);

M. E. Marty, When Faiths Collide (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005);

H. Avalos, Fighting Worlds. The Origins of Religious Violence (New York: Prometheus, 2005);

A. Sharma, ed., The World’s Religions after September 11. Vol. 1: Religion, War, and Peace (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009). One of the earliest—and perhaps best—analyses can be found in Sections 1 and 2 of

J. Kelsay and S. B. Twiss, eds., Religion and Human Rights (New York: Project on Religion and Human Rights, 1994).

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About this chapter

Schmidt-Leukel, P. (2013). Religious Diversity: What Is the Issue?. In: Schmidt-Leukel, P., Gentz, J. (eds) Religious Diversity in Chinese Thought. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137318503_2

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Tariq Modood

Thomas sealy, november 12th, 2024, how should states govern religious diversity key insights from our new book.

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Estimated reading time: 6 minutes

As we enter Interfaith Week, Tariq Modood and Thomas Sealy share their analysis of religious diversity around the world.

Religious diversity is a key feature of countries across the world today, but it also presents governments with very real challenges. Controversies around free speech, religious symbols in public institutions, social values and morals, minority rights, racism, nationalism, the rise of populism, and the role of faith leaders as critical voices are just a few of the issues that have given rise to fierce social, political, and scholarly debate. So how do states include and accommodate religious diversity, and should this change? What are the key difficulties facing states when it comes to governing religious diversity? This is the context of our book, The New Governance of Religious Diversity .

The book is oriented by two questions: an empirical one of how states govern religious diversity, and a normative one of how, in our view, religious diversity should be governed. Indeed, our approach is oriented by a position that sees the relationship between the empirical and normative as one of close entwinement.

Eschewing Euro-Americancentric perspectives that define secularism in terms of religious freedom in general, or treat a particular country as a paradigm (typically the USA or France), we argue there are multiple secularisms, present across different global contexts.

We apply it to two regions, comprising: four countries in Western Europe (Belgium, Britain, France and Germany) and three countries in South and South East Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia). Our strategy is to approach each region, indeed country, contextually and to argue that the two regions have to be respected as embodying two different modes of governance. We do not rank one above the other or make one approximate the other, though we do think each can learn something from the other. We approach that kind of learning via a multicultural normative evaluation. This leads us to the view that moderate secularism becomes multicultural by being open to a certain multicultural, inclusive ‘thickening’, while pluralistic nationalism becomes multicultural through an inclusive ‘thinning’. Our analytical framework is not designed to merely capture specific countries or enable comparative empirical understanding. It also constitutes the basis for a normative engagement with modes of secularism. Our empirical-normative interdisciplinarity, what may be called normative sociology or normative social science, is based on the Bristol school of multiculturalism . And so, we ask ourselves what the situation would be if secularism were to be multicultural.

States do and must necessarily make choices, pass legislation, and develop policies to govern religious diversity and the social and political issues that follow. According to some sources, government restrictions on religion have been rising globally ( Pew Research Center, 2022 ). While some of this trend has been presented in our study, we have also shown that different states, especially in Europe, engage with religion in new, accommodating styles. There are several notable and sometimes divergent factors that lie behind these findings, including matters of religious freedoms, equalities, and nationalisms.

Despite increased attention to a variety of global contexts in which the issue of political secularism is embedded, a sustained attempt at developing a comparative framework for these multiple political secularisms has not yet been made – let alone one that could account for different patterns of similarity, difference, and shifts over time. It offers an original theoretical framework for both comparatively analysing and evaluating, by reference to a political theory of multiculturalism, how religious diversity is governed within different modes of political secularism.

We start with a minimal definition of political secularism as the separation of political and religious authority and the subordination of the latter to the former. But above these, a whole variety of arrangements and dynamics might be present. One arrangement is institutional autonomy. The minimal definition itself is that of a one-way autonomy, in which the superiority of the state is asserted. But this could also be a two-way or mutual autonomy, in which state–religion connections are a significant feature.

Another important dimension is that of freedom of religion, where different emphases are to be found; a key difference being between freedom of conscience or freedom of belief on the one hand and, on the other hand, freedom to manifest or practice, and freedom to live according to one’s religious convictions. Another kind of distinction is the freedom of different religious groups to assert their rules versus the freedom of individuals to want freedom from such authority. A further significant dimension is that of national identity and how states relate to their citizens; to what extent is national identity conceived of in terms of one religion, for example, or in secular or plural terms?

These are the dynamics and questions that we have addressed throughout this book. In treating the governance of religious diversity in this manner, we are guided by an approach that is deeply contextual. Our minimal definition and our attention to the variety of and within these sets of dynamics have allowed us to analytically approach how political secularism operates in different contexts, including non-liberal contexts where the place of religion and its importance are very different, and where different historical, social, and political cultures mean that the relationship between religion and politics take very different forms.

Our analytical framework is not designed to merely capture specific countries or enable comparative empirical understanding. It also constitutes the basis for a normative engagement with modes of secularism. We do not rank the two regional modes of governance one above the other or make one approximate the other, though we do think each can learn something from the other. We approach that kind of learning via a multicultural normative evaluation. This leads us to the view that moderate secularism becomes multicultural by being open to a certain multicultural, inclusive ‘thickening’, while pluralistic nationalism becomes multicultural through an inclusive ‘thinning’. ‘Thickening’ here means extending the recognition and accommodation of religion, historically confined in Western Europe, to one or more Christian churches, to the new post-immigration religious formations, such as Muslims and Hindus, and revising national identity accordingly. While ‘thinning’ means not seeing citizens and social relationships as always mediated by a religious group identity and of defending individual freedom in relationship to religious authority.

Currently, both regions that are home to these two modes are threatened by majoritarian populist forces – threatened, that is, in their historical mode and, a fortiori, in the multiculturalising of that historical mode. This has been going on for longer in South and Southeast Asia than in Western Europe, and has become more intense and violent there. If the situation persists, multiculturalism will be a less likely prospect, or will be weakened. So, paradoxically, in each region the first step, albeit a minimal step, is to protect the historical mode against majoritarian populist nationalism. This falls short of our goal of achieving multiculturalism, but sometimes a conservative yet necessary step like this may be all that is possible.

Whatever optimism one can muster here about various parts of the world, we hope we have at least shown that rethinking secularism has to recognise that there is no single model of it (such as the idealised church–state separation) but that there are multiple secularisms. This rethinking must proceed contextually, yet without losing the aspiration to develop a comparative analytical framework, which should not be merely about categorisations or taxonomies but should be the intellectual framework in which citizens can evaluate the nature of their polities and the possibilities of reform in relation to the accommodation of diversity.

The New Governance of Religious Diversity is now available at Polity books. Use the code MOS30 for a 30% discount.

Photo by Catalin Pop

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE Religion and Global Society nor the London School of Economics and Political Science.  

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About the author

Tariq Modood FBA is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol.

Thomas Sealy is Lecturer in Ethnicity and Race at the University of Bristol.

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